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ABSTRACT 
India's friendly stance towards the USSR has greatly been exaggerated, 
misunderstood and misinterpreted in India and abroad. An examination of the 
subject appeared necessary in order to explain the nature, extent, direction and 
implications of India's relations with the USSR. An attempt has been made 
here to analyze India's policy towards the USSR and place it in proper 
perspective. 
The ever growing friendly relations between the two neighbours are the 
result of many factors such as the complementarily of their national interests 
and the constantly changing national and international situations. The Soviet 
Union's huge size, its vast potentialities and the geo-political situation 
compelled Indian leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, to realize, even 
before India attained independence, the need to develop close and friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
India's attitude towards the USSR has been derived from its overall 
foreign policy objectives. In understanding and evaluating this attitude, it is 
therefore, indispensable to keep in view two important considerations: first, the 
assumptions, motivations, style, basic goals and the principles of India's 
foreign policy which governed her relations with other States in general; 
second, the specific goals which India sought to achieve in her relations with 
the USSR. It is the inter-relationship between the general and the particular 
objectives and the degree of their combination as well as contradiction that give 
us an idea of the various phases of India's relations with the USSR. Such an 
analysis, however, should not be restricted merely to the conceptual level. 
The interaction of such other factors as intimate geographical, historical and 
economic ties between the two States, the influence of external factors and the 
failure or success of Indian diplomacy at the international level should also 
constitute a part of the analysis. 
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The news of the Russian Revolution made an impact on India. It became 
a source of inspiration to the people in their struggle for freedom. They realised 
that the effects of the October Revolution would not be confined to Russia. 
Since the revolution was "against imperialism it might somehow help the 
movement for Indian independence which, with Mahatma Gandhi's advent on 
the Indian scene, was taking a new turn." As pointed out in Montague 
Chelmsford Report: The JRevoJutJon in Russia in its beginning was regarded in 
India as a triumph over despotism ... it has given an impetus to Indian political 
aspirations. The Indian press as well as the political leaders generally showed a 
lively interest in the October Revolution and the new state. It would not be out 
of place here to refer to the comments in some of the leading newspapers and 
periodicals, particularly those associated with the nationalist movement. 
The impact of the Russian Revolution on Indian nationalist intellectuals 
was sensitively reflected in the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru. As a matter of 
fact, Nehru's thinking was the most important factor in bringing about a 
transformation in the Indian nationalist attitude towards the USSR. Nehru held 
a prominent position in the Indian National Congress. He exhibited lively 
academic interest in the scientific outlook of Marxism as an interpretation of 
history. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that his attraction for Marxism was 
confined to its broad features rather than to its fine points. At no time he could 
be termed a doctrinaire Marxist. His intellect was too independent to be 
subjected to the rigid discipline of any dogma. Gandhi's influence reinforced 
his dislike for violence. 
The shift in Soviet policy came soon after Stalin's death, almost 
as soon as Malenkov came to power the Soviet ceased being hostile to India. In 
a speech to Supreme Soviet on 8 August 1953, Malenkov said: 'The position of 
sucfi a considerabfe state as India is of great importance for strengthening of 
peace in the East'. Recognizing India's role in ending the Korean War, he said. 
"We hope that relatioP^ between India and Soviet Union would continue to 
develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote". 
The USSR prop^^^^ India's name for a Neutral Nation's Commission to 
supervise the ceasefirP i^ Indo-China. Form 1954 onwards the USSR also 
worked for the inclusiO'^  °f India in all international forums on disarmament. 
For instance it callec^ ^^  ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ addition of the Communist China, 
Czechoslovakia and Irt^'^ ^^  ^ ^^  UN's Disarmament Commission. 
The Soviet reapP'"'''^ ''*' of India's role in world affairs coincided with the 
increase in Indo-AmeH^^ differences. Deep, abiding frictions arose between 
India and the United States on issues such as recognition of Red China, the 
Japanese Peace TreatV' the Kashmir dispute and the formation of military 
alliances in South East Asia by the United States of America. 
The signing ^^ Pakistan-US military pact in May 1954 marked a 
watershed in Indo-So^iet relations. India's reaction to the alliance was sharp. 
Indian leaders and pre^s bitterly criticized the agreement. Nehru who had tried 
to prevent the Asian i^ountries from being dragged in the cold war expressed 
deep concern. Accor^ '^^ 'g to Indian leaders the US military assistance to 
Pakistan would chan^^ the entire regional balance of power and Pakistan 
would be inflated out ^f all proportions to her size. 
Nevertheless despite his outspoken opposition to the US- Pakistan Pact 
and later on to the S^^^^^ Nehru did not publicly mention the acclaim his 
stand was receiving f(^^ the Russians. The praise of Communist nations was 
probably embarrassing to him as it nurtured a belief in the West that India was 
moving towards an a^^^^Pt^ nce of the Communist bloc line in world affairs. 
Nehru wanted a mod^s vivendi with the Communist world but not at the 
expense of rapidly wofsening relations with the West. 
It is worth noting that shortly after the Geneva Conference Indo-Soviet 
contacts increased markedly. India accepted the Soviet offer of assistance for 
her Second Five Year Plan. It may be inferred that Nehru attached considerable 
significance to the Soviet behaviour at Geneva. The atmosphere between New 
Delhi and Moscow began to clear rapidly after the negotiated settlement on 
Indo-China at the Geneva Conference. 
In September 1954, the Soviet Union made an unexpected and dramatic 
offer to build a giant steel plant in India to help and to develop its iron and steel 
industry. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India's readiness 
to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would "go a long way in the 
rapid industrialization of our country". He also regarded the Soviet offer as a 
welcome alternative source for the supply of capital and machinery and also a 
bargaining counter to the West. On 2nd February 1955 the USSR and India 
signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet assistance for the 
construction of a giant steel mill at Bhilai. The agreement came at a time when 
a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was bogged down on technical 
grounds. 
In mid-1959 border clashes took place between India and China. After 
maintaining a long silence on the Sino-Indian dispute, the Soviet Union came 
out with a cryptic statement on 8th September, 1959 in the TASS. The USSR 
had friendly relations with both China and India, built respectively on 
"fraternal ties" of international socialism and 'friendly' collaboration in 
accordance with the idea of peaceful co-existence. It expressed the hope that 
India and China with both of whom the Soviet Union enjoyed friendly relations 
would settle their disputes peaceably. In the following month, the third session 
of the Supreme Soviet while regretting the incidents between the two states 
friendly to it called for friendly negotiations for Solving the disputed frontier 
question. A week later, Khrushchev termed the entire dispute 'sad' and 
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'stupid' in as much as the area under contention had no strategic importance, 
nor was it even inhabitable. 
In September 1961, Nehru had paid another visit to Moscow. The 
Belgrade Conference of nonaligned states had entrusted the task of conveying 
the concern of nonaligned world to Nkrumah and Nehru, who was, in fact, to 
visit the USSR on his way back which was fixed earlier. The public enthusiasm 
for the Indian Prime Minister in Moscow did not match with that of his 1955 
visit. It confined chiefly to recalling previous meetings with Nehru. But he 
preferred to Icll Khrushchev that in the world in those chiys many new 
important problems have come up and he would be glad to discuss them with 
Khrushchev. In Moscow Nehru repeatedly stressed India's past and present 
opposition to nuclear experiments. He frankly told Khrushchev that the 
resumption of nuclear testing retarded disarmament talks and aggravated the 
international situation. In his major speech, Nehru told his audience at the Indo-
Soviet friendship rally what had happened at Belgrade and why he came to 
Moscow which was withheld from them by the Soviet media. 
The Soviet support to India's claims on Goa had been made public 
from the very outset. During their 1955 visit, the Soviet leaders had expressed 
the hope that Goa would soon become a part of India. The Soviet President 
Brezhnev, who was on a state visit to India at the time of Goa operation 
declared in Bombay that the Soviet Union had complete sympathy for the 
Indian people's desire to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese 
colonialism. On 8 December 1961 the day the world learnt of the liberation 
Brezhnev assured a civic reception of firm Soviet support for the action. The 
Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev sent a telegram to Nehru saying that the 
resolute action of the Government of India to do away with the outposts of 
colonialism in its territory was absolutely lawful and justified." He declared 
that the Soviet people unanimously approve of these actions. When the 
Westerners brought forward a resolution in the Security Council to censure 
India, the USSR blocked it with a prompt Veto. The Soviet delegate contended 
that his vote 'represented a victory for the true principles of UN Charter: 
"Today saw the expression of the will to defend colonial countries and peoples 
and their right to life, freedom and independence." 
The Indian Government and public were greatly appreciative of the 
profound sympathy and understanding of its aspirations by the USSR. The 
Soviet stand on Goa certainly helped in drawing India closer to the USSR and 
helped in consolidating the friendly tics. 
The death of Nehru in May, 1964 did not adversely affect the growing 
relationship between India and the Soviet Union, In fact, the relationship was 
sought to be consolidated by Lai Bahadur Shastri, when as the new Indian 
Prime Minister, and he paid an official visit to Moscow from 12 to 19 May, 
1965. This was the time when the Indo-Pak conflict over the Rain of Kutch was 
developing. Shastri declared in Moscow that the Indian and Soviet peoples 
were already "united together by genuine, strong and abiding bonds of 
friendship" relying "not upon any temporary expedients, but upon Ihc sincere 
realization that the larger interests of humanity can be served best by promoting 
and enlarging the area of peace". His pronouncements as well as the Joint 
Communique on the Shastri-Kosygin talks underlined that this relationship was 
not directed against any third country and opposed interference in any 
country's internal affairs. These were a direct allusion to Pakistan in the 
context of the developments in South Asia at that period of time. What is more, 
the two sides denounced the savage US bombing on North Vietnam and called 
for its halt forthwith. 
After Shastri's death immediately following the Tashkent accord, Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi took over the reins of power in India becoming the third Prime 
Minister of the Republic. Her first official visit to Moscow in that capacity 
lasted four days-from 12 to 16 July, 1966. Her speeches in the Soviet capital 
reflected her devotion to safeguard peace, a legacy of her father-something that 
has found concrete manifestation in her deeds over the years. The Joint 
Communique at the end of her talks with the Soviet leaders reaffirmed their 
common goal of ensuring peace and highlighted the need to renounce the use 
of force in inter-state relations. It urged an immediate end to the US bombing 
of North Vietnam and abolition of military alliances. It also emphasized the 
need for consolidation of peace in Europe, solution of the German problem, 
elimination of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and apartheid in South Africa 
and Rhodesia and realization of nuclear disarmament. 
The year 1971 added a new dimension to both the political 
landscape of South Asia and Indo-Soviet relations. The West Pak 
authorities' brutal suppression of the East Pakistani people's aspirations for an 
independent state was directly responsible for the birth of a new state-the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh-in the first half of the year. This coincided 
with the developing Sino-US alliance punctuated by Kissinger's secret mission 
to Beijing via Islamabad and the declaration of US President Richard Nixon's 
plea to visit China. As the influx of refugees to India escaping from Yahya 
Khan's brutalities continued, war clouds gathered on the horizon with the 
concretization of the sinister Sino-US-Pak axis to keep India at bay and ensure 
Islamabad's domination over Dacca. It was then that in order to defend peace 
and security in the subcontinent and raise Indo-Soviet ties to a qualitatively 
higher level that on August 9, 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation was signed in New Delhi. The treaty provided for 
immediate Indo-Soviet consultations in the event of an attack or threat of 
aggression to remove such a threat and ensure peace and security of the 
countries, while at the same time upholding the Indian policy of non-alignment 
Soviet regard for which was expressively spelt out. 
Within less than a year, there was a change of leadership in India 
following Mrs. Gandhi's defeat at the hosting Morarji Desai, who succeeded 
her as the country's fourth Prime Minister, was reportedly averse to the Indo 
Soviet Treaty and initially sought to have it abrogated. This was, however, 
prevented by others running the Government and Desai, too. realized the 
importance of maintaining the relationship between the two States in the spirit 
of the Treaty. His visit to the USSR in October, 1977 found the Soviet leaders 
including Brezhnev extending a warm welcome and generous hospitality to 
him as a mark of tribute to India. The visit helped to underscore the continuity 
of Indo-Soviet relations. 
In 1980, Mrs. Gandhi returned to power with a thumping majority and 
Brezhnev came to India in December of that year. There was much to discuss, 
for world peace had suffered setbacks with grievous blows dealt on detente by 
revanchists of the Western military circles. SALT II was in cold storage, the 
arms race was spiraling, tensions had mounted in South-West Asia with the 
entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the after math of Sino-US-Pak plot to 
overthrow the Kabul Government as a direct interference in Afghan affairs and 
in South-East Asia with the Chinese attack on Vietnam following the liberation 
of Kampuchea from Pol Pot's inhuman yoke. The Iraq-Iran war was continuing 
and the Arab world stood divided after Egypt's betrayal at Camp David. Nearer 
home, Pakistan was being armed to the teeth by' the US, posing a new threat to 
India. 
The visit of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Soviet Union from 
September 20 to 26, 1982, like her earlier ones, was yet another milestone in 
the ftirther strengthening of Indo-Soviet relations. The talks of the Indian and 
Soviet leaders showed the close identity of views of the two countries on many 
international issues, particularly the preservation of peace and avoidance of a 
nuclear war. They were alarmed over the growth of the arms race, the 
emergence of new seat of tension and the proclamation of new military 
doctrines justifying a nuclear war. The Soviet and Indian people hold that today 
there is nothing which is more important than the preservation of peace. 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation mentioned 
earlier, was renewed in 1991 for a further period of 20 years. This was a proof 
of sustained ties between the two countries, and, in a way, brought India under 
the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The Cold War had ended at the end of 1989, but a 
new environment had been created in the Soviet Union by various reforms 
initiated by Party General Secretary Gorbachev. Meanwhile, in India the power 
was transferred from Rajiv Gandhi led Congress Government to a minority 
Janata Dal Government. After a brief period of lack of warmth. Prime Minister 
V.P. Singh paid a visit to the USSR in 1990. This renewed the warmth in the 
bilateral relations. The Soviet position on Kashmir was reiterated. It was 
decided to renew the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and it was decided to continue 
till 1995 the rupee-rouble trade arrangement. Thus, Indo-Soviet relations 
showed mature and stable friendship. 
During 1990-91, India generally supported the position taken by the 
Soviet Union in the Gulf crisis. India, like the Soviet Union, had decided to 
fiirther consolidate relations with the PLO and yet initiated steps to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel. A minor irritant was noticed when Chandra 
Shekhar Government allowed refueling facilities to US war planes flying 
towards the Gulf during the war. 
Despite his best efforts, when Gorbachev failed to achieve the objectives 
he had view particularly improvement in the economy, settlement of ethnic 
differences and rehabilitation of the administrative machinery through his two 
pet concepts glasnost and perestroika, he decided to give a chance to anew 
move. This he wanted to do through the signing of a Union Republican treaty 
which he proposed to get signed on 21 August 1991.This treaty sought to 
provide for a new decentralized set up in which the republics would be given 
more autonomy in a loose federation. The glasnost and Perestroika, despite its 
limitations has great impact on the thinking on foreign affairs. The Soviet 
decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan from 15 February 1989 
represented a significant and crucial event in the rapid ideological, foreign and 
domestic reforms undertaken by Gorbachev. The Soviet withdrawal was 
important internationally because it bolstered the existing forces for reforms in 
the Soviet bloc. 
The year 1991 saw numerous changes in the erstwhile Soviet Union and, 
what were known as its satellite states in Eastern Europe. Communism 
collapsed and democratic governments were installed one after the other in 
most of the East European countries. In the Soviet Union itself the reforms 
initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev had tremendous impact on the society and the 
people aspired for and got full democratic rights. In a country that had totally 
controlled economy and politics for 70 years, Perestroika and Glasnost gave a 
new shape to the Soviet economy and politics. But the reforms also led to the 
end of monopoly of power of the Communist Party and introduction of multi-
party democracy. An attempt in August 1991 to overthrow the reformist 
Gorbachev and restoration of communist power miserably failed. During the 
period of crisis in the USSR, India made a serious error by commenting that it 
would deal with the new government in USSR because overthrow of 
Gorbachev by the hardliners was the internal matter of that country. When the 
coup failed and Gorbachev came back to power, India faced a very 
embarrassing situation. 
The Soviet Union suddenly disintegrated in December 1991 and the 
mighty state of USSR was replaced by 15 Republics. Russian Republic as 
recognized by the international community as the successor state of USSR. At 
the time of disintegration, a loose union of erstwhile Soviet republics was 
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created and called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). India has 
maintained friendly and cooperative relations not only with Russian Federation 
but also the other Members of CIS. 
Thus the 'collapse of the Soviet Union' leaves a vacuum in the 
international political system. The Soviet Union played an important role 
against imperialism and Western expansionism. It supported national liberation 
movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, 
which found themselves against the Western bloc of countries. 
India decided to upgrade its relations with the three Soviet republics 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine in order to provide direct dialogue with 
through diplomatic channel. It was felt in India that in view of Gorbachev's 
greater preoccupations with domestic economic and political issues, he would 
not be able to give much thought to the third world countries including India. 
Since the USSR was involved in Afghan crises, its first concern was to end the 
Mujahideen nuisance which it hoped to do with the active support of Pakistan. 
Moscow would have to be a little more liberal in extending economic aid to 
Pakistan and also to adopt a more pro-Pakistani attitude towards Kashmir. This 
may be at the cost of India but the Soviet Union had to look to its own national 
interests. 
In the non-economic areas also the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
affected India adversely. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important 
implications are in defense and military areas. India, as we know, was buying a 
very large number of military weapons, equipment and hardware from the 
Soviet Union. These included Mig fighter aircrafts, battle tanks, submarines 
etc. During 1986-90, according to one estimate, about 73 percent of the total 
value of arms imported by the Indian defense forces originated in the Soviet 
Union. Practical difficuhies which confront Indian armed forces since 1991 
include, replacement of the spare parts as well as replenishment of the existing 
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stock. The matter assumed such a seriousness that the Defense Minister of 
India, Sharad Pawar, had to rush to Russia In Sept. 1992 to bail out the armed 
forces of its immediate difficulties. At the end of the visit while there was some 
hope in the improvement of the situation, it was evident that ultimately India 
will have to explore ahemate sources. It was felt that Mascow may not be in a 
position to meet the Indian demands as paucity of funds may force Russians to 
close down their units. Besides, many of the Russian scientists and technocrats 
are reported to have left the country and got jobs in the Western countries 
where they are promised better salaries and employment opportunities. 
Whatever, existing military weapons and hardware are in stock in the member 
states of CIS. They would like to sell them in the Western markets In order to 
earn foreign exchange. Above all, one significant advantage which accrued to 
India in procuring armaments and equipment from the Soviet Union i.e., on 
credit, was most unlikely to be revived. 
Although Russia has put forward a proposal of military collaboration 
with India, but the harsh reality was that Moscow did not feel the strategic need 
of India in the post Cold War period. As a matter of fact decline in the strategic 
significance of India to Moscow began with the improvement of relations 
between the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, when Gorbachev started 
giving priority to good relations with the West which was to provide loans and 
technologies, there was a sea change in the geo-strategic perceptions of the 
Soviet Union. Now when Russia was strategically integrated with Europe and 
China has ceased to be a socialist rival, need for a strategic consensus with 
India did not have the same relevance as in the previous two decades. In brief, 
diplomatically India could not hope to depend on Russia to the same extent as 
she did on the Soviet Union. 
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Gradually the obstacles were overcome to an extent, and from 1997 
onwards Russia was again on the way towards establishing a special position in 
the supply of defense-related equipment. 
India and Russia decided in March 1997 to continue defense ties 
into the 21st century and Russia offered a new air defense system and a $10 
billion military deal. Significant agreements were reached during Yevgeny 
Primakov's visit in December (1999) when cross-century defense relationship 
was formalized. Described as "cooperation 2010 Document" it envisaged 
partnership in research, development and joint production of sophisticated 
equipment besides incorporating other defense areas. 
The defense ties expanded phenomenally between 1999-2000. India 
contracted to purchase, among other items, 40 super class jet fighters, Sukhoi 
SU-30K, of which the first installment came last year. It may be noted that this 
was the modem jet fighter that had not even been fully inducted into the 
Russian air force and that China had been supplied only SU-27.29 Russia was 
also set to supply state-of-the-art T-90 battle tanks. 
Defense Minister George Fernandez went to Moscow in June 2000 
to negotiate new defense deals. He described his discussions with the Russian 
President and the Russian Defense Minister as "path-breaking" with a $400 
million deal for the supply of 100 T-90 main battle tanks (MBT) and for the 
production of another 200 MBT in India. It was also agreed that Russia would 
complete delivery of SU-30 MKI fighter jets to India by 2003 as part of an 
earlier $1 .8 billion contract. The fighter jets would also be produced under 
license in India. 
Vladimir Putin's visit to New Delhi led to an agreement on Indo-
Russian cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The earlier 
agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply of giant atomic power plants 
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with a capacity of 1000 Mw. at Koodaniculam, I'amilnadu had been signed in 
May 1998. It was the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and General Secretary 
Milkhail Gorbachev who had initiated the agreement. 
Russian President Putin urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) during his visit to India. India has in any case stopped further 
nuclear testing since May 1998. Putin made his plea on the CTBT in a meeting 
with scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Trombay near 
Mumbai. He did however; appreciate the Indian stand that its natural interests 
and the needs of its people should also be considered, Yet Putin fell it would be 
better for India if it were to sign the CTBT. 
There is in the present era- division between Moscow and New Delhi on 
Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control issues. Russia and China are two 
major powers who are both members of the UN Security Council as also a 
member of the NPT regime. Their strategic cooperation on military and 
nuclear issues is necessitated by the need to reduce tensions and concentrate on 
economic development, Russia would also favour the emergence of a Russia-
India-China Iriangulation of cooperation. The idea has as yet to take shape 
because neither India nor China would like to be freed from the bilateral 
arrangement that presently exists with the lone superpower the United States. 
Putin's visit to BARC exemplifies Russia's evolving position on 
military- technical cooperation with India. He was the first Russian leader to 
tour BARC, joining only two other foreign leaders before, Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou-en-Lai and British Prime Margaret Tharatcher.Putin's high-
powered 70-member delegation, which included Deputy Prime Minister, Uya 
Klebanov, Foreign Ministe Igor Ivanov and Defense Minister Igo Sergeyev, 
attests to the importance the Russians give India in this new phase of their 
defense industrial strategy. Let us now turn to some aspect of Indo-Russian 
cooperation in science and technology. New avenues and areas of economic 
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scientific and technical cooperation between India and Russia are being 
explored. A renewed Integrated Long-Term Programme (ILTP) for Indo-
Russian cooperation in science and technology for instance is being actively 
considered. 
The ILTP programme, signed by the President of erstwhile Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 
Moscow in 1987, lasted till the year 2000. It has emerged as the world's largest 
technology. This programme is a reflection of the close cooperation in science 
and technology that has developed between India Russia over the last 13 years. 
The programme had facilitated exchange visits of over 2,500 scientists and 
generated about 300 developments projects in India and Russia. 
After the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry warned Pakistan, in strict terms, to stop cross-border 
terrorism and create conducive atmosphere for bilateral dialogue and 
consultation. To jointly tackle the menace of terrorism, during the visit of 
Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2001, India and Russia 
signed the Moscow Declaration. 51 They set up joint working group during the 
visit of President Putin to India in December 2002. Moscow strongly 
condemned the terrorist attack that took place on 26 March 2003 in the 
Nandimarg village of Kashmir, killing more than twenty people. Besides 
condemning the terrorist attack, the Department of Information and Press of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its support to the measures taken by India 
to stop the activity of terrorist forces. 
Taking into account all these positive developments, il would be logical 
to emphasize the point that terrorism is one of the important contributory 
factors for perceptional convergence between the two countries. This 
convergence led Russia and India to support each other on their stands on 
Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. The Ministry of External Affairs in India 
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praised the referendum of March 2003 in Chechnya, under the guidance of the 
Russian government as important for the restoration, normalization, 
rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Russian Federation's Chechen 
republic within the democratic framework. Similarly, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry release after the general election in Kashmir in October 2002, said 
that, very fact of holding elections is an evidence of the striving of Delhi and 
the population of Jammu and Kashmir to restore the normal situation in the 
state. Despite the attempts of the extremist elements to frighten the population 
of Kashmir, they could not hinder the voting. 
The last quarter of 2003 witnessed some positive developments in 
economic relations between the two countries. The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) opened its office at the Russian Chambers of Commerce and 
industry in October 2003 to facilitate the process of economic cooperation. 
During the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2003, 85 
Indian businessmen accompanied him to study the prospects of investment and 
joint collaborations with Russian companies. Amit Mitra, Secretary General of 
FICCI (Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), 
accompanying the prime minister during the visit, estimated that the bilateral 
trade might reach $5 billion by 2005. He said: such a breakthrough could be 
made through close cooperation in oil and gas industry, telecommunications 
and information technology, metallurgy and energy. 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, the then India's Petroleum Minister visited 
Moscow in October 2005 to discuss India's energy requirements with Russia. 
He welcomed Gazprom's (Russian firm) interest in the Iran-Pakistan-India 
pipeline (IPI), A 10-member high-level delegation of Gazprom arrived in 
Islamabad in October 2005 to begin formal discussion on the construction of 
the $ 7 billion Iran- Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, and an ambitious project 
of gas storage in Pakistan. It was the first visit of the Chairman of Gazprom to 
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Pakistan, the world's largest gas producing company with over 20 per cent 
share in global gas production. 
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit in May 2005, both 
countries decided to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG) on Economic 
Cooperation to look into the feasibility of the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA). On the Kudankulam issue, the Prime 
Minister sought to allay fears of President Putin on the nuclear fuel falling into 
wrong hands and said a Bill to prevent its misuse would be introduced in the 
Indian Parliament. The Indian Cabinet had already Okayed the Bill. During 
Manmohan Singh's visit to Moscow in December 2005 to attend the sixth 
bilateral summit, President Putin said, "We have been successfully cooperating 
in nuclear energy and Kudankulam nuclear power project is an example. We 
see India taking necessary steps to build relations with the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG)". Prime Minister Singh observed that there was a vast potential 
for expansion of cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy given India's 
growing energy requirements and the importance of nuclear energy as a clean 
and viable alternative energy source. Some of the most 'significant and 
promising areas' of cooperation identified during the visit were energy, 
telecom and transportation. 
During Prime Minister Singh's visit an agreement was signed on 
technology safeguards while implementing the long-term cooperation in the 
area of joint development, operation and use of the Russian global navigation 
satellite system Glonass. G Madhavan Nair, Secretary, Department of Space 
and A Perminov, Director, Russian Federal Space Agency signed the 
agreement. This agreement envisages launching of Glonass satellite using 
GSLV launch vehicle of India. In turn, Russia will provide access to Glonass 
system signals for Indian use. It also envisages joint development of user 
equipment for exploitation of Glonass signals for commercial purposes. The 
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agreement opens the road for the implementation of a 2004 agreement on joint 
design and 'launching of Glonass communication satellites, which will be used 
by both countries for civilian and military purposes. 
No country can be fully self-reliant in all areas of defence-related 
technology. Moreover, the today trend is towards joint development and 
production of defence equipment. According to the emerging opinion in the 
Indian strategic community the country must be self-reliant in areas where 
technology denial regimes are imposed, like nuclear and missile technologies. 
India may concentrate on developing and further expanding the areas of her 
core competence. In other areas, the country may opt for overseas partners, 
including Russia. Joint development and production of new weapon systems 
may emerge as a very promising area of continued Indo-Russian cooperation. It 
may provide continuity and stability to existing ties. Advanced avionics and 
electronic systems developed by Western countries and Israel may also be 
incorporated as is already being done. Competition among the suppliers may 
indeed be good and has already produced beneficial results. There is a need to 
handle the emerging situation with dexterity and savoir by giving attention to 
details and nuances. In the pursuit of its enlightened national inlcrcsis, it is to 
be expected that India would seek to leverage its position as a major defence 
buyer, and so would Russia as a supplier. 
In the 21st century geopolitical scenario has totally changed. India's ties 
with Russia will continue to be driven by not only common strategic and 
geopolitical interests but also shared interest in the defence sector. They would, 
however, need to adjust policies wherever necessary for enhancing mutual 
gains in this vital sector if they want to sustain a robust relationship in the new 
global environment. 
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PREFACE 
Nehru once said, "Russia is our neighbour, there can be either amity 
or enmity. Indifferences are out of the question." Thus India's relations with 
Russia can be traced back into history and legend. Allover Indo-Russian 
relations one finds numerous symbols of these ancient ties and strategic 
considerations. Indian philosophy, culture, religion, and language all these 
left an abiding impact on Russia. Indeed Indian and Chinese cultural 
influences met in the oulreaches of Russia, 'rhercforc India's relations with 
Russia are of abiding importance to her. It was with this understanding that 
the state occupied a central place in India's foreign policy prospect!ves and 
consideration. The central theme of my thesis is to survey and critically 
analyse India's Relations with Russia: 1992-2002.A period of great stress 
and significance after the dramatic Collapse of Soviet Union. 
The thesis consists of four chapters and the conclusion. 
The first chapter of the thesis deals with historical, political, 
economic and strategic importance of Russia. Russian importance to India in 
terms of its foreign policy objectives and its strategic interest that India has, 
for the security environment of Russia is based on its broad foreign policy 
framework. China as a factor in Indo-Soviet relations, Soviet support to 
India on Goa and Kashmir issues and relations between the two countries 
during the period of Stalin and Brezhnev have been discussed in detail. 
Nehru as the architect of India's foreign policy has also been taken into 
account. 
The second chapter refers to disintegration of Soviet Union, its causes 
and impact on India has been dealt with in detail. Emerging trends in Indo-
IV 
Russian relations and Indo-Russian cooperation in the field of defence, 
science and technology have also been discussed. 
The third chapter takes into account Indo-Russian strategic and 
economic collaboration in the Post Cold war era. Shift in the Soviet policy 
and the Cold War dynamics, its attitude towards Kashmir issue, the Yehsin 
period have also been examined. Military and Technical Cooperation 
between the two countries and Indo-Russian economic collaboration have 
also been discussed in details.. 
The fourth chapter provides an insight into the emergence of defence 
collaboration between India and Russia in the context of changing 
international and regional scenario. India's nuclear test and Russian 
response, signing of intellectual property rights (IPR) agreement etc have 
also been discussed in detail. 
The study has made use of all the available official documents on the 
subject. I have also utilized Indian and Russian articles, newspapers, books 
and other publication written by eminent scholars on the subject. 
The methodology adopted is primarily analytical, it has become 
historical wherever historical prospectives were necessary to arrive at right 
and logical conclusions. 
V 
CHAPTER-1 
Introduction 
BACKGROUND OF INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS 
India's friendly stance towards the USSR has greatly been exaggerated, 
misunderstood and misinterpreted in India and abroad. An examination of the 
subject appeared necessary in order to explain the nature, extent, direction and 
implications of India's relations with the USSR. It is all the more essential as 
there is a noticeable tendency among some quarters to gloss over certain events 
and decisions which do not fall in line with their own view and heavily 
underscore those which do so. An attempt has been made here to analyze 
India's policy towards the USSR and place it in proper perspective. 
The ever growing friendly relations between the two neighbours are the 
result of many factors such as the complementarily of their national interests 
and the constantly changing national and international situations. The Soviet 
Union's huge size, its vast potentialities and the geo-political situation 
compelled Indian leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, to realize, even 
before India attained independence, the need to develop close and friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union. 
Ihe changing pattern of Indo-Soviet relations from 1953 onwards and 
the analysis of the forces and factors which influenced the course of events. 
India's attitude towards the USSR has been derived from its overall foreign 
policy objectives. In understanding and evaluating this attitude, it is therefore, 
indispensable to keep in view two important considerations: first, the 
assumptions, motivations, style, basic goals and the principles of India's 
foreign policy which governed her relations with other States in general; 
second, the specific goals which India sought to achieve in her relations with 
the USSR. It is the inter-relationship between the general and the particular 
objectives and the degree of their combination as well as contradiction that give 
us an idea of the various phases ol' India's relations with the USSR. Such an 
analysis, however, should not be restricted merely to the conceptual level. 
The interaction of such other factors as intimate geographical, historical and 
economic ties between the two States, the influence of external factors and the 
failure or success of Indian diplomacy at the international level should also 
constitute a part of the analysis.' 
.lawaharlal Nehru, popularly known as the architect of India's foreign policy, 
had a clear idea of what a country's foreign policy shall be. It must sub serve 
its interests, both economic and political. On numerous occasions, he declared 
that economic policy would determine foreign policy. He stated: 
Let us not imagine that foreign policy is like a 
game of chess played by superior statesmen 
sitting in their chancelleries. It is much more 
complicated than that, for it is governed by the 
aspirations of hundreds of millions of people 
whose economic needs and objectives are 
motivated by a variety of causes. . . Foreign 
policy is thus no more a matter, as in the olden 
days, of siding with one power against another in 
return for some territorial possession or 
advantage. 
India under Nehru's leadership decided to expedite an historical process 
which by the very fact of India's independence was known to be well under 
way. India realised the difficulties, the non-self-governing people were facing 
in overthrowing the colonial rule. The achievement of freedom by India made 
it necessary for her to follow a policy of resisting colonialism throughout the 
world.^  The opposition to colonialism in turn is directed to lend help and 
support to the dependent peoples in the achievement of their freedom. This 
policy was manifested in the Asian Relations Conference, the Asian 
Conference on Indonesia, and in the meetings of the Colombo Powers which 
initiated the Bangdung Conference. Nevertheless, a closer examination of 
India's foreign policy in this regard reveals that in everyone of these cases 
whether in her support to independence movements as in Indonesia or her 
hesitation to support them fully, as in the initial stages of the Suez Crisis, 
India's policy has been first of all a policy of protecting her security and other 
vital interests. India demonstrated selectivity in championing the causes of 
dependent peoples. She refused to condemn Soviet colonialism in Eastern 
Europe. India's attitude towards the Soviet colonialism was the product of the 
lack of experience with the Soviet Union as against the experience with 
Western colonialism. In fact, India's championship of subjected people was not 
based on moral grounds alone. It was part of India's strategy to safeguard 
India's independence and security.'' 
Nehru was utterly realistic in his assessment of foreign affairs. The 
proof of India's independence for Nehru was the posture of non-alignment in 
foreign relations. At the time of India's attainment of independence the world 
was bipolar. The cold war was at its height. Nehru took the most realistic view 
of the situation and refused to make India anybody's camp follower.^ 
Before analyzing India's relations with the USSR during the period 
1953-1964. it seems imperative to go back a bit in history. It appears 
pertinently indispensable to briefly mention the principal facts and events that 
had taken place during 1917-1952. In what way the October Revolution affected 
India? What was the British India's policy towards Russia? What was the 
attitude of the Indian nationalists towards the USSR? How did the Indian 
revolutionaries look upon Russia? Did they share British Government views 
about Russia? How did the USSR behave towards India after independence? 
What was the state of relations between the two countries in the years 
immediately after India attained independence? Such questions merit close 
attention because their answers help in understanding the relations between the 
two countries during the period under study.** 
However, a careful study of the Indian National Congress records 
reveals that the Indians did not accept the British theory about Russia's 
aggressive designs on India even during the pre-October Revolution period. On 
the contrary, they were critical of the British policy which they declared to be 
motivated by imperial interests. The nationalist movement in India, wishing to 
drive away the Britishers, looked upon the British policy, as the means of an 
imperialist power to keep itself entrenched in India and hence against the 
interests of Tndia.^  The Indian National Congress did not consider the threat 
from Russia to be real and consistently opposed the military expenditure of the 
government which the British sought to justify by referring to that threat. This 
disbelief in any danger from Russia turned into positive fascination as a result 
of the October Revolution.^ 
The news of the Russian Revolution made an impact on India. It became 
a source of inspiration to the people in their struggle for freedom. They realised 
that the effects of the October Revolution would not be confined to Russia. 
Since the revolution was "against imperialism it might somehow help the 
movement for Indian independence which, with Mahatma Gandhi's advent on 
the Indian scene, was taking a new turn."'" As pointed out in Montague 
Chelmsford Report: The Revolution in Russia in its beginning was regarded in 
India as a triumph over despotism ... it has given an impetus to Indian political 
aspirations." The Indian press as well as the political leaders generally showed 
a lively interest in the October Revolution and the new state. It would not be 
out of place here to refer to the comments in some of the leading newspapers 
and periodicals, particularly those associated with the nationalist movement.'^ 
The impact of the Russian Revolution on Indian nationalist intellectuals 
was sensitively reflected in the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru. As a matter of 
fact, Nehru's thinking was the most important factor in bringing about a 
transformation in the Indian nationalist attitude towards the USSR. Nehru held 
a prominent position in the Indian National Congress. He exhibited lively 
academic interest in the scientific outlook of Marxism as an interpretation of 
history. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that his attraction for Marxism was 
confined to its broad features rather than to its fine points. At no time he could 
be termed a doctrinaire Marxist. His intellect was too independent to be 
subjected to the rigid discipline of any dogma. Gandhi's influence reinforced 
his dislike for violence.'^ 
Mis adherence to democratic values was always very strong. For him the 
central problem was how to combine democracy with socialism, how to 
maintain individual freedom and initiative and yet have centralised control and 
plarming of democratic life of the people on the national as well as the 
international plane.''* Nehru's participations asjhe Congress representative in 
the International Congress against imperialism held in Brusels in February 
1927, followed by his visit to the USSR turned him into an enthusiastic though 
not uncritical admirer of the USSR. He returned from the USSR with very 
favourable impressions which he described in articles and talks, and which 
were reflected in the Congress pronouncements on the international scene from 
then on. He wrote on: 
/ must confess that the impressions I carried back from Moscow were 
very favourable and all my reading has confirmed those impressions, although 
there is much that I do like or admire. 
The October Revolution and its aftermath had a different kind of impact 
on the most miUtant section of the Indian nationalists, the revolutionaries or 
terrorists as they were often called. They regarded the new Soviet regime as a 
polenlial source of strength for overthrowing the British rule in India. Many 
revolutionaries visited Ihe USSR after the revolution. Some of them, notably 
Raja Mahendra Pratap and Barkatullah, President and Prime Minister, 
respectively of the provisional government set up at Kabul, were received by 
Lenin. Ambitious plans were made to bring Russian arms and trained hands of 
Indian revolutionaries into India via Afghanistan to overthrow British rule,'^ 
but they could not succeed because of various reasons into which one need not 
go here. What is important to note is that in spite of this failure Indian 
revolutionaries continued to be inspired by the message of October Revolution 
and felt greatly attached to the Soviet Russia. This received the most poignant 
expression on the occasion of the Sixth anniversary of Lenin's death. 
Soon after the formation of interim Government on 2 September 1946 
Nehru, as its head, announced his policy of developing close and friendly 
relations with the USSR. In his very first policy speech on September, 1946 
Nehru greeted the Soviet Union which, he said, 'carries a great responsibility 
for shaping word events' and added that as 'neighbours in Asia we shall have 
to undertake many common tasks and much to do with each other'. It was 
indeed a bold statement as at that time the USA with it's the then monopoly of 
the atomic secrets was speaking in very threatening terms to Russia. The cold 
war has reached a high pitch and it needed courage to make such a bold 
statement. 
In January 1947 a delegation from the Soviet academy of sciences came 
here on invitation sent at the instance of Nehru to the session of the Indian 
Science Congress where on 7 January he told the guests that "once diplomatic 
relations are established, the door will be opened for close contacts in many 
fields of beneficial human activities." Thus, the Russian Revolution laid the 
foundation for the building and expansion of new kind of ties between the 
Indian people and the people of USSR.These friendly relations naturally 
entered a new phase after India became an independent and sovereign state 
in 1947. 
India established diplomatic relations with the USSR quite_promptly. A 
press communique issued in New Delhi on 13th April, 1947 stated that the 
Governments of India and the USSR had agreed to exchange diplomatic 
relations at the ambassador's level.'* It means that diplomatic relations were 
established between the two countries four months before India actually 
Decame independent. The initiative and the promptness on the part of India 
in this regard well demonstrated Nehru's intense desire to establish contacts 
with Moscow as early as possible. The importance that India attached to the 
USSR was manifested when Nehru appointed his own sister as ambassador to 
the USSR. It was in a sense, symbol of India's desire for close relations and 
cooperation with the USSR. With a powerful and resourceful country like the 
USSR, India wanted to maintain friendly but not subservient relations. In the 
course of a foreign policy speech, Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly: 
We intend cooperating with the United States of America 
and we intend cooperating with the Soviet Union. On the 
other occasion, Nehru emphasized the need for cultivating 
the USSR in these words: The Soviet Union being our 
neighbor, we shall inevitably develop closer relations with 
it. We cannot afford to antagonize Russia. " 
In the first place, the USSR pointedly refused to acknowledge India's 
sovereign status for some years after India became free in August I947.The 
news of transfer of power in the sub-continent was never published in the 
Soviet press. One of the secretaries of the CPSU, Zhdanov declared in 
September 1947 that the imperialists were keeping China and India in 
'obedience and enslavement'. This clearly indicated that the USSR considered 
India's status after August 1947 at per with that of China under Chiang Kai-
shek. Similnrly. F. Zhukov. a Soviet writer on eastern affairs, ridiculed the US 
secretary ol" stale Achcson's contention India was Tree and china was not. The 
Soviet government official organ published an article entitled "The colonial 
policy of British laborite" as late as September 1950 in which the author argued 
that the British act of granting independence to India had in no way change the 
latter's status in the British empire. These extracts amply demonstrate that the 
USSR did not accept the genuineness of India's independence for quiet 
sometime.^^ 
At the same time in the United Nations, the USSR successfully opposed 
India's candidacy for a seat in Security Council in June 1947.The USSR 
supported the Ukraine while the United States backed India. India lost the bid 
as a result of previous understanding between the USSR, UK and China 
commenting on this, K. M. Pannikar wrote: 
// was clear that Russia had become uncertain of India's 
attitude and was generally suspicious of our approach to 
questions of vital impotence. 
The question of Kashmir which came before the Security Council in 
January 1948, the USSR took up an indifferent attitude. An analysis of 
speeches made by the Soviet delegate on this issue reveals that right up to early 
1952, when the Council discussed the Graham Report; the Soviet 
representative rarely participated in the deliberations. On an occasion when he 
spoke he dealt either with some procedural matters or referred to some aspects 
of a resolution under consideration. Being indifferent to the issue, his 
participation in the Kashmir debate, was, on occasions, pointless. His behavior 
was of an uninterested observer who had nothing to say on the question under 
discussion. Even on the issue of Indonesian freedom raised in the UN, during 
this period, there was divergence of opinion between India and the USSR 24 
The Dutch-Indonesian agreement was condemned by the Soviet delegate in the 
UN. While India put her seal of approval on il. As a matter of fad, right up to 
the time when the Security Council had seized of the Korean question, India 
remained a neglected country in the eyes of the Soviet delegate in the United 
Nations.^^ 
However, despite mounting Soviet criticism, Nehru kept the door open 
for cordial relations with the USSR. Although dismayed by the verbal assault, 
Nehru was not too surprised, for over the past twenty year's he had observed 
the fluctuations of Soviet policy and was accustomed to its abrupt shift. 
Illustrative of Nehru's attitude towards this treatment by the Soviet media is the 
following incident recalled by H.V.R lengar. One day he brought a sheet of 
extracts from radio Moscow broadcasts which described Nehru as a tool of 
British imperialism. Nehru glanced cursorily at the extracts, smiled a little 
wanly, and said. "The heat is not against us though its look likes it. The heat is 
against the British .The British have always tried to keep Russian out of this 
sub-continent, and the Russian cannot believe that the policy has changed. Let 
us wait and see. If we show the world that we are, in fact, an independent 
country, the world will changed its attitude to us. In the mean time, you may 
study these things, but do not gel bowled over by them".'^ '' 
An objective analysis of India's relations with the USSR in the years 
immediately following independence makes it clear that it was not USSR but 
India that had offered the hand of friendship. The main reasons for India's 
overwhelming desire for Russia's friendship may be surmised.^^ 
The first reason was India's desire to keep on the right side of a mighty 
neighbor. The USSR was the most powerful neighbor of India and had a 
common border. Powerful neighbors should not be provoked or alienated. 
Thus, it was in recognition of its geographical importance that India sought 
Russia's friendship. From the point of view of India's security, friendship with 
the Soviet Union appears to have been more important for geographical 
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reasons. 
Secondly, as discussed earlier in detail, Jawaharlal Nehru, the main 
architect of India's foreign policy, had a soft corner for the USSR. He did not 
envisage any danger to India from the USSR. Nehru assumed that as the Soviet 
society is transforming itself from a backward to an advanced economy and the 
pent-up consumption of the Soviet people is seeking satisfaction, there is bound 
to be an increasing stake felt by the USSR in the peaceful solution of world 
problems. Also, in the age of declining colonialism, it is difficult for any great 
power to view with equanimity the prospect of adding to its empire, especially 
when Communist theory, on which such an empire is based implies the 
impossible task of underwriting allied economics.^^ He firmly believed that 
ordinarily the two countries should live as the best of neighbours with fewest 
points of friction.'^ ^ 
Thirdly, friendly relations with the USSR were of tremendous 
importcncence for internal development of India. During this period India was 
facing grave economic crisis. There were famine conditions in some parts of 
10 
India. It badly needed help and assistance from all possible quarters. Thus, 
even before the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Nehru as the head 
of the Interim Government, instructed V.K. Krishna Menon, who was then in 
London, to get in touch with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, with a view 
-3 1 
to securing food aid from the USSR. 
Another reason was their identical views on questions of colonialism 
and imperialism. Whatever their motives, their positions were highly 
compatible. India's championship of freedom movements was very much 
similar to that of the USSR, as their close collaboration in U.N. forums during 
the period would suggest. 
Nehru's policies of peace, nonalignment and creating a new balance of 
power in Asia could have a chance of success only with the active cooperation 
of the USSR. Because she was the leader of the Communist bloc and much 
depended on her about the prospects of world peace. 
Indo-Sovict Relations: Stalin Era: 
Indian independence according to the Soviet press was the outcome of 
the Political Compromise" of the "Indian bourgeoisie", the Indian leadership in 
Soviet assessment continued to be "lackeys" and "vassals of Anglo-American 
imperialism. 
After the collapse of Kuomintang regime in China, Dyakov wrote that 
the Nehru government was turning India into an "Anglo-American colony in 
the East", and that, "recent lessons of history show that the role of imperialist 
comes to a sad end for those who choose to assume it". For Soviet press, 
India's decision to join the commonwealth was tantamount to remaining a part 
of British Empire. 
The early Soviet attitude towards India was summed up in Stalin's 
unconcealed disdain for Nehru's bourgeoisie government. Russia refused to 
recognize the reality of Indian independence. The Soviet commentators refused 
to believe that the British had abandoned control and instead argued that it had 
merely altered it style of control. The anti-colonialist and peace championing 
worth of nonaiignment was denied. It was characterized as a hypocritical play 
between the two camps. The sincerity of the desire to achieve economic 
indepciulcncc wii.s compiclcly denied. The violent niovcniciil of subversion 
started by the Communist Party of India was the direct result of this verdict on 
India by the Soviet leadership. The real reason behind the Soviet attitude of 
deliberate affront to India seemed to be that it was banking on the ultimate 
communist seizure of power through armed struggle. Because of this belief an 
influential group in Moscow Supported Ran dive's "Left Strategy" of 
condemning Nehru's government as an ally of imperialism and supporting the 
genuine liberation struggle launched by the C.IM. lincouraged by Moscow's 
support, the C.P.I, started the Telengana movement. The first clear indication 
of the radical line the CPl came through the Soviet theoretician Zhdanov's 
famous_Report in 1947 in which he asserted that Nehru's policy was only 
leading to the Anglo-American imperialist camp. 
This might have created the impression that there was complete lack of 
understanding between the two throughout the period 1946-1952.During this 
period the relations between the two countries were far from cordial and much 
less friendly. It was mainly due to the failure of the Soviet leaders to 
understand the new India, their pre-occupation with Europe and America, the 
low priorities they gave to India at that time and the tremendous internal 
problems they were facing after World War II. 
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Post- Stalin Era 
The shift in Soviet policy came soon after Stalin's death, almost as soon 
as Malenkov came to power the Soviet ceased being hostile to India. In a 
speech to Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov said: The position of 
such a considerable state as India is of great importance for strengthening of 
peace in the East. Recognizing India's role in ending the Korean War, he said, 
we hope that relations between India and Soviet Union would continue to 
develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote. 
Several factors contributed to Indo-Soviet amity directly or indirectly. It 
appears pertinent to take into account all such factors and analyse them 
objectively. Because only then the real nature of India's relations with the 
USSR during this period can be explained. 
In the first place, the Western bloc was not quite in sympathy with 
India's policy of nonalignment. It was often critical of it. The new Republican 
Administration under the inllucnce of all powerful Secretary of State, Dulles 
had adopted an attitude of "those who are not with us are against us". India's 
role during the Korean War had made many American leaders feel that India 
would be an uncertain ally in any future show down with the Communist 
Camp. This led them to oppose India's participation in the political conference 
on Korea, on the flimsy ground of her being a non-belligerent. Such an 
indifferent attitude on the part of the United States contributed a good deal to 
India's coming to a better understanding with the Soviet Camp. 
Closely related to this, was the continuing desire of India to play its part 
in world affairs. The only way India could make herself felt in international 
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arena, in the face of the growing Western curbs on her, was to cultivate and 
strengthen her relations with the Communist bloc. 
Thirdly, the Western nations had failed to support India's stand on 
Kashmir issue, where India's vital interests were concerned and in respect of 
Goa question, where Indian emotions and sentiments were deeply stirred. On 
the other hand, the USSR until 1955 had at least remained neutral with the 
inherent possibility that some day she might throw the weight of her support in 
India's favour. 
Another reason for India desiring to cultivate the USSR was the 
economic consideration. It was India's long-term interest to diversify the 
sources of external assistance for her economic development, instead of 
continuing to depend, as hitherto on solely the Western source. This economic 
factor was greatly reinforced by the political desire to protect her independence 
by not entirely being dependent on Western economic assistance. An 
independent and nonaligned foreign policy cannot remain as such unless it was 
backed by at least a reasonably and relatively independent foreign economic 
policy. And this could only be achieved by developing economic relations with 
the Soviet bloc. Obviously, this was possible only by following a parallel 
course of action on the political planes too. 
After signing of US-Pakistan military pact, the importance of the USSR 
to India enhanced tremendously. Because of all these factors, Nehru 
continued his efforts to cultivate friendly relations with the USSR with 
greater vigor."''* 
India's reaction to Stalin's death in March 1953 was illustrative of 
India's keenness to demonstrate its friendly feelings to Soviet Union. Indian 
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leadership showed effusiveness in consoling the Soviet people. The Indian 
Parliament was adjourned as a mark of respect to the departed leader. In his 
speech on the occasion, Nehru made one of the most moving orations, it was 
remarkable for its stress on the greatness of Stalin. While paying glowing 
tributes to him, Nehru termed him as a man of great Stature who moulded the 
destinies of his age and proved himself great in peace and war. At a time when 
Stalin's contribution to the 'cold war' was by no means small, Nehru could 
express the belief that "his influence was exercised generally in favour of 
peace. 
In view of the fact that the USSR had sent no message of condolence on 
Gandhi's assassination and that Stalin was responsible for formulating the 
hostile Soviet line to India, Nehru's tribute and his emphasis on Stalin's 
positive contribution could be regarded as a gratuitously friendly gesture 
towards Russia. Other Congress leaders expressed their sympathy in a similar 
vein. Among the few public figures who raised their voice against effusive 
condolences was P.S.P. leader Ashok Mehta. He called Stalin a "great tyrant" 
and added that "the deranged, however diabolical, deserve one's 
understanding."^'' As a matter of fact, Stalin's death provided an occasion for 
the assessment of the depth and extension of pro-Soviet feelings among the 
Indian people. 
there can hardly be two opinions that so far as India was concern it 
almost always earnestly desired friendly relations with the USSR. In spite of 
the earlier indifferent attitude of the USSR, it consistently made friendly 
gestures and tried its utmost to establish cordial relations with her most 
powerful neighbour. However, relations between two countries cannot be 
developed unilaterally. Bilateral relations develop on reciprocal basis. Indo-
Soviet relations remained formal, passive and even indifferent during the early 
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phase because the USSR failed to reciprocate India's gestures of cordiality. It 
was largely due to Soviet Government's lurking Suspicion that behind a facade 
of independence and the policy of non-alignment, India was actually pro-West 
and was not fully free from Western influence, in particular British influence. 
It will not be an exaggeration to say that Stalin's personality was an 
obstacle in the development of cordial Indo- Soviet relations. He had nothing 
but scorn for India. Nehru's efforts to cultivate friendly relations with the 
mighty neighbor were cold-shouldered by Stalin. However, Stalin's departure 
from the Russian political scene heralded a new era of liberation in the Soviet 
system. I he new Soviet leadership displayed remarkable flexibility towards the 
third world countries. They acknowledged both the importance and 
independence of nonaligned states, by adopting an attitude of "those who are 
not against us are for us" instead of earlier thesis- those who are not with us are 
against us. In the words of K.P.S. Menon: 
The new government was animated by a spirit of 
accommodation. 
The new Soviet leadership realized that the development of friendly ties 
with India would help the Communist world's efforts to break out of its 
diplomatic isolation. Equally important was the Soviet need to counter the 
Western alliance system. 
New Delhi watched keenly for indication of the future direction of the 
Soviet foreign policy. The signing of the Korean armistice agreement in July 
1953 on the basis of the original unamended Indian formula removed one of 
the main causes of Indo-Soviet misunderstanding. New Delhi regarded it as an 
important step in the desired direction.^^ 
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The first overture by the USSR to India was made shortly after the death 
of Stalin. The Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov in his address to the Supreme 
Soviet on 8 August 1953 made the first truly fi-iendly reference to a non-
Communist state, India. He observed: 
In the efforts of peace-loving countries directed towards 
ending the Korean War, India made a significant 
contribution. Further he expressed the hope that in future 
relations between India and the USSR will grow stronger and 
develops in a spirit of friendly cooperation. 
This was a clear indication that the USSR had become appreciative of 
India's nonaligned foreign policy. This statement was a tactical Soviet effort to 
establish close relations with India. This was the first attempt by the Soviet 
leaders to endorse the position of non-alignment.'" 
The USSR recognized India's desire to be included in any conference 
where the future of Asian people was being discussed. Thus, the USSR was 
among the 27 countries who voted in the General Assembly Political 
Committee to include India in the Conference on Korea, while the United 
States was among 21 nations who opposed. At the Conference Malotov 
appraised Indian's status in unambiguous language: 
PVho can deny that a country like India with a 
population of more than 300 million people has entered into a 
new, historic arena? Not long ago India was a colonial 
country. But now nobody can deny that India is occupying a 
very important place among the countries which are 
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consolidating their national independence and striving to 
secure her weighty place in world affairs. 
The USSR also proposed India's name for a neutral nation's 
commission to supervise the ceasefire in Indo-China. From 1954 onwards the 
USSR also worked for the inclusion of India in all international forums on 
disarmament. For instance, it called in 1954 for the addition of the Communist 
China, Czechoslovakia and India to the UN's Disarmament Commission.''^ 
By the end of 1954, the Soviet media began to speak highly of Nehru 
Government. Some articles praised the peace-loving nature of the Indian 
people while others the diversity of the Indian culture. In an editorial Pravda 
acknowledged India's valuable contribution for strengthening peace.'*'' 
Referring to the rapid shift in the Soviet treatment of India, a Congress party 
back bencher S. N. Sinha pointed out in the Indian Parliament: 
Formerly they (Soviets) used to criticize us and say that our Government 
was a tool of British imperialism . . . Any Soviet paper you will find today is all 
praise for our culture, for our government, for our Prime Minister. ' 
Reflecting the changed official attitude towards India the writers 
A.M. Dyakov and V.V. Balobushevich reversed their earlier condemnation of 
Nehru's policies. They now started praising, India's struggle for peace, its 
attitude towards the Korean conflict and its support for the seating of Red 
China in the United Nations. By January 1955 the Soviet press was hailing 
India as a factor of peace in Asia. In a report to the Supreme Soviet on 18th 
I'cbruary 1955, Malatov referred to the increasing recognition of India in world 
affairs: 
India's international prestige as a new and important factor 
for peace and friendship among nation is increasing.^^ 
The changed Soviet posture towards India began to find expression in 
the Soviet Government's moves to establish cultural and economic ties with 
India. It was reflected in the warm receptions accorded to a number of Indian 
delegations and individuals that visited the USSR. India's Health Minister Raj 
Kumari Amrit Kaur, on her return from the Soviet Union, told a press 
conference that the Soviet Union wished warm friendly relations with India, 
and Soviet people ardently desire peace.""*' In the following month, Indra 
Gandhi paid a visit to the Soviet Union. After her return, she too testified the 
warm feelings of friendship towards India prevalent everywhere in the Soviet 
Union.'*^ The frequency of the exchange of delegations rose considerably and 
continued high hereafter. However, the most important being the goodwill 
visits exchanged by the premiers of two countries in 1955. 
The Soviet reappraisal of India's role in world affairs coincided with the 
increase in Indo-American differences. Deep, abiding frictions arose between 
India and the United States on issues such as recognition of Red China, the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, the Kashmir dispute and the formation of military 
alliances.''^ 
The signing of Pakistan-US military pact in May 1954 marked a 
watershed in Indo-Soviet relations. India's reaction to the alliance was sharp. 
Indian leaders and press bitterly criticized the agreement. Nehru who had tried 
to prevent the Asian countries from being dragged in the cold war expressed 
deep concern. According to Indian leaders the US military assistance to 
Pakistan would change the entire regional balance of power and Pakistan 
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would be inflated out of all proportions to her size. It appeared like a dragger 
pointed at India. As Nehru said at a press conference: 
// is matter of greatest concern to us and something which will 
have far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of 
things in South Asia and especially in India and Pakistan. 
The entire country was emotionally charged in its opposition to the U.S. 
move. As a matter of fact, America's military pact with Pakistan inevitably set 
in motion a chain of events which could not but bring India closer to the USSR. 
The anti-Western lobby came out very much stronger and those elements 
which were neutralists, as between the two blocs, got rudely shocked. The 
wave of ami- Americanism in Indian public opinion reached a high watermark. 
This could not result but in India and the USSR seeking to build up their 
friendly relations on a firmer foundation of trade and technical cooperation, and 
exchange of art and culture. Both India and the USSR joined in condemning 
the pact. Their interests had converged in this respect, but for different reasons. 
Though the Government of India was not opposed to the American policy of 
containment of communism, it was disturbed at American policy of 
checkmating their aspirations in South East Asia and West Asia, by pinning it 
down in the sub-continent to deal with a hostile now militarily armed neighbor. 
In any case, the pact helped the development of better understanding between 
India and the USSR. India started looking towards Soviet bloc for her security. 
The most glaring indication of this trend was Nehru's Peaking visit in 1954 and 
his acceptance of the Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. 
Nevertheless, despite his outspoken opposition to the US- Pakistan Pact 
and later on to the SEATO, Nehru did not publicly mention the acclaim his 
stand was receiving from the Russians. The praise of Communist nations was 
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probably embarrassing to him as it nurtured a belief in the West that India was 
moving towards an acceptance of the Communist bloc line in world affairs. 
Nehru wanted a modus vivendi with the Communist world but not at the 
expense of rapidly worsening relations with the West. 
The ties between India and the USSR were strengthened by the 
mediator's role which India played during the Korean Peace Conference in 
Geneva in May-July 1954. The conference offered the USSR an opportunity to 
capitalize on Indo-Amcrican tensions. The US opposition to India's 
participation in the Conference heightened Moscow's campaign to demonstrate 
its friendship for New Delhi. The USSR pleaded for India's inclusion and 
recognized India's desire to be included in the Conference where the future of 
Asia would be discussed. The American effort to exclude India from the 
Conference was criticized by the Soviet delegate at the U.N. and the Soviet 
press played up the American opposition in an attempt to stimulate anti-
American feeling in India. Although India was not invited to the Conference an 
Indian delegation headed by Krishna Menon had an active role behind the 
scene. Menon had several meetings with Molotov. In his memoirs the then 
British Prime Minister A. Eden who kept in close touch with the Indian 
delegation during the Conference recollected that his strategy and that of 
Menon was to convince the Communists that there was a balance of advantage 
to them in arranging a girdle of neutral states in Indo-China. 
It is worth noting that shortly after the Geneva Conference Indo-Soviet 
contacts increased markedly. India accepted the Soviet offer of assistance for 
her Second Five Year Plan. It may be inferred that Nehru attached considerable 
significance to the Soviet behavior at Geneva. The atmosphere between New 
Delhi and Moscow began to clear rapidly after the negotiated settlement on 
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Indo-China at the Geneva Conference. Any Indian reluctance to request Soviet 
assistance disappeared. '^ 
In September 1954, the Soviet Union made an unexpected and dramatic 
offer to build a giant steel plant in India to help India and to develop its iron 
and steel industry. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India's 
readiness to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would "go a long 
way in the rapid industrialization of our country".^ ^ He also regarded the 
Soviet offer as a welcome alternative source for the supply of capital and 
machinery and also a bargaining counter to the West. On 2nd February 1955 
the USSR and India signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet 
assistance for the construction of a giant steel mill at Bhilai. The agreement 
came at a time when a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was 
bogged down on technical grounds. 
In meeting with the Yugoslav leader Tito in December 1954, Nehru 
received a first hand reappraisal of recent developments in the USSR. Ousted 
from the Cominform in 1948, Tito successfully withstood Stalin's pressure, 
rhc new Soviet leadership had recently put forth the olive branch of 
reconciliation hoping to bring Tito back within the fold. This reorientation of 
Moscow's policy towards Belgrade was watched carefully by New Delhi. 
Considerable significance was attached to the gradual Soviet acceptance of 
Yugoslavia's non-alignment in the cold war. From Tito, Nehru gained insight 
into the nature and extent of the Soviet 'thaw'. The Soviet treatment of 
Yugoslavia provided Nehru a barometer with which to assess the trends of the 
Soviet policy over the coming years. Shortly after his talks with Tito, Nehru 
accepted a Ibrmal Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. 
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State visits are generally tedious affairs dominated by protocol. 
Normally they generate limited and short lived goodwill. But sometimes they 
crystallize a national mood or dramatically demonstrate it. The exchange of 
visits by Nehru and Soviet leaders, however, earned landmark significance. 
They were events of international significance too. Undoubtedly, these visits 
marked a watershed in Indo-Soviet relations. It seems imperative to discuss 
them at length and assess their importance and impact of Indo- Soviet 
relations.^' 
Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955. On the eve of his visits 
Nehru made it clear that he was not going to the Soviet Union "to negotiate on 
any issues between blocs or intervene in any dispute."^"* His object was merely 
to exchange views on world problems of mutual interest. This was necessary 
because of the active role India was playing in world affairs as well as friendly 
relations with both the blocs of nations.^^ No doubt, he also intended by his 
visit to strengthen Indo-Soviet relations as well as acquaint himself, first hand 
with the conditions within the USSR about which there was much 
misunderstanding in the Western press. Perhaps, he also intended to mitigate a 
little, the isolation imposed by the West on Communist countries.^^ 
At the huge public meeting at the end of his visit, Nehru congratulated 
the Soviet people and Government on the several steps taken by the latter 
which had lessened world tensions and contributed to the cause of peace. He 
assured the Soviet people that India never harbored any 'unfriendly' feelings 
towards the Soviet Union, even though the methods of achieving their 
respective national goals were different.^ ^ 
In the Joint communique issued at the end of Nehru's Visit, it was 
resolved that relations between the two would continue to be guided by the 
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principles of Panchsheel. Significantly enough, the third principle of non-
interference in each other's internal affairs was elaborated with the addition of 
the words 'for any reason of an economic, political or ideological character'. 
The two Prime Ministers also affirmed that in the observance of these 
principles by nations in the conduct of their mutual relations lies the main hope 
of banishing fear and mistrust from their minds and thus lowering world 
tensions. In the rest of the communique they commended the results of the 
Bandung Conference, and urged the representation of Red China in the United 
CO 
Nations and peaceful settlement of the- Formosa dispute. 
From the joint communique it becomes evident that the Soviet 
leadership accepted the Panchsheel and made it plain that despite different 
social systems, there would be no bar in economic, cultural and technical 
cooperation. The Soviet attitude, when viewed in conjunction with India's own 
needs for the development of heavy industry, must have been greatly 
comforting to Nehru. 
The Moscow visit enabled Nehru to speak of Soviet intentions with 
confidence and authority. After personal observation of the Soviet life and 
direct talks with the Soviet leaders, India was heard by Western powers with 
greater respect and credibility. 
The fact that Nehru made the Soviet leaders agree to an effective 
international control of any measures for disarmament (in view of the earlier 
stand on it) was also no inconsiderable achievement. So also the express 
assertion of non-interference in other countries affairs, especially of an 
ideological character. Nehru had the Soviet Premier committed to a peaceful 
settlement of the Formosa question. In short, as a result of all this, India's 
status in international affairs was undoubtedly enhanced. 
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Apart from all this, Bulganin had accepted Nehru's invitation to visit 
India-a rather unusual step for the Soviet Government to agree to. The USSR 
had also 'gladly offered', according to Nehru, to help India in its industrial 
development by supplying machinery and technical assistance and personnel.^' 
All these were no grate achievement. But the greatest of all was the 
lasting impression left on the mind of Nehru and the Indian people of the 
affection and regard of the Soviet people for India. The feeling in India was 
one of exultation over the triumphant tour of their national hero. In most 
quarters in India, Nehru's visit was considered a success. "Deeds, it is often 
said, speak louder than words. Yet it would be unfortunate to underestimate the 
considerable capacity for restraint contained in the words of Mr. Nehru and 
Bulganin"^° 
Indeed, foundations of Indo-Soviet friendship were laid 
deep. Nehru's visit was a milestone in the development of 
Indo-Soviet relations. It was a momentous event in cementing 
Indo-Soviet friendship. Just as Eisenhower's visit to India in 
1959 marked the end ofDullesian rejection of nonalignment, 
the visit of Nehru closed the chapter of Soviet antagonism and 
indifference towards India. The thaw in the relations had, of 
course, started much earlier. Nehru was profoundly 
impressed by the personal conduct and the manner of 
approach to problems of the Soviet leaders.^^ 
The return visit to India by Bulganin and Khrushchev in November 
1955 marked another watershed in Indo-Soviet relations as India was the first 
non-Communist country they visited. The visit demonstrated a change that was 
coming over in the relations between the USSR and non-communist nations. 
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Its importance was magnified many times more because of the statements made 
by the Soviet Leaders in the course of their visit. It is worth pointing out that by 
the end of 1955 Pakistan had become the Western anchor of the SEATO and 
the Eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact. By then Pakistan had also signed 
mutual defense agreement with the United States and had received substantial 
military and economic assistance from that country. On the very day of the 
Soviet leaders' arrival in India, the US had announced an offer to construct 20 
million dollar airfield in Pakistan.**^ 
In the context of the above-mentioned developments, the Soviet leaders 
enjoyed tremendous popularity and welcome in India. Wherever they went, 
they received tumultuous popular welcome. They were greeted with slogans 
Hindi-Rusi Ek Hai and Hindi-Rusi Bhai Bhai. Speaking at a Delhi civic 
reception to the visitors. Nehru spoke for all Indians when he said: 
This day will go down in history as a very important 
event. The two visitors represented more than the meeting of 
the leaders of two great countries. ..They signified something 
deeper and more far-reaching, viz, the meeting of the two 
great people, and this had a great significance. 
However, from India's point of view the most important 
pronouncements of the Soviet leaders were the Soviet pledge of unreserved 
support to its claim on Kashmir. India's stand was publicly and categorically 
endorsed. In his speech at Srinagar, Khrushchev declared: 
The question of Kashmir was a matter for the Kashmiris to 
decide. But the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the 
Republic of India had been settled by the people of Kashmir 
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when they decided to join the Indian Union. The Soviet Union 
accepted their verdict. 
Equally important was the unequivocal Soviet support to India's stand 
on Goa. During their visit the Soviet leaders attacked Portugal for refusing to 
withdraw from Goa and emphatically supported India's claim on it. Practically 
in all major speeches Khrushchev mentioned Goa and forecast its early 
freedom.^ ^ 
In the joint communique issued at the end of the visit, both governments 
agreed to exchange trade representatives to look after their growing trade. The 
USSR also agreed to supply machinery and necessary help for oil exploration 
and construction of hydroelectric projects in India. Of special importance to 
India was the observation that the representatives of the two countries would 
meet and discuss later further mutually advantageous forms of economic and 
technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and India.^ ^ 
In reviewing the significance of the Bulganin-Khrushchev tour, Sisir 
Gupta listed "the promise of Soviet aid; the endorsement of India's unity; the 
acceptance of its national leadership as a progressive and desirable 
phenomenon; the promotion of India's status in the world; and the use of 
Soviet influence to prevent the irresponsible functioning of its followers in 
India as providing the basis for India's friendly relations with the USSR in the 
following years.^^ 
The visit demonstrated a historic transformation that was coming over in 
the relations between the Soviet Union and non-Communist nations. The visit 
was highly successful enterprise in public relations. It made a deep impact on 
Indian people about the USSR'S sincerity in the pursuit of peace in spite of her 
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enormous nuclear power and also her genuine appreciation of India's 
nonalignment and extension of peace area. The statements of the visiting Soviet 
leaders, with reference to further Indo-Soviet cooperation in various fields and 
on Kashmir and Goa, evoked great satisfaction and goodwill in India. The 
Soviet posture was obviously appreciated in India, especially in the context of 
the current Republican attitude in the USA, which equated nonalignment with 
immorality and by including Pakistan in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact 
gave India a sense of encirclement. 
Nevertheless, these visits had hardly any effect on India's general 
outlook on world affairs or her own basic foreign policy. The mere formal and 
joint repetition of views already held individually and separately by the two 
governments did not imply that after the exchange of visits there was greater 
agreement between the two governments on those or other world issues than 
before. However, what pleased India was the fact that, unlike the West, the 
Soviet leaders publicly and clearly expressed themselves in favour of India 
continuing to follow her own policy of nonalignment. Indians also received the 
psychological and emotional satisfaction that in their stand on two issues 
involving India's national interest (Kashmir and Goa) a great power and a 
permanent member of the Security Council had, practically, for the first time, 
expressed support to India. This was undoubtedly a source of great strength to 
the Indian people, even though it did not have much significance to the 
Government of India's continuing efforts for a solution of these questions. For 
India, the acceptance by the USSR of the Panch Sheel, India's concretely 
defined version of co-existence in the joint communique provided public 
witness to the fact that Moscow preferred good relations with the Indian 
Government to support of the C.P.I. Finally, the visits also resulted in the 
expansion of Indo-Soviet relations, both in extensive and intensive terms, in the 
fields of commerce, science and culture. 
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Misgivings about the growing rapport between India and the USSR were 
often sublimated in the Indian press also, but sometimes came to the surface. 
Such an instance occurred over the treatment of Gandhi in the 1954 edition of 
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. As before, Gandhi was termed "one of the 
initiators of the agreement by the Congress leaders with British imperialism in 
1947 which led to the division of the country." Gandhism was characterized as 
the reactionary political doctrine of Gandhi. Protests were made by the Indian 
press and government that the treatment of Gandhi was completely opposed to 
the professed Soviet friendship and respect for India. 
To sum up, it may be said that India's relations with the USSR during 
this phase improved considerably. This was a period when the USSR became 
India's source of strength in international affairs and a major supplier of India's 
defense requirements. Trade was opened between India and the Soviet bloc. 
Numerous cultural and economic delegations exchanged visits. The mutual 
relations which began to improve since 1953 reached its high watermark by the 
end of 1955. The year 1955 ended with India and the USSR well on their way 
to securing better mutual understanding and friendly relations. The statements 
of Indian and Soviet leaders during this period evolved "a more stated basis of 
Indo-Soviet relations."^' 
A new understanding was reached. The visits of Nehru to the USSR and 
the Soviet leaders created an atmosphere of exuberant friendship summed up in 
the phrase "Hindi-Rusi Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Russians are brothers). The 
USSR not only made amends for the earlier 'indifferent attitude towards India 
bui also made several gestures of goodwill and friendly feelings. India 
responded enthusiastically to USSR's active friendship. It was in keeping with 
India's policy of nonalignment. It secured badly needed political support for 
India's critical relations with Pakistan without necessitating a formal alliance. 
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Finally, the trade with the USSR enabled India to make good the ground lost in 
the Western markets. 
The period between 1956 to 1958 was one of strengthening of ties 
between India and the USSR. India's foreign policy moved towards more 
cordial relations with the USSR during these years. An increasing cooperative 
relationship with the USSR had become by middle of 1956 a cornerstone of 
India's foreign policy. On the other hand, the Soviet courtship of India 
continued in 1956 with an admixture of promises, praise, and economic 
assistance. The relationship between the two countries had reached a point 
where neither could withdraw from its commitments to the other without strong 
repercussions. Several developments had taken place which helped India 
coming closer to the USSR. It seems pertinent to analyse objectively all such 
developments. 
The Suez crisis revealed the common approach of India and the USSR. 
Nehru's reaction to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was prompt and sharp. 
The USSR too reacted sharply to the Western powers attack on Egypt. At the 
London Conference, the USSR supported the Indian proposals. The Soviet 
Foreign Minister termed the Indian proposals "a plan for a just and peaceful 
settlement of the Suez problem".^'' In short, in policies and attitudes, India and 
the USSR were alike on the Suez issue. This identical attitude on this issue 
greatly reinforced Indo-Soviet friendship.^' 
In a work on India's relations v/ith the USSR, India's stand on the 
Hungarian crisis deserves special and careful attention. Severe criticism has 
been poured on India's apparently "cautious" and hesitant behaviour during the 
crisis. In the words of K.P.S. Menon: 
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Nothing has caused much misunderstanding regarding 
India's foreign policy than her attitude towards the 
Hungarian revolution. 
However, before discussing and analyzing India's stand and its impact 
on her relations with the USSR, it' appears pertinent to give a brief summary of 
the broad facts of the Hungarian tragedy. 
In October 1956, the Hungarian people revolted against the USSR. Their 
main demands were: democratization of government, withdrawal of Soviet 
troops (who were stationed there under the Warsaw Pact) and restoration of 
Imry Nagy to power. A civil conflict broke out. Several developments 
followed. On October 31, the new Hungarian Government headed by I. Nagy 
informed the U.N. Secretary-General about Hungary's decision to withdraw 
from the Warsaw Pact. It appealed the U.N. to guarantee Hungary's permanent 
neutrality. Moreover, after Soviet forces withdrawal, there was a good deal of 
mutual killing. A rival government under J. Kadar was set up, and finally at 
dawn, on November 4, the Soviet troops, which had encircled Budapest, 
suddenly reentered and started suppressing the revolutionary movement with 
an iron hand. Ultimately, they succeeded in crushing the popular upsurge in a 
•7-1 
ruthless manner. 
India was among 15 states who abstained on the November 4 resolution 
condemned the Soviet intervention, called for immediate withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, upheld the Hungarian peoples' right to choose their own form of 
government and instructed the Secretary General to set up a committee which 
would thoroughly investigate the situation within Hungary.^ '' 
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India found the tone and content of the resolution objectionable as was 
evident from' the speech of the leader of the Indian delegation, Krishna Menon. 
Fxplaining his abstention. Menon held that the abstention did not mean 
unconcern or lack of interest. He pointed out India's disagreement with certain 
portions of the resolution, He took exceptions to the parts condemning the 
Soviet action and calling for an investigation under U.N. auspices into 
Hungary's internal affairs. He proceeded to maintain that the Assembly could 
not deal with a UN member state as in the case of a colonial country where the 
people had no representation. 'We cannot in any circumstances", he argued, 
•ye 
"disregard the sovereign rights of Members". The chief Indian delegate 
attempted to explain that while India was "not neutral where human freedom is 
concerned", the tone and content of the resolution required India's abstention. 
It is worth pointing out that the resolution was put to vote only as a whole, not 
in parts.'^ 
Most of the assessments of the Indian Government's reaction to the 
Hungarian revolution have failed to notice the fact that there were several 
distinct phases to India's stance on Hungary. Undoubtedly, the critical nature 
of the Hungarian situation was not immediately recognized in India. A number 
of factors may be attributed to India's somewhat slow reaction. 
In the first place, India had no authentic report of the facts of the 
situation on which it could express a quick opinion. No senior Indian diplomat 
was present at Budapest at the outbreak of the revolution. There were also 
difficulties resulting from the breakdown of communication within Hungary. 
Of course, the Government of India received reports from various sources but 
many of them contradicted each other. To quote Nehru: 
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The broad facts regarding the Suez conflict were 'completely 
clear' to the Government and hence they expressed very clear 
and definite opinion about it. In regard to Hungary, however, 
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the broad facts were not clear. 
Moreover, as the nature of events in Hungary became clearer, 
Nehru felt an urge to speak out as he had done on Suez canal crises. This 
phase started after the Anglo-French forces had ended its Egyptian venture. 
India was then ahle li> look :il the Riiropean scene with a cooler perspective. 
More importantly the inception of the phase coincided roughly with the 
end of the effective resistance by the Hungarian insurgents against the Soviet 
troop. Nehru's reaction prior to this time was indicative of his primary concern 
that the conflict should remain localized. By November 10, the question 
whether Hungary should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact had been 
decided by force of arms. With this matter was resolved, Nehru's concern 
centered on how the sufferings of the Hungarian people might be relieved. He 
strongly supported food and medical shipments and other relief measures 
sponsored by the U.N. He also began to consider ways that the Soviets might 
be gradually induced to withdraw forces from Hungary. At the AICC meeting, 
Nehru stated that the growth of democracy should be encouraged in Hungary 
and that the Hungarian people should decide about themselves without 
any external pressure. The meeting passed a formal resolution to that effect. 
Speaking in parliament, Nehru sharply criticized the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary. He held that it created a: grave crisis of mind; compelling (Indians) to 
think afresh of the hitherto acknowledged virtues of democracy, socialism and 
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communism. 
Nehru condemned the Hungarian episode as a gross and brutal exercise 
of violence and armed might against weaker countries. 
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Nehru called for the eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Hungary. This change was evidenced in a joint statement issued by the 
Premiers of India, Burma and Indonesia, after their meeting in New Delhi to 
discuss Suez and Hungary. The statement regretted the reentry of the Soviet 
troops into Budapest and called for their speedy removal. The Hungarian 
people should then be permitted to determine their own form of governments 
free from external interference.^^ 
It may be said that Nehru's views on the Hungarian revolution and its 
artcrnialh provided an interesting case study of his thoughts about and policy 
toward developments in the communist world. 
India's foreign policy was moving towards more cordial relations with 
the USSR during this period was evident, for instance from Nehru's efforts at 
the Commonwealth Conference held in July 1956. There Nehru sought to 
persuade others to accept his basic approach in dealing with Russians. His 
stance was reflected in the resultant joint statement which indicated the 
participants "willingness to facilitate increased contacts with the USSR". In the 
same month, during his visit to the West Germany Nehru refused to condemn 
the Soviet domination of the Eastern Europe to be a species of colonialism 
because of different historic reasons.^" 
On 21st November, the Soviet delegate announced that his country 
would veto the 5-Power resolution if it was put to vote. Thus, twice in 1957, 
the USSR came to India's rescue when India's position was being jeopardized 
by the Western powers siding with Pakistan. The 1957 debate served notice 
that Soviet veto or threat of veto would readily be available to check Security 
Council resolution on Kashmir unfavorable to Indian position. This 
undoubtedly brought India closer to the USSR and strengthened Indo-Soviet 
ties. This Soviet support made it possible for Nehru to develop close and 
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friendly relations with Moscow without being the part of the Communist 
camp.^' 
During this period, there was a close identity of views between the two 
nations on matters concerning arms control. On 22nd and 27th May 1957, the 
two Houses of Indian Parliament passed unanimous resolutions calling on the 
great powers to stop nuclear testing. It is worth pointing out that on 10th May 
1957, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had made similar appeals to the British 
Parliament and the American Congress for the renunciation of the nuclear 
weapons. The representatives of the two countries consulted more frequently 
on this issue in the United Nations. In June 1957, the USSR backed India's 
unsuccessful bid to send a delegate to speak at the forthcoming 5-Power 
Disarmament Commission in London. For sometime India had favored the 
enlargement of the UN Disarmament Sub Committee, contending that Indian 
representative on Committee discussing disarmament would give a voice to 
the vast majority of nations who neither had nuclear weapons nor wish to 
make them. Nehru told the Parliament: 
/ suppose that the basic issues which perhaps govern other 
matters are that of disarmament. All kinds oj proposals have 
been made, but the fact is that at the present moment, again, 
the Disarmament Commission faces a deadlock... it is not 
our desire to push ourselves in these committees or 
Coinini.ssions. hul naturally we would like to help, we are 
prepared to do so. 
Thus, in the matter of disarmament, especially in their desire to 
suppression of nuclear tests, as also in the matter of elimination of foreign 
bases with a view to prevent surprise attacks- there was almost unanimity of 
approach between India and the USSR. This naturally resulted in bringing them 
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closer and strengthened the feelings of friendship between the two during this 
period. 
China as a Factor in Indo- Soviet Relations: 
India sought to cultivate the Soviet Union for immediate political 
objectives as well as for long-range policy goals. The year 1959 saw the 
addition of a new concern, namely, areas occupied by China. This added a new 
dimension to New Delhi-Moscow relationship. Significantly, the growing 
tension between China and the Soviet Union also came to the surface in the 
year 1959. The gulf between China and the USSR has a parallel in the guiflhat 
existed, between China and India. China became a source of common concern 
to both the countries. This became an important and domina ting factor in the 
development of India's relations with the Soviet Union since then.^ ^ 
In mid-1959 border clashes took place between India and China. After 
maintaining a long silence on the Sino-Indian dispute, the Soviet Union came 
out with a cryptic statement on 8th September, 1959 in the TASS. The USSR 
had friendly relations with both China and India, built respectively on 
"fraternal ties" of international socialism and 'friendly' collaboration in 
accordance with the idea of peaceful co-existence. It expressed the hope that 
India and China with both of whom the Soviet Union enjoyed friendly relations 
would settle their disputes peaceably. In the following month, the third session 
of the Supreme Soviet while regretting the incidents between the two states 
friendly to it called for friendly negotiations for Solving the disputed frontier 
question. A week later, Khrushchev termed the entire dispute "sad" and 
"stupid" in as much as the area under contention had no strategic importance, 
nor was it even inhabitable. '^* 
The Soviet reaction reflected the cautious neutrality of the Soviet 
position. For the first time, the Soviet Union had refused to side with its ally on 
a dispute with a non-Communist State. While the Soviets had not expressed 
any opinion publicly on the merits of the dispute, they had not supported the 
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Chinese. This was highly significant and reassuring to Indian leaders. The 
Government of India realized the significance of the Soviet attitude and 
regarded it as indirectly helpful to India. 
However, the Chinese action did create misgivings in the minds of 
common people in India about the Communist world as a whole. Thus, in order 
to counter the suggestion that the Soviet Union being a communist nation, was 
unreliable and might turn against India, Nehru repeatedly drew a clear 
distinction between the conducts of the Soviets and the Chinese in his public 
utterances.Indo-Soviet friendship was put to test in the face of the Chinese 
hostility culminating in armed aggression in October, 1962. 
This period witnessed further consolidation of cordiality between the 
two states. Contacts were increased in almost all spheres. New agreements 
were concluded to extend trade, technical assistance and cultural relations. 
Soviet efforts for the expansion of existing projects and the establishment of 
new ones made available. It seems pertinent to digress for a moment from the 
interplay of the Sino-Soviet-Indian triangle to consider and objectively analyze 
various developments that had taken place during these years and assess their 
significance in the growth of India's relations with USSR. 
The visits of high dignitaries continued as in the past. Both the President 
of the Supreme Soviet Voroshilov and the government chief Khrushchev 
visited India in early 1960. The President of India normally does not go to 
receive the visiting head of the government. When Bulganin and Khrushchev 
visited India in 1955, the President did not go to the airport to receive them. 
But this time the President was present at the airport to receive Khrushchev. 
The informality that grew during this period was indicative of the strength of 
close bounds that existed between two countries. However, it is worth noting 
37 
that the public enthusiasm for the Soviet premier in India did not compare with 
that of his earlier visit. Taya Zink in summed up the lack of interest in these 
words: 
To add insult to injury, Nehru fell asleep while his guest spoke 
at the civic reception in Delhi to an audience half the size that 
greeted him last time. 
Moreover, the bonds of friendship that existed between the two 
countries after the exchange of visit of the leaders of the two countries were 
visible in the public utterances of the Indian and Soviet leaders on the occasion 
of Khrushchev's second visit to India. In his address to the Indian Parliament, 
Khrushchev paid glowing tributes to Nehru and the Five Principles. Proposing 
vote of thanks, the Lok Sabha Speaker told Khrushchev: 
Last time you came here as a visitor, this time as a friend and 
when you come next time you will be relative. 
Khrushchev's second visit had a larger significance as event in the 
bilateral relations between the two states, as the Soviet leader was striving to 
patch up his differences with Mao during this period. At the time of his visit, 
Sino-Indian relations had reached almost a point of complete breakdown. 
Nehru on 13th January 1960 had refused to meet Chou for any further talks on 
the ground that such negotiations were unacceptable to India in view of the fact 
that China not India had committed the border aggression. Ihc fact that at a 
time when Khrushchev was trying to improve Soviet relations with China, his 
acceptance of India's invitation to break journey in India was illustrative of his 
unwillingness to compromise with Mao on the question of Soviet ties with 
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India. Significantly, Khrushchev's visit coincided with the tenth anniversary of 
the Sino-Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Alliance of 1950. 
Khrushchev apparently urged Nehru to enter into negotiations with 
Chou on the border question. After talking with Khrushchev, Nehru told the 
Rajya Sabha: 
As things stand now, I see no ground for a meeting, no bridge 
between the Chinese position and ours. There is no room for 
negotiation on that basis and there is nothing to negotiate 
now. But it may arise later. 
Yet Khrushchev's request probably influenced Nehru's decision several 
weeks later to extend an invitation to Chou for a meeting. This shift in the 
Indian policy was obviously the result of the Indo-Soviet talks. Anyhow, the 
visit provided an opportunity to both the leaders to exchange views on various 
issues particularly the emerging Chinese menace and to appreciate each other's 
viewpoint. 
The visit of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the President of India in June 1960 was 
another manifestation of warm feelings between the two countries. Welcoming 
the Indian President, the Soviet President said: 
Warm friendship and wide cooperation between our 
governments and peoples is very bright evidence of the fact 
that nothing can stop the irresistible longings of the 
progressive forces from establishing new relationship based 
on principles of peaceful co-existence between countries}'^ 
Speaking at a Soviet Indian friendship meeting. President Prasad noted 
the fruitful development of Indo-Soviet relations: 
The USSR and India have shown to all skeptics and cynics on 
right and left that two great countries, adhering to different 
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traditions and to different philosophies, can cooperate freely 
and successfully in furthering not only the improvement of the 
well-being of the people, but also the consolidation of peace. 
When the Indian President called on him, the Soviet President declared 
that "our friendship is greatly promoted by the exchange of visits between 
Soviet and Indian statesman".^° 
In September 1961, Nehru paid another visit to Moscow. The Belgrade 
Conference of nonaligned states had entrusted the task of conveying the 
concern of nonaligned world to N. Krumah and Nehru, who was, in fact, to 
visit the USSR on his way back which was fixed earlier. The public enthusiasm 
for the Indian Prime Minister in Moscow did not match with that of his 1955 
visit. It confined chiefly to recalling previous meetings with Nehru. But he 
preferred to tell Khrushchev that in the world in those days many new 
important problems have come up and he would be glad to discuss them with 
Khrushchev. In Moscow Nehru repeatedly stressed India's past and present 
opposition to nuclear experiments. He frankly told Khrushchev that the 
resumption of nuclear testing retarded disarmament talks and aggravated the 
international situation. In his major speech, Nehru told his audience at the Indo-
Soviet friendship rally what had happened at Belgrade and why he came to 
Moscow-which was withheld from them by the Soviet media. 
Soviet Support to India on Goa and Kashmir Issue 
The Soviet support to India's claims on Goa had been made public from 
the very outset. During their 1955 visit, the Soviet leaders had expressed the 
hope that Goa would soon become a part of India. The Soviet President 
Brezhnev, who was on a state visit to India at the time of Goa operation 
declared in Bombay that the Soviet Union had complete sympathy for the 
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Indian people's desire to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese 
colonialism. On 18 December 1961, the day the world learnt of the liberation 
Brezhnev assured a civic reception of firm Soviet support for the action. The 
Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev sent a telegram to Nehru saying that the 
resolute action of the Government of India to do away with the outposts of 
colonialism in its territory was absolutely lawful and justified." He declared 
that the Soviet people unanimously approve of these actions.. When the 
Westerners brought forward a resolution in the Security Council to censure 
India, the USSR blocked it with a prompt Veto. The Soviet delegate contended 
that his vote 'represented a victory for the true principles of UN Charter: 
Today saw the expression of the will to defend colonial 
countries and peoples and their right to life, freedom and 
independence. 
Undoubtedly, the Soviet stand on Goa had made a very favorable 
impression on Government of India which was angered by the Western 
attitude. It definitely pleased the Indian public opinion. Some sections of the 
Indian press, usually more, circumspect about Indo-Soviet relations, now 
defended their nation's policy in a surge of chauvinistic vigor. 
The Indian Government and public were greatly appreciative of the 
profound sympathy and understanding of its aspirations by the USSR. The 
Soviet stand on Goa certainly helped in drawing India closer to the USSR and 
helped in consolidating the friendly ties. 
In early 1962, Pakistan tried to use Western hostility to India due to 
liberation of Goa by asking the Security Council to reconsider Kashmir issue 
on the plea that the speeches of certain leaders revealed an Indian plan to 
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recapture the Pakistan occupied portion of Kashmir. In view of this, it was 
claimed that a serious situation was created which warranted an immediate 
consideration by the Council. Participating in the debate, the Soviet delegate 
pointed out that no new situation had arisen in Kashmir which warranted any 
fresh discussion by the Council. When the Irish delegate introduced a 
resolution urging the two governments to negotiate on the dispute at the earliest 
and settle it on the basis of a plebiscite, the Soviet delegate vetoed it. The 
Soviet delegate categorically declared that the question of holding a plebiscite 
in Kashmir was dead and out dated and the Kashmir question had been solved 
once for all. In January 1964, Pakistan once again raised the bogey or threat 
from India on Kashmir issue. During the debate the Soviet delegate held that 
the position of the Soviet was that question of Kashmir's belonging to India 
had already been decided by the people of Kashmir. Fearing the veto on a 
resolution, the Western Powers raised the issue of consensus but the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia said that they would not agree to any so-called 
consensus whose con- tents are not acceptable to India. Thanks to the Soviet 
attitude, the debate ended without a resolution. Thus, the USSR once again 
came to India's rescue when India's position was being jeopardized by the 
Western Powers siding with Pakistan. This brought India closer to the USSR 
and further strengthened Indo-Soviet ties.^ ^ 
It may be said that despite some irritants and their differences of opinion 
on various world issues, India's relations with USSR were further consolidated. 
The friendly ties between the two countries were further strengthened as a 
result of unqualified Soviet support on Goa operation, the use of Soviet veto on 
Kashmir issue, economic aid, and military assistance and identity of views 
between New Delhi and Moscow with respect to China. On the one hand, it 
was essential to India's security and her political survival as an independent 
nation to contain and withstand the pressure of Chinese aggressive designs. 
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Indo-Soviet Relations in the Post- Nehru Period 
The death of Nehru in May, 1964 did not adversely affect the growing 
relationship between India and the Soviet Union, In fact, the relationship was 
sought to be consolidated by Lai Bahadur Shastri, when as the new Indian 
Prime Minister, and he paid an official visit to Moscow from 12 to 19 May, 
1965. This was the time when the Indo-Pak conflict over the Rain of Kutch was 
developing. Shastri declared in Moscow that the Indian and Soviet peoples 
were already united together by genuine, strong and abiding bonds of 
friendship relying 'not upon any temporary expedients, but upon the sincere 
realization that the larger interests of humanity can be served best by promoting 
and enlarging the area of peace'. His pronouncements as well as the Joint 
Communique on the Shastri-Kosygin talks underlined that this relationship was 
not directed against any third country and is opposed to interference in any 
country's internal affairs. These were a direct allusion to Pakistan in the 
context of the developments in South Asia at that period of time. What is more, 
the two sides denounced the savage US bombing on North Vietnam and called 
for its halt forthwith. 
Pakistan launched an attack on Kashmir engendering a full-scale Indo-
Pak war in September, 1965. Well aware of the far-reaching repercussions of 
such a war, the Soviet Union took prompt diplomatic initiatives to stamp out 
the flames of tension in South Asia and primarily Kosygin's peace efforts 
succeeded in bringing about the Tashkent Summit of the two neighboring 
countries from 4 to 10 January, 1966. Today when India and Pakistan are 
striving to conclude a no-war pact and treaty of peace, friendship and co-
operation, the signal importance of the Tashkent Agreement cannot be 
minimized. It was through Kosygin's painstaking endeavors that the state of 
war between India and Pakistan was brought to an end, diplomatic relations 
among them restored and cultural and trade contacts resumed. The agreement 
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did help albeit temporarily, in strengthening the forces of peace in South Asia 
and was yet another direct offspring of Indo-Soviet friendship. 
After Shastri's death immediately following the Tashkent accord, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi took over the reins of power in India becoming the third 
Prime Minister of the Republic. Her first official visit to Moscow in that 
capacity lasted four days-fi^ om 12 to 16 July, 1966. Her speeches in the Soviet 
capital reflected her devotion to safeguard peace, a legacy of her father-
something that has found concrete manifestation in her deeds over the years. 
The Joint Communiqu(i at the end of her talks with the Soviet leaders 
reaffirmed their common goal of ensuring peace and highlighted the need to 
renounce the use of force in inter-state relations. It urged an immediate end to 
the US bombing of North Vietnam and abolition of military alliances. It also 
emphasized the need for consolidation of peace in Europe, solution of the 
German problem, elimination of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and 
apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia and realisation of nuclear 
disarmament. 
Mrs. Gandhi again visited the Soviet Union in November 1967 to attend 
the 50th anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution. It was a gesture of 
goodwill- similar to the gestures of the Soviet Government seen in Kosygin's 
visit to India accompanying the body of Shastri from Tashkent and on the 
demise of President Zakir Hussain in May 1969. It mirrored once again the 
Government of India's desire to further improve Indo-Soviet ties. It was also 
noteworthy that Mrs. Gandhi was one of the only two heads of non-Communist 
states to be invited to the celebrations. 
Kosygin visited India in January, 1968 and asserted thai the 
deteriorating international climate persistently demanded from all who cherish 
peace and security of peoples, to take united action aimed at combating the 
aggressive forces of imperialism and colonialism. He spoke of the value USSR 
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attached to the Tashkent Agreement, adding: We, like ail friends of India and 
Pakistan, would like to see Hindustan as a region of stable peace, a region 
where the foundations of friendly cooperation between India and Pakistan 
could be laid. The Joint Communique envisaged regular exchange of opinions 
on political issues at the highest level. 
The year 1971 added a new dimension to both the political 
landscape of South Asia and Indo-Soviet relations. The West Pak 
authorities' brutal suppression of the East Pakistani people's aspirations for an 
independent state was directly responsible for the birth oi' a new slate-the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh-in the first half of the year. This coincided 
with the developing Sino-US alliance punctuated by Kissinger's secret mission 
to Beijing via Islamabad and the declaration of US President Richard Nixon's 
plea to visit China. As the influx of refugees to India escaping from Yahya 
Khan's brutalities continued, war clouds gathered on the horizon with the 
concretization of the sinister Sino-US-Pak axis to keep India at bay and ensure 
Islamabad's domination over Dacca. It was then that in order to defend peace 
and security in the subcontinent and raise Indo-Soviet ties to a qualitatively 
higher level that on August 9, 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation was signed in New Delhi. The treaty provided for 
immediate Indo-Soviet consultations in the event of an attack or threat of 
aggression to remove such a threat and ensure peace and security of the 
countries, while at the same time upholding the Indian policy of non-alignment 
Soviet regard for which was expressively spelt out. 
The situation was deteriorating fast. In a brief stopover in New Delhi on 
1 October, 1971, Soviet President Podgomy said the Soviet people were closely 
watching the "difficult and dangerous situation in the Hindustan subcontinent". 
Intense Indo-Soviet consultations at various levels in conformity with the 
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Treaty followed as the US under Nixon took a tough stand trying to bend India 
in Pakistan's favour. 
The Indo-Pak war broke out on 3 December, 1971 and ended with 
India unilaterally declaring ceasefire after the complete liberation of 
Bangladesh on 16 December. In the meantime, political and diplomatic moves 
by the USSR in India's support at the UN thwarted all Sino-US attempts to 
block Bangladesh's independence. Again it was Indo-Soviet coordination in 
accordance with the Treaty which foiled the nefarious design of the US 
Government in its dispatch of a Seventh Fleet task force to the Bay of Bengal 
just on the eve of Bangladesh's freedom from the oppressive yoke. 
The subsequent developments gave a fillip to all peace champions 
across the globe. The South Asian events flowing from the most positive and 
beneficial impact of Indo-Soviet relafions in the world arena also made their 
contribution to the global process of detente that was set in motion with the 
Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Moscow in the summer of 1972. 
Soviet Communist Party General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev visited 
New Delhi in November, 1973. This visit was one of the most striking 
landmarks in Indo-Soviet relations next only to the historic visits to the USSR 
by Nehru in June, 1955 and to India by Bulganin and Khrushchev in 
November-December of that very year. Brezhnev used the visit to convey the 
intense Soviet feeling towards India-a feeling shorn of any trace of artificiality. 
"Friendship and cooperation with India", he declared at the Red Fort grounds 
on 27 November, 1973, "is part and parcel of the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union. We were with you when India's new statehood was emerging. We were 
with you in difficuh and trying periods for India. We were with you when 
various external forces were trying to bring pressure on your country when it 
46 
was upholding its vital interests. We shall be with you in the days of joy and in 
thedaysoftrial."^^ 
He explained the essence of detente, and upheld the international 
significance of Indo-Soviet friendship cemented by the Treaty. The experience 
of Indo-Soviet relations he said "shows how close. Many- faceted friendly 
relations can unite states with different social systems when the policy of the 
states is inspired by the ideals of the struggle for peace and security of peoples, 
against aggression and all forms of colonialism", and added: "This good 
example exerts and, we are confident, will continue to exert ever wider 
influence on the international life".''' 
Within less than a year, there was a change of leadership in India 
following Mrs. Gandhi's defeat at the hustings Morarji Desai, who succeeded 
her as the country's fourth Prime Minister, was reportedly averse to the Indo 
Soviet Treaty and initially sought to have it abrogated. This was, however, 
prevented by others running the Government and Desai, too, realized the 
importance of maintaining the relationship between the two Stales in the spirit 
of the Treaty. His visit to the USSR in October, 1977 found the Soviet leaders 
including Brezhnev extending a warm welcome and generous hospitality to 
him as a mark of tribute to India. The visit helped to underscore the continuity 
of Indo-Soviet relations. 
Desai again went to Moscow in June, 1979 just when Brezhnev was 
about to leave for Vienna to sign the SALT II accord with llic then US 
President, Jimmy Carter. While greeting this development, the two leaders 
expressed concern over the happenings in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The 
Joint Statement at the end of the talks found both leaders agreed on the 
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question of opposing 'any interference by outside forces in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan'.^ ^ 
In 1980, Mrs. Gandhi returned to power with a thumping majority and 
Brezhnev came to India in December of that year. There was much to discuss, 
for world peace had suffered setbacks with grievous blows dealt on detente by 
revanchists of the Western military circles. SALT II was in cold storage, the 
arms race was spiraling, tensions had mounted in South-West Asia with the 
entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the after math of Sino-lJS-Pak plot to 
overthrow the Kabul Government as a direct interference in Afghan affairs and 
in South-East Asia with the Chinese attack on Vietnam following the liberation 
of Kampuchea from Pol Pot's inhuman yoke. The Iraq-Iran war was continuing 
and the Arab world stood divided after Egypt's betrayal at Camp David. Nearer 
home, Pakistan was being armed to the teeth by' the US, posing a new threat to 
India. 
The visit of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Soviet Union from 
September 20 to 26, 1982, like her earlier ones, was yet another milestone in 
the further strengthening of Indo-Soviet relations. The talks of the Indian and 
Soviet leaders showed the close identity of views of the two countries on many 
international issues, particularly the preservation of peace and avoidance of a 
nuclear war. They were alarmed over the growth of the arms race, the 
emergence of new seat of tension and the proclamation of new military 
doctrines justifying a nuclear war. The Soviet and Indian people hold that today 
there is nothing which is more important than the preservation of peace.^ ^ 
Mrs. Gandhi's visit also helped to strengthen Indo-Soviet cooperation. 
The summit talks reaffirmed that the relations between the USSR and India are 
based on the firm foundations of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
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Cooperation; that they meet the fundamental interests of the two countries and 
that they have a positive impact on the developments of the international 
situation. The Joint Indo-Soviet Declaration signed by Mrs. Gandhi and L.I. 
Brezhnev stated, The two sides reaffirm that the Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation concluded between them is a symbol of the traditional 
friendship between the USSR and India and of their commitment to 
international peace and detente. 
Both sides noted with satisfaction the large scale and high level of their 
cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, which was 
being carried out on a planned basis and was of a mutually-beneficial and long-
term character. 
The relations between India and the USSR are a model of relations 
between states following different socio-economic system. They have been 
built by the peoples of the two countries over a long period of time and through 
persistent efforts based on goodwill and mutual trust. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and 
the late Soviet President L.I. Brezhnev have made outstanding personal 
contributions to the consolidation of these relations. 
During their review of the international scene, both countries strongly 
condemned Israel's criminal aggression against Lebanon, encouraged by the 
USA and demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. They also 
reviewed the situation in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet side fully supported the 
proposal of the littoral states to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. They 
also expressed concern over the continuing tension in South West Asia. They 
were of the view that both the problems of Afghanistan and Kampuchea should 
be settled through political discussions. The Soviet side noted the growing 
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significance of the nonaligned movement against imperialism, neocolonialism 
and racism. 
Mrs. Gandhi expressed regret that events during recent years had not 
produced a congenial atmosphere in which the developing countries could 
effectively pursue their path of self-development.^ ^ 
Bilateral Relations in the Post Brezhnev Period 
India was assured after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 that Indo-Soviet 
relations would continue to be cordial and friendly. Bilateral trade continued to 
grow. After Mrs. Gandhi's assassination in October, 1984, India's leadership 
went into the hands of her son Rajiv Gandhi. In the USSR' after two short 
leaderships of Andropov and Gorbachev became General Secretary of the 
Communist Party in 1985.Indo-Soviet relations were further consolidated 
during the period that two countries were led by Rajiv and Gorbachev. The two 
countries had more or less identical views on most of the international 
questions, Rajiv Gandhi asserted a number of times that the Soviet Union had 
stood by India in all difficult times. Therefore, Indo-Soviet friendship would be 
maintained at high level. Rajiv Gandhi went on 6 days visit to the Soviet Union 
in may 1985.He was assured by the Soviet leaders that they were aware of 
India's anxiety caused by Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. Both the 
countries signed agreements for economic and technical cooperation whereby 
Soviet assistance to India was considerably increased.^ ^ 
Gorbachev proposed to promote the idea of collective security for Asia 
originally initiated by late Brezhnev. He admitted that it was not easy to give 
practical shape to this proposal. Acknowledging India's important role in Asia, 
the Soviet leader said that, we appreciate the contribution of India in 
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strengthening international peace and security, and applaud India's contribution 
in promoting the role of Non-aUgned Movement in this endeavor".^^ 
A significant Delhi Declaration was issued at the end of Gorbachev's 
Delhi visit. It was signed by Rajeev Gandhi and Gorbachev. On his arrival in 
India Gorbachev had warned that if Indo-Pak disputes were not amicably 
solved then it could lead to serious consequences. He had expressed the hope 
that, like India, Pakistan would also behave like a good neighbor. Another 
significant announcement was made by him. He said that the USSR not attempt 
to improve relations even with China at the cost oflndo-Soviel friendship."*" 
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation were, as 
mentioned earlier, renewed in 1991 for a further period of 20 years. This was a 
proof of sustained ties between the two countries, and, in a way, brought India 
under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The Cold War had ended at the end of 1989, 
but a new environment had been created in the Soviet Union by various 
reforms initiated by Party General Secretary Gorbachev. Meanwhile, in India 
the power was transferred from Rajiv Gandhi led Congress Government to a 
minority Janata Dal Government. After a brief period of lack of warmth. Prime 
Minister V.P. Singh paid a visit to the USSR in 1990. This renewed the warmth 
in the bilateral relations. The Soviet position on Kashmir was reiterated. It was 
decided to renew the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and it was decided to continue 
till 1995 the rupee-rouble trade arrangement. Thus, Indo-Soviet relations 
showed mature and stable friendship. 
During 1990-91, India generally supported the position taken by the 
Soviet Union in the Gulf crisis. India, like the Soviet Union, had decided to 
fiirther consolidate relations with the PLO and yet initiated steps to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel. A minor irritant was noticed when Chandra 
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Shekhar Government allowed refueling facilities to US war planes flying 
towards the Gulf during the war."°' 
Most surprisingly the 1985-1990 period of Perestroika witnessed little 
substantial progress in the relations between India and the Soviet Union. The 
situation exacerbated by growing pro-western tilt of Soviet policy and the 
economic crisis it faced in the closing years of the perestroika period. Mikhail 
Gorbachev during 1986-87 was known for his policy of glasnost which 
provided a greater degree of freedom for mass media, and pcrmiltcd free 
discussion of some previously censored aspects of Russian history as well as 
more critical views concerning contemporary Politics. Gorbachev also 
announced a programme of economic reforms known as perestroika the 
purpose of which was to liberalize the economic system by introducing market 
mechanism, competiton and private initiatives. In his view, transformation of 
the communist economy would be possible by freeing Soviet industry from the 
stultifying effects of centralization and bureaucratization. He felt that the 
objective could be achieved making Soviet enterprises more accountable and 
therefore more efficient. 
Despite his best efforts,when Gorbachev failed to achieve the objectives 
he had view particularly improvement in the economy, settlement of ethnic 
differences and rehabilitation of the administrative machinery through his two 
pet concepts glasnost and perestroika, he decided to give a chance to anew 
move. This he wanted to do through the signing of a Union Republican treaty 
which he proposed to get signed on 21 August 1991.This treaty sought to 
provide for a new decentralized set up in which the republics would be given 
more autonomy in a loose federation. The glasnost and perestroika, despite its 
limitations, a great impact on the thinking on foreign affairs. The Soviet 
decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan from 15 February 1989 
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represented a significant and crucial event in the rapid ideological, foreign and 
domestic reforms undertaken by Gorbachev.The Soviet withdrawal was 
important internationally because it bolstered the existing forces for reforms in 
the Soviet bloc.'"^ 
The year 1991 saw numerous changes in the erstwhile Soviet Union and, 
what were known as its satellite states in Eastern Europe. Communism 
collapsed and democratic governments were installed one after the other in 
most of the East European countries. In the Soviet Union itself the reforms 
initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev had tremendous impact on the society and the 
people aspired for and got fiiU democratic rights. In a country that had totally 
controlled economy and politics for 70 years, Perestroika and Glasnost gave a 
new shape to the Soviet economy and politics. But the reforms also led to the 
end of monopoly of power of the Communist Party and introduction of multi-
party democracy. An attempt in August 1991 to overthrow the reformist 
Gorbachev and restoration of communist power miserably failed. During the 
period of crisis in the USSR, India made a serious error by commenting that it 
would deal with the new government in USSR because overthrow of 
Gorbachev by the hardliners was the internal matter of that country. When the 
coup failed and Gorbachev came back to power, India faced a very 
embarrassing situation. 
The Soviet Union suddenly disintegrated in December 1991 and the 
mighty state of USSR was replaced by 15 Republics. Russian Republic as 
recognized by the international community as the successor state of USSR. At 
the time of disintegration, a loose union of erstwhile Soviet republics was 
created and called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). India has 
maintained friendly and cooperative relations not only with Russian Federation 
but also the other Members of CIS.'"'' 
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CHAPTER-2 
DISINTEGRATION OF SOVIET UNION 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union is one of the most epoch-making 
events in the history of mankind. It has transformed the whole nature of global 
politics and dramatically altered the basic parameters in which the various 
relationships between nations, states and classes have hitherto operated. If the 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant that world would change, what emerges 
from the present flux will determine the direction of that change. However, the 
pace of change were so quick and fast that left the political analysts and 
observers completely confused and bewildered, starting with Gorbachev's 
'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost', followed by the 'Union Treaty' and unsuccessful 
'August Coup', and, on top of all, the disintegration of the mighty Soviet 
Union, the events moved at such a speed that even before the fallout of one was 
assessed, the other came with a bang.' 
Not surprisingly, almost eleven years after the fall of the Soviet 
Communist state, academics all over the world are still puzzled and perplexed 
trying to find out the reasons for the collapse. Unfortunately, no satisfactory 
answer to this question is available so far. At this stage, one can only speculate 
on why the USSR disintegrated. Paradoxically, the attempt to reform the Soviet 
system led to its collapse. A brief analysis of the reforms and the processes 
which emerged as their consequences would show that it was the conjecture of 
the objective and the subjective contradictions-the long term accumulation of 
weaknesses and short-term methods of their resolution, which broke the Soviet 
Union into 15 independent Republics. 
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Controversies surround the method of Gorbachev's reforms of 
'Perestroika and Glasnost. But this doesn't detract from the fundamental issues 
that reform was essential for the Soviet system.Gorbachev's reforms were not 
evolutionary or systematic, they attacked the system from all sides and a 
number of issues were raised simultaneously. He introduced the policy of 
"Glasnost" which he feU would help mobilize people for reform, and initiate a 
communication revolution in the Soviet Union. However, this in term initiated 
the course of the legitimizing the Communist party and the very basis of the 
Soviet system. The reforms eventually brought the ethnic problems and 
subsequent demands for independence of republics to the forelront, promising 
to put an early end to Perestroika. 
Whatever other weakness of the soviet state that might be revealed by 
deeper historical analysis, one thing is clear, its biggest weakness has been the 
absence of democracy and civil liberties.Stalinisim gradually transformed the 
soviet system into a totalitarian structure, which, over the years, caused not 
only to economic stagnation but also to cultural stagnation and intellectual and 
creative atrophy. 
Initially, the soviet people assumed that the absence of democracy and 
civil liberties was a temporary aberration caused by the necessity of the 
socialist state to survive in a hostile international environment. But what 
seemed to be a temporary adjustment to concrete historical circumstances soon 
became a system, a structure which resisted democratization even when 
circumstances favored it. 
Moreover, the Soviet economy has become lopsided with a very high 
defense account up to 40 percent of the budget was linked to defense 
expenditure. Technological upgradation was concentrated in the defense sector. 
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The consumer sector was continually neglected. In other words, rise of 
consumerism as great influence on the minds of new generation of soviet 
people. They were enamored by consumerism of the west, slow rate of 
economic growth in general and incompetent and inadequate number of 
consumer industries in particular in the former soviet union and all round the 
economic development in the capitalist countries of Europe and the USA led to 
the belief among the people of the ex-USSR that capitalism is a better 
economic system for them then socialism. That mood of the people is 
dominated by the sprit of consumerism in all walks of life. This new concept of 
consumerism backed up by personal freedom will have its new dynamism in 
the decades to come not only in the erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
but also in the whole world.^  
Causes of Soviet Disintegration 
Mikhail Gorbachev during 1986-87 was known for his policy of 
glasnost (openness) which provided a greater degree of freedom for mass 
media, and permitted free discussion of some previously censored aspects of 
Russian history as well as more critical views concerning contemporary 
politics. Now the new freedom contributed towards the creation of a 
distinctively Russian milieu in which, the media, now freed from censorship, 
acted as forum for debate of public issues not only exposing the contours of 
public sentiments but also shaping them .Freedom of press acted as a major 
form of control over executive power and newspapers took great pride in 
calling themselves the fourth state. 
Gorbachev also announced a programme of economic reforms known as 
perestroika the purpose of which was to liberalize the economic system by 
introducing market mechanism, competition and private initiatives. In his view, 
transformation of the communist economy would be possible by freeing Soviet 
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industry from the stultifying effects of centralization and bureaucratization. He 
felt that the objective could be achieved by making Soviet enterprises more 
accountable and therefore more efficient. In his view they would survive only 
by cutting costs and retaining and expanding their market share. 
Despite his best efforts, when Gorbachev failed to achieve the objectives 
he had in view particularly improvement in the economy, settlement of ethnic 
differences and rehabilitation of the administrative machinery through his two 
pet concepts glasnost and perestroika, he decided to give a chance to a new 
move. This he wanted to do through the signing of a Union Republic treaty 
which he proposed to get signed on 21 August 1991.This treaty sought to 
provide for a new decentralized set up in which the republics would be given 
more autonomy in a loose federation. 
The western interpretation is constrained to concede the absence of 
political pluralism as one of the few main causes. This element of the western 
interpretation highlighting the absence of political pluralism, democratic norms 
and practices, disregarding of human rights and freedom in the former USSR, 
making signal contribution to the collapse has to be conceded to a great extent.^  
The Root Cause for the Disintegration of Soviet Union 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was economic in nature. At the 
heart of the problem was the Soviet Union's command economy. But economic 
policy since its inception had been to increase inputs (e.g., labor, capital, raw 
materials, and energy) to bolster production. Up to the 1960s, this formula 
resulted in an impressive growth rate, because Soviet planners before then were 
still enroute to mobilizing the full potential of all available inputs. The problem 
with input-induced economic growth is that it is wasteful. By contrast, 
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capitalist economies carefully consider the extent and type of inputs used and 
compensated by maximizing productivity, that is, efficient production of goods. 
In the 1970s, as economic power rose to prominence, the Soviet input 
potential was employed to the limit; productivity stagnated. Industrial plants 
overdue for overhauls simply continued to produce goods of questionable 
quality using time-honored methods of inefficient production. Lacking the 
stimuli that exist in open-market economies, dependent upon a derelict traffic 
and transportation system, and distinguished only by pervading corruption, the 
Soviet Union began to fall behind the standards set by the international 
economy."* 
Thus the 'collapse of the Soviet Union' leaves a vacuum in the 
international political system. The Soviet Union played an important role 
against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation 
movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, 
which found themselves against the Western bloc of countries. 
DISINTEGRATION OF SOVIET UNION AND IMPACT ON INDIA 
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the break-up of the Soviet-Union 
in December 1991 dealt a body blow to India's foreign policy framework, 
necessitating a through review of the assumptions on which this framework 
was based. Events happened with bewildering rapidity for which India had not 
prepared itself. The shock was more devastating as it was so unexpected and 
the collapse was so dramatic. 
The Soviet Union was succeeded by the Russian federation and the 
people in Russia went through traumatic experience which has yet to end. 
Slowly and gradually the pieces are being picked and a surer policy is bringing 
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established, ll has certainly been a painful experience, the almost precipitous 
lowering of living standards, the fall in production, the amazing rise in 
unemployment and the equally amazing levels of corruption, the decline in 
central authority, the specter of the ugly face of the mafia, the increasing 
disparities and so on. 
The worst is perhaps not yet over, but at least now there is a semblance 
of order and some re-establishment of central authority. The wheels of 
production have started moving although even the previous levels have not 
been achieved. At least foreign policy assumed some recognizable shape and 
Russia has begun to assert itself in a somewhat more determined manner with 
better coherence and purposefulness. Both Moscow and New Delhi are 
discovering that geopolitical realties do not vanish even in the winds of 
change.^  
The demise of the Soviet Union inevitably created serious problems, no 
less in Indo-Russian relationship too. Not just that no longer in a position to 
advance the kind of economic and technological assistance that it gave earlier, 
but also the two countries had to grapple with the need for a new adjustment in 
their relations. India had built up a rather heavy stock Soviet Union nearly $7 
billion. Since and as long as was in rupee-rubble terms, the problem was , but 
the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the cash-strapped successor state 
teetering around an acute financial crisis first desired the payment to be made 
in hard currency. Moreover the exchange rate between a free falling rubble and 
rupee was a contentious issue. 
What was worse was that the anarchic conditions in Russian industry 
and the virtually forced decentralization that had made the previously normal 
economic relationship cumbersome and hazardous. That accounted for the 
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steep decline in the trade between the two countries in the early year's 
following the demise of the Soviet Union. 
For India the most critical area was the supply of defense equipment and 
spares from Russia. A significant segment of India's defense requirements had 
been supplied by Moscow, With the altered political and economic conditions 
in Russia the supply became erratic and fitful, creating serious bottlenecks and 
problems for India's armed forces. In the early years of the successor Russian 
Federation, this was a matter of serious concern to the Indian Government and 
the military brass.^ It took, considerable deliberations and efforts from both 
sides to get a grip over the problem and turn around the defense relationship. 
It appeared as if India would now be more conscious of developing new 
links with the western powers. But soon it appeared that the structural change 
in the constitutional frame work of the Soviet Union would not much affect 
India's relationship though it may have to renew it under different names. The 
new Commonwealth of states appeared to be keen on diversifying its relation 
with India which formerly was dictated by the interests of the former Soviet 
Union. Despite the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union, it was 
not presumed here that some drastic change was going to occur in Indo-Soviet 
relations.^ 
These developments created a new problem of diplomatic adjustment for 
India. To meet the challenge posed by the collapse of the USSR as a monolith, 
India decided to split its embassy in Moscow in two separate divisions, one 
accredited to the Union to deal with Boris Yeltsin on one hand and the other to 
the Gorbachev's Russian federation. Simultaneously two new consulates, one 
each at St. Petersburg (till recently Leningrad) and Vladivostok were opened to 
help continue India's relations with both. 
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India decided to upgrade its relations witii the tliree Soviet republics 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine in order to provide direct dialogue with 
through diplomatic channel. It was feh in India that in view of Gorbachev's 
greater preoccupations with domestic economic and political issues, he would 
not be able to give much thought to the third world countries including India. 
Since the USSR was involved in Afghan crises, its first concern was to end the 
Mujahideen nuisance which it hoped to do with the active support of Pakistan. 
Moscow would have to be a little more liberal in extending economic aid to 
Pakistan and also to adopt a more pro-Pakistani attitude towards Kashmir. This 
may be at the cost of India but the Soviet Union had to look to its own national 
interests.* 
According to some analysts, there were other factors which would not 
allow Indo-Soviet relations to get diluted. India had acquired enough self 
confidence to tackle new problems on its own resources. This would make its 
dependence on the Soviet Union irrelevant. Moreover, under the stewardship of 
Gorbachev the USSR had gone so close to the USA that India could develop 
cordial relations with each super power without offending the other. Then there 
was an unbroken continuity of cordial relationship between the two countries 
extending over four decades during which there arose hardly any issue on 
which there were irreconcilable differences. Such a sound relationship could 
not be wished away merely by some differences which would fade away in 
course of time. 
Despite the fact that Russia remained embroiled in the crisis after crisis 
it did not leave Indian affairs ignored. At the instance of Russia the two 
countries had agreed in January 1991, to change some important features of the 
1971 treaty in order to eliminate the suspicion of the US and others that by that 
treaty India has compromised its non-aligned status. But the changed terms of 
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the treaty would confirm Indo-Soviet desire for continuing economic and 
scientific cooperation and the Russian supply of military hardware to India. 
One important reaction to these changes was some corresponding 
change in Indo-US relations. The US agreed to supply defense material as well 
as to have joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean area consistent with 
continuing the policy of non-alignment. This cooperation also upstaged US 
supply of high technology and scientific shares.^  
The beginning of the end of Cold War is thus attributed to the launching 
of perestroika and glasnost and the disintegration Soviet Union as the logical 
culmination of it. Within this broad view, however, it does not mean that the 
eclipse of the Soviet Union was inevitable in the process even though 
Gorbachev's new thinking acted as a catalytic agent all through. In brief, the 
end of Cold War need not have coincided with the end of the post war global 
system.'° 
On the contrary, India may come under greater pressure in certain 
matters such as the signing of NPT. Horizontal proliferation, on which both the 
Super Powers agreed ever since the signing of the NPT, has now acquired top 
priority." Following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation 
is in the forefront of global strategic thinking. As Russia, as a successor of the 
Soviet Union, may not always come to the rescue of India or other such 
countries, the global constraints in this respect have increased. Ever since 
Sept.-Oct. 1991, Indian public opinion and political parties have articulated 
deep concern over mounting pressure of USA on India to sign the NPT which 
both the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of India denied. The latter even 
made a statement in the Parliament that India would not sign the NPT. 
Nevertheless, fact remains that in the new global situation, India's position has 
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become more vulnerable on this issue. That USA can even indulge in arm 
twisting tactic has been evident in the case of the supply of rocket technology 
to India by Russia. Therefore, while an all out nuclear war between the two 
Super Powers has become a remote possibility, so have the strategies of nuclear 
deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction. But, the nuclear or traditional arms 
race between the local powers has not ceased to exist. It is for these reasons, it 
can be said that the above stated advantages flowing from the end of the Cold 
War need not accrue to the Third World countries as a matter of course.'^  
Because of India's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and 
economic bond with the members of the socialist bloc, the change cuts deep in 
to our foreign policy strategies followed within the framework of a bi-polar 
global political and economic system. The strategy of our foreign policy of 
non-alignment is being questioned and the need or utility of this treaty, it is 
now being argued, stands outmoded. Special relationship with Russia has no 
relevance in a unipolar global system in which Moscow strategically and 
economically is not different from Washington, London, and Paris. The 
imperatives of the new situation, therefore, demand that we should "dump our 
traditional slothful friends and hitch our wagon to the western fast track. '^  
Impact on Defense Sector 
In the non-economic areas also the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
affected India adversely. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important 
implications are in defense and military areas. India, as we know, was buying a 
very large number of military weapons, equipment and hardware from the 
Soviet Union. These included Mig fighter aircrafts, battle tanks, submarines 
etc. During 1986-90, according to one estimate, about 73 percent of the total 
value of arms imported by the Indian defense forces originated in the Soviet 
Union.''' Practical difficulties which confront Indian armed forces since 1991 
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include, replacement of the spare parts as well as replenishment of the existing 
stock. The matter assumed such a seriousness that the Defense Minister of 
India, Sharad Pawar, had to rush to Russia In Sept. 1992 to bail out the armed 
forces of its immediate difficulties. At the end of the visit while there was some 
hope in the improvement of the situation, it was evident that ultimately India 
will have to explore alternate sources.'^  Moscow, it is argued, may not be in a 
position to meet the Indian demands as paucity of funds may force Russians to 
close down their units. Besides, many of the Russian scientists and technocrats 
are reported to have left the country and got jobs in the Western countries 
where they are promised better salaries and employment opportunities.'^ ' 
whatever existing military weapons and hardware are in stock in the member 
states of CIS. They would like to sell them in the Western markets In order to 
earn foreign exchange. Above all, one significant advantage which accrued to 
India in procuring armaments and equipment from the Soviet Union i.e., on 
credit, is most unlikely to be revived. 
Although Russia has put forward a proposal of military collaboration 
with India, but the harsh reality is that Moscow does not feel the strategic need 
of India in the post Cold War period. As a matter of fact decline in the strategic 
significance of India to Moscow began with the improvement of relations 
between the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, when Gorbachev started 
giving priority to good relations with the West which was to provide loans and 
technologies, there was a sea change in the geo-strategic perceptions of the 
Soviet Union.'^  Now when Russia is strategically integrated with Europe and 
China has ceased to be a socialist rival, need for a strategic consensus with 
India does not have the same relevance as in the previous two decades. In brief, 
diplomatically India cannot hope to depend on Russia to the same extent as she 
did on the Soviet Union. 
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It is unlikely to expect USA to throw her tbrmer military and political 
allies, like Pakistan, totally in the lurch, if and when issues and problems like 
Kashmir come for discussion in the United Nations or elsewhere. All the same 
India cannot depend upon the Russia support in the changed situation. What is 
required is that strategic and diplomatic losses here and there should be 
compensated with new initiatives and modified responses to meet the 
exigencies of the new situation.'^  
Undoubtedly, defense ties constituted a critical element in Jndo-Ru.ssian 
relations. Like the erstwhile Soviet Union, Russia came to be a predominant 
supplier of military hardware and spares to India. As the Indian armed forces 
had large quantities of Russian arms, the supply of spares had also to come 
from Russia. The figures provide their own tell-tale story: the rate of 
dependency for Russian spares was 40 per cent for the army, 60 per cent for the 
air force and 80 per cent for the navy.'' India's defense requirement included 
modernization of equipment and a state-of-the-art air defense. We have already 
noted the early hiccups in this defense relationship as a result of the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the centralized production apparatus in 
the economy as well as in defense industries. 
Gradually the obstacles were overcome to an extent, and from 1997 
onwards Russia was again on the way towards establishing a special position in 
the supply of defense-related equipment. 
India and Russia decided in March 1997 to continue defense ties into the 
21st century and Russia offered a new air defense system and a $10 billion 
military deal. Significant agreements were reached during Yevgeny Primakov's 
visit in December (1999) when cross-century defense relationship was 
formalized. Described as 'cooperation 2010 Document' it envisaged 
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partnership in research, development and joint production ol' sophisticated 
equipment besides incorporating other defense areas.^ *^  
The defense ties expanded phenomenally between 1999-2000. India 
contracted to purchase, among other items, 40 super class jet fighters, Sukhoi 
SU-30K, of which the first installment came last year. It may be noted that this 
was the modem jet fighter that had not even been fully inducted into the 
Russian air force and that China had been supplied only SU-27.29 Russia was 
also set to supply state-of-the-art T-90 battle tanks. 
The then Defense Minister George Fernandez went to Moscow in June 
2000 to negotiate new defense deals. He described his discussions with the 
Russian President and the Russian Defense Minister as 'path-breaking' with a 
$400 million deal for the supply of 100 T-90 main battle tanks (MBT) and for 
the production of another 200 MBT in India. It was also agreed that Russia 
would complete delivery of SU-30 MKI fighter jets to India by 2003 as part of 
an earlier $1 .8 billion contract. The fighter jets would also be produced under 
license in India. 
The two countries also formalized the defense deal during the Russian 
President's visit by which India contracted in $ 3 billion deal to purchase 310 
T-90 tanks and 140 Sukhoi 30 MKI multi- role fighters. What was significant 
was that the technology for their manufacture in India would also be 
transferred. India would also acquire subsequently the aircraft carrier Admiral 
Gorshkov and pay only for the refitting charges. 
The problems relating to the debt issue elicited serious deliberation from 
both sides. The Russians agreed in July 1999 that Russian would utilize the 
rupee-rubble debt fiands for investment in projects in India. This was decided 
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during the first Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Viktor Khnstenko's visit towards 
the end of July. Both countries are now taking the measure of the problem but a 
great deal remains to be done. Something vital will be missing in their 
relationship if the economic content was not deepened.^ ^ 
With the liquidation of the Soviet empire the Central Asian Republics 
offer an opportunity for India of opening up whole "new vistas of economic 
cooperation". Technologically and industrially backward as compared to the 
European Republics, the new sovereign States of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan would stand to gain as much out of expanded relationship with -
'India. Geo-politically speaking, these Republics are closer to the sub-continent 
than Europe. South Block, it appears, has taken note of it as was evident from 
the visits of the political leaders from these countries in 1991-92 and economic 
agreements signed with them. It is through these new bonds of friendship with 
these States that India can hope to salvage whatever is left of the Indo-Soviet 
friendship. 
Likewise changes have taken place in other parts of Europe and in the 
First World as a sequel to the developments in the Second World and Soviet 
Union. Hence, it is suggested that India will also have to build new bonds of 
trust and understanding and exploit opportunities even Within the Western 
camp. To quote a former Indian diplomat: 
"Now we will have to learn to lobby with the Americans and the 
Europeans and create groups which will look after our interests in their 
countries, both politically and economically."^^ 
As per this line of thinking, it will be unrealistic to deal with USA and 
Europe as one bloc. In fact, as was apparent during the Gulf crisis and War in 
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1990-91. European countries, particularly both France and Germany, did not 
fully endorse US perception of the crisis and or the strategy of resolving the 
crisis. The difference was more conspicuous in the initial stages of the crisis. 
Eventually, however, because of their common oil interests in the region, 
Europe and USA waged a war under the aegis of the United Nations. But, in 
South Asia or in the sub-continent, these countries are in the process of re-
defining their strategic and political interests. 
Consequently, India will also have to learn to deal with them separately 
and not as a bloc. In the coming decades, it is possible that both USA and 
Western Europe would be competing for markets both in East Europe and in 
the Third World. Since India, too, offers a very large consumer market, such a 
competition can be diplomatically exploited by her to sit her economic 
advantage. Therefore, as United Europe is willing to help their freed 
neighbours and open the door for them to institutions like the Council of 
Europe and the European Community."^ '* Europe may act as an autonomous 
centre of power towards the close of the century. It is this global scenario 
which Indian policy planners would not be able to ignore altogether. 
Like Unified Germany in Europe, Japan in Asia is another economic 
Super Power to be seriously reckoned with, by India and the Third World. 
Japan's interests in Southeast Asia on East Asia have priority over those of 
U.S.A. Therefore, USA and Japan might compete with each other in these 
regions. It is in this context that India's expanded diplomacy - economic and 
political - with Japan sounds most logical. The domestic economic crunch has 
motivated India to lure Japanese capitalists to invest money in the Indian 
market. Economic linkages may soon be extended to include the political and 
strategic areas. Rising Sun of Asia is all set to embark on a bold peace 
offensive. Two particular events, Tokyo's decision to participate in the peace 
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keeping operations in Cambodia, and Japanese Emperor's visit to China, 
signify the prospective role that Tokyo would play in the Asian affairs in 
future. Therefore, India might also have to learn to live with this changed 
reality. 
In short, with the dismantling of the red and white blocs there are 
several more, grey and pink areas which have emerged on the global scene. A 
declined world offers conditions for building up of new cooperative and 
beneficial ties, both on bilateral and multilateral bases.^ ^ 
In the new global order India will have to pay maximum attention to the 
improvement of relations with her neighbuors. The courses of dialogues with 
most of the neighbouring countries including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and China, 
which have been in progress on certain pending issues, are welcome 
developments. But, as far as Pakistan is concerned, no encouraging 
developments have so far taken place and an atmosphere of doubt and 
suspicion persists. Nevertheless, as internal situation in Pakistan is worsening, 
hopefully Islamabad does ultimately realize the futility of an anti-Indian 
posture in the region. In view of Pak-US ties becoming more problematic, there 
are signs of political realism. Pakistan's top military brass have realized that a 
Military option vis-a-vis India will not be in the interest of people and the 
country. "If this trend continues the armies emerge as the pillars of confidence-
building in Indo-Pakistan affairs."'^ ^ If this happens, South Asia will' be able to 
utilize adequate the given potential in regional cooperation. Resources, skills 
market opportunities needed for the long term economic industrial 
development of each country will then be possible. 
It is characteristic of the new global order which has emerged in the post 
Cold War period and after the collapse the Soviet Union, that reordering of the 
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old ties and reasons are necessary. As a result of the process of dealignment, 
building new bridges, striking of new bonds of friendship and mutual 
cooperation are in sight. Undoubtedly, for India, it poses fresh challenges. But, 
it also offers new opportunities which, if handled with diplomatic skill and 
single-mindedness, can be exploited India's advantage.^ '' 
Impact of Economic Reforms in Russia on Trade with India 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a disruption for many 
sectors of Indian economy. Many of these problems that Russia has been lacing 
in its economic sphere have affected India's trade and economic relations with 
Russia. As per on the basis of DGCI and S data, total trade turnover between 
India and Russia declined sharply from over $2,368 million in 1991-92 to $ 
860 million in 1992-93. Although there was some improvement in trade 
turnover is subsequent years, during the period 1993-99, India's exports to 
Russia have been in the range of about $ 600 to 1,000 million per annum. 
Annual export data does not show any steadiness and in fact there have been 
wide fluctuations in exports over the years. Similarly, India's yearly imports 
from Russia have been fluctuating in the range of $250 to $ 850 million. For 
India, the former Soviet Union was an important trading partner of India, which 
is no more the case at present. Similarly, India has lost its position among 
Russia's foreign trade partners. Moreover, there is lack of growth and 
dynamism which should be a matter of concern for the policy makers and 
business community at large. 
It is important to note that some large industrial houses which were 
operating for many years during the Soviet era wound up their establishments 
in Moscow presumably due to uncertain and unfavorable socio-economic 
conditions prevailing in the country. Equally significant was the fact that 
several projects that were initiated in the early 1990's by some reputed Indian 
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companies to set up processing units in Russia including 4nat..Qf..TataVtBa 
processing and packaging unit miserably failedMndia's Finance J*^i^^er 
Yashwant Sinha has, in his address in Mumbai dur^^5;;Putin'Tr^^^fg with 
Indian business community, opined that there were a few shortcomings with 
regard to trade with Russia. There are some experts and businessman who 
consider that the prevaiUng mechanism of trade has not done much good for 
promoting Indo-Russian trade. What is more, 80-85 per cent of this annual 
export trade is accounted for by debt repayment funds (DRF) and that too 
mainly concentrated on a few traditional items such as tea, coffee, tobacco, 
rice, leather etc. '["here arc very few nonlradilional items in India's export 
basket with the exception of pharmaceutical products. Hence one would 
legitimately question about the prospects of India's trade with Russia beyond 
say, 2005 when DRF are fully utilized. Hence the visit of Russian President 
Vladimir Putins to India and agreements signed by both the countries and 
opportunities created after the visit should be utilized for finding ways and 
means to revive trade and economic relations between India and Russia. 
Notwithstanding the prevailing situation as mentioned above, there has 
been a realization on the part of both in India and Russia about vast potential 
for growth in trade economic relations between the two countries given their 
large size, vast resource potentialities, skilled manpower etc. Both the countries 
have also good record of trade and economic co-operation during the Soviet 
era. Moreover, as pointed out by India's finance minister at the Mumbai 
meeting with the Russian President, both the countries have initiated economic 
policies of liberalization, privatization and greater integration with the world 
economies which should enhance scope for closer economic ties. Hence as an 
appropriate step in this direction leading Indian business group such as the CII, 
FICCI have rightly taken initiative in identifying some specific areas of co-
operation with Russia. 
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For instance in their assessment, given skilled manpower Irom India and 
Russia's strong R and D base coupled with hardware design capabilities, there 
is vast scope for the two countries to collaborate in areas such as IT including 
advanced computing, biotech (including pharmaceuticals), telecommunication, 
training of personnel in managerial and financial services and so on. There are 
other areas of co-operation which are identified by Russia and were specified 
during the recent visit of the Russian deputy prime minister Ilya Klebanov to 
India. They include power engineering, new materials, utilization of industrial 
waste, environment control systems and instrumentation.^ ^ 
Bilateral Level: The Techno-Commercial Impulse 
The end of the Soviet era posed special difficulties for India, particularly 
in the military realm given its huge dependency on Soviet arms transfers for 
spare parts and equipment. During this crunch, the Indian Defense Ministry 
was even forced to turn to Ukraine and East European states as a stop gap 
measure. As Indo-Soviet ties unraveled at a dizzying speed, India faced 
multiple crises in the security and economic spheres, with not only its strategic 
framework in shambles, but also in the financial sector, where the country was 
left with just enough foreign exchange to cover a fortnight's worth of imports. 
Russia could offer no help for the latter emergency even if it wished to 
do so, revealing its stark limitations and lopsided development. Indeed, the 
rupee-ruble arrangement that had earlier been viewed as innovative and 
uniquely helpful became a burden to both countries and only complicated 
India's financial situation. Besides, in India's view, Russia was 
unceremoniously dumping its erstwhile 'special' partner with unseemly haste 
in the new Russia's rush into the western fold.^ ° 
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Emerging Trends in Indo-Russian Relations 
Indo-Russian relations have begun to unfold new trends which stand as a 
complete contrast to the situation soon after the demise of the Soviet Union and 
end of the bipolar world. The ruling elites in both the countries have begun to 
look at these relations with an open mind and without any ideological 
overtones. This is reflected in the recent tendencies in the relation between the 
two countries, both in geo-economic and geo-strategic terms. These relations 
have both continuity and change, though it will be incorrect to equate Indo-
Russian relations with Indo-Soviet relations. The driving force behind indo-
Russian relations in the beginning of the 2r ' century is commonality of geo-
political and geo-economic interests of both the countries in the new historical 
conditions. Notwithstanding that both the countries are witnessing changes in 
their internal economic and political structures. With India there came to be 
greater depth in the fast-emerging relationship. Russia and India began to 
redevelop a multifaceted political, economic, security and defense 
relationship.'" 
Indo-Russian Cooperation in the Field of Defense 
India's connections with Moscow always had a strong military side. 
Under the new regime, Russia was keen to continue with defense contracts. 
The receipts from defense contracts are in hard currency. Thus, despite US 
pressure on the Russians to stop military co-operation with India (which was a 
part of Clinton's talks with Yeltsin in September 1998), the Russians would 
like to strengthen defense exports. 
The reason for Russian interest is clear. Russian Military Industrial 
Complexes were in great need for funds. Despite the initial problems faced by 
the breakup of the Soviet Republics and dispersion of some defense industry, 
Russia revived the possibility of re-negotiating defense contracts and the 
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contracts on rocket and nuclear power technology. The US tried to impose 
sanctions on the Russian firm Glavkosmos, when they tried to cell cryogenic 
rocket to India. But here too, US advice was rejected. 
Indian military and defense orders now sustain many defense industries 
in Russia, especially in St. Petersburg and Irkutsk which would otherwise have 
faced closure at the time of transition in the Russian economy. India is the only 
country with which Russia has a long-term programme of military-technical 
co-operation, which was signed in 1994, till the year 2000. This was renewed 
for another 10 years, during the Primakov visit and a Defense Agreement until 
2010 with deals on aircraft carrier, planes and modernization. 
The Indo-Russian agreement on the sale of highly advanced air defense 
systems clinched by an Indian defense delegation to Moscow in September 
1998 was viewed by the Indian government as a feather in the cap for Indian 
security especially in the context of economic and military sanctions imposed 
by the USA. The Indo-Russian defense deals contribute to the new arms race 
that has been set off in the subcontinent after the Indian nuclear tests and the 
Pakistani response in May. Given the possibility of nuclear tipped Ghauri 
missiles and the Chinese M-11 missiles acquired by Pakistan. It is with this in 
mind that India sent a high level team to Moscow with a long shopping list. Six 
S-300V Anti- Tactical Ballistic Missiles costing billions of dollars are being 
purchased. Bilateral military programmes include that both countries help each 
others R&D efforts. India has a programme for 1 billion dollar with the Russian 
for the creation of new fighter planes the SU-30K1 fighters India also gets 
much naval hardware from the Russians and has recently acquired the 636-
class submarines Defense is thus the major component of Indo-Russian 
relations. It underlies the economic and strategic relations between the two. In 
fact it is the most privileged part of the relation."'"' 
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Reviving the old defense cooperation with India, the declaration 
highlights defense and military technical cooperation, service to service 
cooperation, Joint Research and Development (R&D) and training. In 1994, 
India and Russia reached an agreement on long-term bilateral military-
technical cooperation till the year 2000. This was extended by a decade in 
October 1997. On the government side the defense relationship will happen at 
the political level with the setting up of an Indo-Russian Inter Governmental 
Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation (IGCMTC). The Indian 
Defense Minister Mr. George Fernandez and the Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Mr. llya Klebanov will jointly head this. The IGCMTC will have two 
working groups and will meet annually. One group will be headed by the 
Defense Secretary of India and will deal with military-technical cooperation, 
the second one will be headed by the Secretary, Defense Production and will be 
involved in the production area of ship building, aviation and land systems. 
Acquisition of military hardware from Russia will give more teeth to the Indian 
armed forces in terms of its reach and capability. 
A new, cooperative sphere in the Indo-Russian relationship has been 
addressed in agreements. Inter-Governmental agreements were signed during 
President Putin's visit for the acquisition of the aircraft carrier Admiral 
Gorshkov, MIG-29 K fighters on board the Gorshkov, Kamov-31 and Kamov-
28 early warning helicopters, T60 S tanks and license production of 140 SU-30 
MKI in India. Nearly $3 billion defense contracts have been finalized. India 
would acquire complete technology transfer from Russia for indigenous 
production. Russia has also agreed to lease four Tu-22 M maritime 
reconnaissance, medium bomber aircraft to India. Final contracts however, are 
yet to be signed.^ '' 
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A total of eleven agreements were reached to enhance bilateral ties. At 
the governmental level, an Indo-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on 
Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural cooperation has been 
agreed upon through eleven working groups. In the oil and gas sector, India's 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. and Russia's Gazprom have signed a contract in the 
field of oil exploration. 
At present the Indian Navy has acquired two submarines and three 
frigates from Russia. The first of the two type 877 EKM Kilo class submarines 
Sindhurakshak', was commissioned into the Indian Navy on December 24th 
1997. The submarine was built by the Admiralteiskie Verifier (Admiralty 
Shipyards) of St. Petersburg, with Russian Baltic fleet instructors training the 
Indian crew. The 'Sindhushastra' is armed with Novator Alfa Klub anti-ship 
missiles with a range of 300 km, which could also be optimized for land attack 
roles. The Indian Navy's submarine fleet includes ten ex-Russian Type 877-
EKM Kilo class submarines four of the ten Kilo class submarines will be 
retrofitted with Klub missiles at a later date. The new submarine will cost 
around US $300 million each.^ ^ 
In addition, the Navy is also acquiring three Krivak-class frigates 
(Project 1135.6) from Russia, which will be used for Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) operations. They will have a speed of 30-32 knots and a range of 4000 
nm range at 14 knots. These vessels are fitted with SSM-Novator Alfa Klub 
missiles with a range of 300 kms. Besides these, the New Delhi class missile 
destroyer is exclusively fitted with Russian weaponry and sensors. These 
include SSM Zvezda missiles with a range of 130 kms and Gadfly with a range 
of 25 kms and the associated weapon designation system. A matter of 
considerable interest is the 44,500 tone Kiev-class aircraft carrier 'Gorshkov', 
which will cost around $ 750 million and will take three to four years to 
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complete. The carrier will be modified to provide a 12-14 Ski-jump for a short-
take-off-but-arrested-recovery (STOBAR) capability for its air wing. The refit 
would entail rewiring the carrier, upgrading its propulsion power and air 
conditioning systems. Around 1,700 personnel will be there to operate this 
carrier in tropical waters. There are plans to acquire the naval variant MIG-29 
K to be operated from aircraft carrier Gorshkov as and when it becomes part of 
the Indian Naval Fleet. About 40-45 MIG-29 Ks would be purchased. These 
will be armed with air-to-air, air-to-surface and television guided missiles as 
well as in-flight refuellers to increase the fighters' striking range to around 
600nm (1,111 km). These submarines, frigates and aircraft carrier will add to 
the Indian Navy's deceasing number of principal combatants. The Navy's 
maritime surveillance aircraft Tu-142M and reconnaissance aircraft 11-38 also 
require up gradation and engine overhaul, with Russian assistance. 
The modernization of MIG-21 Bis is in the advanced stage, flight trial 
testing is on and bulk up gradation would be done by Hindustan Aeronautics 
Limited (HAL) through the subsequent transfer of technology. The 
modernization of MIG-27s has also been decided. On the Su-30 MKI mission 
computer and its navigation, the Indian Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO) are collaborating with its Russian counterpart. SU-30 
MKI will have equipment from five countries like France, Israel, South Africa, 
And United Kingdom and of course India, integrated and proven by the 
Russians. Thirty new systems will be fitted into the Su-30 MKI. The two sides 
also decided to encourage collaboration between the defense scientists, 
especially in the field of avionics. 
The Air Force requires tanker aircraft to enhance the range and 
capabilities of deep-penetration fighter aircraft like the, Su-30MKI Mirage-
2000 and MIG-29. This mid air-to-air refueling will enhance the lethal power 
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of the aircraft by keeping them much longer in the air. The lAF has received 
four of forty Mil MI-17-IV transport helicopters ordered for $ 170 million 
earlier this year. By late 2001 the remaining helicopters will be delivered to 
India. It is expected that all forty helicopters will have 12 Vikhr-(M AT-16) 
medium range air-to-surface missiles. This laser guided weapon has a 
maximum range of around 10 km. 
India is buying 310 T-90S MBTs from Russia. The T-90S tank has a 
blend of layered armour and explosive reactive armour (ERA). The T-90S has 
a new Shtora-1 electronic system that deflects incoming missiles. Its missile 
power has a range of one kilometre over that of the T-72S and T-80MBT. 
According to the reports the T-90s laser guided missile system is capable of 
hitting enemy armour and helicopters at a range of up to 5 km. Indian and 
Russian negotiators are yet to resolve their differences over the price of r-90S 
MBl. The total value of the deal is likely to be $800 million with the outright 
purchase of 124 tanks in fully assembled state and 186 in semi-knocked down 
and completely knocked down conditions. Uralvagonzavod tank factory will 
manufacture T-90S tank for India. The contract also includes a license for 
production of more T-90 S tanks a the Avadi Heavy Vehicles Factory, which 
has been manufacturing T-72 tanks, with Russia supplying engines, fire control 
systems and some other components. Up gradation and modernization of 1,500 
T-72 tanks are on the cards. The Indian Army is also looking for self-propelled 
guns, which can fire 155mm rounds, and Tunguska anti-aircraft systems. 
The IGCMTC would look into the purchase of BM 9A52 SMERCH 
(Tornado) multiple rocket launchers, which can haul twelve 7.5 meter missiles 
in a single salvo to wipe out enemy personnel and hardware in an area of over 
67 hectares up to 90 km away and six S-300 PMU 1 how-to-high altitude air-
defense systems for protection against missiles and aircraft. The two sides are 
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currently negotiating financial terms. Also, India is looking into the in-depth 
modernization of Russian supplied surface-to-air Pechora missiles, which have 
already gone through trial tests in India. 
According to the report of t he Congressional Research Service, Russia 
is eyeing countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa in order to protect its 
military industrial complex. Dr. Richard F. Grimmett author of the 
Congressional report says that Russia looks towards China and India as its 
lucrative customers in the years to come. Russian arms sale to the developing 
countries is to the tune of $ 4.1 billion. 
Inherited from the Soviet era, Indo-Russian defense cooperation has 
stood the test of time. It would now be appropriate for both countries to work 
out an understanding on 'Strategic Partnership' covering whole range of issues-
economic, political and military. 
Russia understands the priority in broadening the bilateral defense 
cooperation to keep its own economy moving which is in some difficulty 
today. The survival of Russian defense industry is at stake. Capability is there 
which is to be harnessed. Russian equipment is sturdy and has the killer instinct 
but there is no timely technical backup system. India understands the need for 
the Russian defense industry to survive. It wants to deal with the manufacturer 
directly, not through any agencies. Joint venture and joint development 
between India and Russia is the need of the hour, which will progressively help 
in technology development in both the countries. Costing and pricing 
mechanism is still in the process of being developed. Inconsistency in the 
pricing system of the equipment is a matter of serious concern for India. 
Friendship prices are no longer available and hence, there arc prolonged 
negotiations on the Gorshkov and T-90 deals with Russia. Russia has accorded 
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'most favored nation' status to India as far as prices go. For the first-time price 
lists have been finalized. Su-30 contract was not finalized because of the 
pricing problem. Through the pricing mechanism this time, the problem has 
been overcome for lifetime. India understands the need for license production 
keeping in mind the economic viability.''^  
Indo-Russian Naval Cooperation 
It may be mentioned here that although the U.S. had begun reducing its 
military' forces worldwide, it has nofdonc so in Diego Oarcia. The Indo -
American naval relations are slowly taking roots but they are still uncertain. 
The U.S. government has proposed to have Indian naval escorts for U.S. navy 
vessels at the straits of Malacca. When approved by the Indian Cabinet, it will 
advance Indo-U.S. naval cooperation over the Malabar type exercise that was 
coordinated in 1995-1998. In the September 2002, India and the U.S. had their 
week-long naval exercise 'Malabar-4' which was tactical in nature and 
warfare-oriented, in the Indian Ocean. India may be keen to cooperate with the 
U.S. troops and provide escort to U.S. naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. But 
the crux of the problem is that despite this trend in Indo-U S. cooperation, the 
American administration still considers Pakistan as its strategic partner. The 
Indian defense experts cannot minimize this aspect. But it needs to make sure 
what it is going to gain fi-om such cooperation. As despite Indian's gesture of 
cooperation in fighting terrorism, the United States relies more on Pakistan and 
it remained the main player in America's retaliatory attack on Afghanistan. 
That being the position in the foreseeable future Indo-Russian naval 
cooperation will be a key factor in strengthening India's maritime strength. It is 
in this setting that the importance of India's negotiation with Russia for 
acquiring Gorshkov aircraft carrier should be seen. The long awaited package 
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deal for the acquisition of the Gorshkov aircraft carrier, as well as nuclear 
capable long-range bombers and submarines may be finalized in the near 
future. Defense Minister George Fernandez had indicated that we have agreed 
that all efforts will be made to complete the three contracts by the end of March 
2003".^ ^ 
It may be mentioned here that the 44,500 tonne Kiev-class Admiral 
Gorshkov aircraft carrier is tied to the supply of four Tu-22 M3 Backfire 
strategic bombers and two Akula-class nuclear powered submarines. 
Indian Navy has already acquired the capability of operating nuclear 
submarines on the earlier Russian leased out INS Chakra Class nuclear 
submarines in the eighties. The submarines were decommissioned in 1991. 
The Indian Navy has even subsequently been keeping alive its skill in 
operating a nuclear submarine. "Training of personnel is an on-going process". 
The Indian Navy also wants two Tu-22 (black .Tack) nuclear bombers on 
lease while its Tu- 124 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft are being 
overhauled. 
Russia has also made a formal after to India for jointly developing a fifth 
generation fighter, which is expected to roll out- simultaneously with the U.S. 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 
Regarding the delivery schedule of three Krivak-111 Class stealth 
frigates under construction in St. Petersburg the Defense Ministry hopes that all 
the three warships Talwar, Trishul and Tabar has been handed over to the 
Indian Navy.-'* 
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These facts show that within the framework of naval cooperation with 
all the countries, at the present the Indo-Russian naval cooperation continues to 
be a key factor. 
Indo-Russian Nuclear Cooperation 
Vladimir Putin's visit to New Delhi led to an agreement on Indo-
Russian cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The earlier 
agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply of giant atomic power plants 
with a capacity of 1000 Mw. at Koodankulam, Tamilnadu had been signed in 
May 19S8. It was the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and General Secretary 
Milkhail Gorbachev who had initiated the agreement. 
The Russian Delegation with Mr. Reshenikov included some of the 
world's best nuclear scientists and technologists. Their arrival ahead of 
President Putin was significant. Nuclear cooperation in the peaceful use of 
atomic energy was firmed up. After the visit to RAPS Reshenikov mad it clear 
that four more units of the VVER type reactors of 1000 Mw capacity would be 
set up at Koodankulam. He remarked that from the economic point of view it is 
viable to have four units at the same site if not six. 
Mr. Reshenikov's contemporary Dr. V.K. Chaturvedi Chairman and 
Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPC) are 
respectively Co-Chairman of the co-ordination committee at Koodankulam. At 
their meeting in New Delhi on Sept. 28 it was decided to prepare a Detailed 
Project Report (DPR) on Koodankulam. 
Under the first agreement Kodankulam was to be a turnkey project with 
the NPC providing the site. The then USSR was to provide the design of the 
VVER 1000 type Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). It would also bring the 
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fuel, equipments, components and spares and build the reactors. Under the 
supplementary agreement that is a technical one Russia will give the NPC the 
design and bring most of the equipment whilst the NPC will build the two 
reactors. Russian will also supply the enriched uranium fuel for the life of the 
reactors. Unlike the RAPS, light water will be the moderator.^ ^ 
India and Russia have thus entered a new phase of nuclear cooperation. 
The construction of the Koodankulam reactors with the help of the Russian 
Federation would improve electricity generation and availability. The Russian 
delegation that accompanied Reshenikov included the dircrcctor general ZAO 
Atomstroy export, Dr. V.V. Koziov, Deputy Director General Dr. G. 0. 
Kumani, Director VVER Center, and RSC Kurchatov institute, Dr. G. 1. Lunin, 
Director Atomenergo project and Dr. A. B. Malyshev Atomstroy export 
handles the export of Russian reactors, components and fuel. Dr. Lunin, a 
nuclear scientist has worked on the core Physics of every type of reactor, Dr. 
Malyshev was in charge of the over all 1000 Mv reactors. 
Dr. Malyshev has opined that the VVER 1000 type reactors planned for 
Koodankularn would have additional safety features compared to the prototype 
made in Bulgaria. Russian nuclear power stations rank third in terms of safety 
after Japan and Germany. Russia was building two VVER type reactors in Iran 
and China also.''" 
A major feature of President Putin's visit to India was his trip to the 
Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) at Trombay, Mumbai on Oct. 5. This 
was indeed a significant development. It signals the support of a major head of 
state towards the strengthening of Indo-Russian relations. However, there were 
some points of divergence between New Delhi and Moscow of today on the 
politics of nuclear non-proliferation. 
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Russian President Putin urged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) during his visit to India. India has in any case stopped further 
nuclear resting since May 1998. Putin made his plea on the CTBT in a meeting 
with scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center in Trombay near 
Mumbai. He did however; appreciate the Indian stand that its natural interests 
and the needs of its people should also be considered, Yet Putin felt it would be 
better for India if it were to sign the CTBT.'" 
There is in the present era division between Moscow and New Delhi on 
Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control issues. Russia and China are two 
major powers who are both members of the UN Security Council as also a 
member of the NPT regime. Their strategic cooperation on military and 
nuclear issues is necessitated by the need to reduce tensions and concentrate on 
economic development, Russia would also favor the emergence of a Russia-
India-China triangulation of cooperation. The idea has as yet to take shape 
because neither India nor China would like to be freed from the bilateral 
arrangement that presently exists with the lone superpower the United States. 
Also China favors India's adversary Pakistan as a strategic partner and 
New Delhi has often enough cited China as a "threat" At another level, it must 
be pointed that the United States as a unipolar power has sought to object 
before the nuclear suppliers group to any further Indo-Russian nuclear 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.'^ ^ 
A major change took place when President Putin's visit to BARC and 
exemplifies Russia's evolving position on military- technical cooperation with 
India. He was the first Russian leader to tour BARC, joining only two other 
foreign leaders before, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou-en-Lai and British Prime 
Margaret Tharatcher.Putin's high-powered 70-member delegation, which 
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included Deputy Prime Minister, llya Klebanov, Foreign Ministe Igor Ivanov 
and Defense Minister Igo Sergeyev, attests to the importance the Russians give 
India in this new phase of their defense industrial strategy. 
India's former Atomic Energy Chairman Chidambaram has sought to 
portray Indo-Russian cooperation in the nuclear realms far-reaching and 'pan 
of an Indian plan to give significant impetus to the nuclear program. India's 
target, as outlined, is to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear-generated electricity 
by 2020. Chidambaram stated that although India had a self reliant nuclear 
power program based on indigcnizcd prcssuri/cd heavy ' water reactors 
(PHWR), the objective was to develop fast breeder reactors (FBRs) and 
thorium utilization in a closed nuclear fuel cycle, as well as modem light water 
reactors (LWR). 
The current production is limited, and the Indian nuclear program has 
come under criticism in terms of cost, efficiency and safety. So far however, 
the nuclear power establishment has warded off such criticism, in part pointing 
out the need for reducing the country's energy dependency, a view shared by 
successive Indian leaderships. The exigencies of working under external 
sanctions, imposed on India in light of its nuclear activity, has also allowed the 
nuclear energy program to enjoy a more exalted position than it might 
otherwise have had. 
It is precisely in the context of sanctions and other international regimes 
that Russia's role in the nuclear field becomes critical for India. India has been 
looking toward other suppliers such as France, but without immediate results. 
As a leading Indian strategic analyst commented, 'The reality is that Russia 
today is the only great power which is ready to cooperate with India in the 
atomic energy sector'.'*^ 
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Nuclear cooperation is not without costs for Russia, and Russian policy 
has not been entirely predictable vis-a-vis India. So far, Russia has been able to 
circumvent some of the most restrictive clauses of key relevant regimes of 
which Russia is a member because of loopholes and creative interpretation. At 
the moment, India does not appear to have much choice but to bank on 
Russia's stated and implied intentions. A critical testimony to the desire of the 
Russians to deepen future relations is the Memorandum of Understanding on 
peaceful nuclear energy uses signed along with the Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership during Putin's visit to India. While the latter has been made public, 
the former remains unpublished. 
Russia has been careful about not appearing to deviate from the most 
important nuclear export control mechanism, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and 
its guidelines. Russia itself has enacted national export control legislation, most 
notably the Federal Law 'On Export Controls' adopted in June 1999 by the 
Russian Parliament and signed by the President. There is also an Export 
Control Commission which has an impressive high level roster of 
representatives: the Federal Security Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Industry and Trade, the 
States Customs Committee, State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety 
of the Russian President and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The 
Commission determines whether contracts and agreements and some licenses 
comply with Russia's international commitments. 
According to some leading Russian critics, 'whole ministries are closely 
associated with certain companies in pursuing their short-term economic 
interests and ignoring long term Russian national interests'. A campaign 
against corruption was launched in spring 1999 by then Prime Minister 
Primakov which coincided with his other campaign to force Russian oligarchs 
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to follow the law. This may have led to his downfall when he was removed in 
May 1999. 
The most export-oriented ministries are the Ministry of Atomic Energy, 
the Russian Aviation and Space Agency and the Ministry of Economics which 
stands in some contrast to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The greatest Russian 
lobbyist for nuclear collaboration with India in recent times was the former 
Minister of Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, who ignited a storm of 
controversy when he indicated in an interview with the newspaper The Hindu 
in December 2000 that Russia might consider withdrawing from existing 
export control regimes. 
Adamov was making an oblique reference to the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) which was formed in 1975. Adamov cited China as an example 
since it is not a member of the NSG, but is part of the Zangger Committee 
which does not require full-scope safeguards. The NSG's Guidelines for 
Nuclear Transfers did not demand full-scope safeguards for non-nuclear states 
until 1992 following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon 
program. President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 312, which paralleled the 
NSG guidelines — though it exempted Russia's 1988 agreement with India to 
build two nuclear reactors at Kudankulam that provided for facility safeguards, 
thus meeting the requirements governing deals prior to 1992. 
In 1996, Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the NSG 
Guidelines. However, Putin took a step soon after he took office distancing the 
country's policy from NSG by amending Russia's export control legislation; in 
May 2000, Decree No. 312 was modified to allow nuclear supplies to non-
nuclear weapon states whose activities were not under full- scope safeguards in 
exceptional circumstances'. 
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The position of Russia's Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy) was that 
the new Decree significantly expanded Russia's nuclear export capability and 
that it was linked to Russia's intent to assist the Indian program. Indeed, Putin 
said as much when he noted in New Delhi that two more reactors in addition to 
Koodankulam were distinct possibilities.34 This was consistent with Adamov's 
promise in The Hindu interview that 'We will do our best to participate in 
India's ambitious programme to generate 20,000 MW of nuclear power by 
2020'."" 
In another positive signal, Russia came to India's rescue when China 
stopped badly needed supplies of enriched uranium fuel to Tarapur after India's 
1998 nuclear tests. India turned to Russia which began delivering supplies in 
February 2001, despite criticism from the west. For example, The Economist 
took the Russian leadership to task, calling Russia's nuclear dalliance with 
India', a result of 'the fissile nature of Russian polities'. The Russians were 
accused of falling back on old Soviet connections with India, allegedly often 
with the connivance of officials who are supposed to police any irregularities. 
Adamov, who was close to Putin, seems to have exerted strong influence 
on Indo-Russian nuclear policy. The Atomic Energy head apparently not only 
had Putin's ear hut was also close to certain influential business communities. 
According to some analysts, Putin's decision to sign the Decree in May 2000 
allowing nuclear supplies to non-nuclear countries which did not have full-
scope safeguards may have been a political move to support Adamov as the 
nuclear energy chief tried to increase nuclear sales abroad.''^ 
Crises in the over ridden by the drive for sales. Indeed, Adamov was 
perceived to have been replaced in March 2001 partly for his outspokenness 
(His interview to The Hindu), and enthusiasm for deals with Iran. His ouster 
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gave rise to speculation that the Ministry of Atomic Energy may abandon its 
attempts to substitute its corporate policy for state policy in nuclear non-
proliferation' thus providing an opportunity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
On the contrary, Adamov's successor, Alexander Rumyantsev, has come 
out firmly in favor of Russian nuclear assistance to India (and Iran for that 
matter). Rumyantsev, a former head of one of Russia's top nuclear labs, left no 
room for confusion, and in a news conference, stated that cooperation with Iran 
on the Bushehr nuclear power plant was strictly civilian and in keeping with 
international commitments. Indeed, he indicated that the Russians were 
considering a second reactor at Blusher and vowed to catch up if work was 
lagging behind schedule. Regarding India Rumyantsev took the long view and 
noted that 'India is our strategic partner. We want to ensure that there are no 
reproaches (from the international community) in this regard'."*^ He stated that 
Russia intends to build a nuclear power station in India despite international 
concern. 
Rumsyantsev's statements so far should put to rest any sentiment that 
the replacement of Adamov would have negative repercussions for Indo-
Russian relations in the nuclear sector as initial analysis might have suggested. 
Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation would seem to have support at the highest 
levels of Russian leadership, at least for now. But it is no secret that India 
would prefer to get nuclear assistance from France or even the US, and to that 
extent, India might be betting that the bait of its deals with Russia might 
eventually draw in the others. Moreover, India is not likely to forget Russia's 
backtracking on the cryogenic engine technology contract in 1993 suggesting 
that it is not the most reliable partner. Thus while the stage is being set for a 
higher level of nuclear cooperation, there is no guarantee that other interests 
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and preferences will not take precedence in the future for either India or 
Russia.'*' 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
Let us now turn to some aspect of Indo-Russian cooperation in science 
and technology. New avenues and areas of economic scientific and technical 
cooperation between India and Russia are being explored. A renewed 
Integrated Long-Term Programme (ILTP) for Indo-Russian cooperation in 
science and technology for instance is being actively considered. 
The ILTP programme, signed by the President of erstwhile Soviet 
Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 
Moscow in 1987, lasted till the year 2000. It has emerged as the world's largest 
technology. This programme is a reflection of the close Russia in science and 
technology that has developed between India Russia over the last 13 years. The 
programme had facilitated exchange visits of over 2,500 scientists and 
generated a close to 300 developments projects in India and Russia. 
Moreover, India and Russia have entered into an agreement to expand 
their cooperation in nuclear physics. A MoU (Memorandum of 
Understanding) has been signed between the Department of science and 
technology of the Government of India and Russia's leading nuclear research 
institute, the Kurchatov Centre. The three year agreement, signed by the 
officials of India and Russia, will be automatically renewed unless one of the 
sides decided otherwise. 
Nuclear physics has thus become one of the thrust areas of Indo-Russian 
cooperation under the 13 years ILTP, which would be renewed for another 10 
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years. The two countries are planning setting up a satellite link between the 
PARAM 10000 in Moscow and the supercomputer at C-DAC in Pune (Centre 
Development of Advanced Computing). The C-DAC and the Institute for 
Computer Aided Design (ICAD) have already prepared a joint work document 
identifying applications and areas of requirements will be met in Russia and 
India, besides third world countries.''^ 
Multi-faceted scientific cooperation has been thriving between India and 
Russia, the most significant being cooperation in nuclear realm. As the 
culmination of this process has come the Indo-Russian agreement on 
collaboration reactors in India, each of 1000 Mwe generating capacity. The 
reactor are described as the WER type, incorporating the most advanced reactor 
technology in Russian and rated among the best in the world. The project is 
located at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu. 
The Kudankulam project is being implemented under the inter-
Government agreement signed between the government of India and the 
erstwhile USSR in November 1988, which was subsequently amended through 
a "supplement" in June 1998. In the initial phase, a detailed project report for 
the project was prepared with the help of Premier Russian design Organization 
an institutes, a contract for which was signed between NPCIL and the Russian 
Organization Atomstroy export in July 1998. 
The project has now entered the second phase of construction that civil 
Works with the ground breaking for the project work seared out On October 7, 
2001. 
The Kudankulam project has several distinguishing features-its design 
and technology, the impact Indian atomic reactor design technology, Indo-
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Russian scientific cooperation terms for implementing the project and not the 
least, the financial arrangements to cover costs of an atomic project of such a 
massive size. Notable, too, has been another development related to the project 
strong pressures form nuclear weapon powers, particularly the United States, 
on Russia against implementation of the Kudankulam project, invoking terms 
of the London Club, of which Russia is a member. 
To take the financial aspect first, one should note that the soft repayment 
terms of the Russian loan for the project set new parameters that facilitate 
implementation of this massive nuclear undertaking without any harsh burden 
on the Indian economy. The final costing and the financing terms of the 
project, completed in recent negotiations between the Indian and Russian sides, 
stipulate that the Russian side will carry out the entire design of the project and 
supply all the equipment and machinery for the plant. Eighty-five per cent of 
the cost of the supplies and services from the Russian organizations shall be 
covered under the State Credit extended by the Russian Government to the 
Indian Government for the project. 
The total amount of credit for the project from the Russian side will 
work out to about 50 per cent of the total project cost. The credit utilized for 
the project is to be repaid in 14 equal installments, beginning with the 
commercial operations of the plant. This will enable loan repayments largely 
from earnings of power generations. 
The scientific and technological aspects of the Russian reactor design 
have a special bearing for India, for induction of the light water reactor design, 
based on low enriched uranium as fuel will mean a departure from the existing 
pattern of atom & power plants in India. These have pressurized heavy water 
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reactors that use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and 
coolant. 
The view of the scientific establishment is that far form being a 
technological slow down, induction of the Russian reactor design will mean 
enrichment of India's nuclear reactor technology. The Kudankulan project will 
be based on the latest WER, reactor design of pressurized water type (PWR), 
which is rated as the leading type of nuclear power reactors worldwide. 
This perfunctory survey on the course of Indo-Russian cooperation in 
economy, science and technology clearly reflects that after 15 years of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Indo-Russian cooperation ha begun to take a 
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new turn. 
Indo-'Russian Energy Cooperation 
India and Russia showed readiness to work together in the pcaccliil uses 
of atomic energy. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed on the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. Russia reiterated that it would abide by 
international legal obligations in cooperating with India in the nuclear field. 
However, amongst the five permanent members of the United Nation's 
Security Council (p-5), Russia has openly committed itself to cooperate with 
India in the field of nuclear energy. India's growing demand for nuclear energy 
is to be met by Russian cooperation. Two large 1000 megawatts nuclear power 
reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu are being constructed by Russia help 
each costing $2.6 billion. Russia is keen to construct more nuclear power plants 
in India. The Koodankulam nuclear power project predates the nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) agreement. Since 1992, NSG restrictions effectively 
bar the member states from selling any nuclear related items as well as transfer 
of civilian nuclear technology to countries that do not accept full scope 
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safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. India is one of the countries which are 
not accepting full scope IAEA safeguards. President Vladimir Putin received a 
rare honour to visit the BARC complex in Mumbai.^ ° 
India has recently stepped up efforts to access energy resources in 
Russia, the world's second largest oil producer and leading gas producer. 
India's ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) holds a 20 percent stake in Sakhalin-1 of 
$1.7 billion, which is set to begin production this year eventually generating 
2.3 billion barrels of oil and 17.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. India is also looking 
to invest in the SakhaIin-3 project, which is estimated to hold 4.6 billion barrels 
of oil and 770 billion cubic meters of gas as well as investing in the joint 
Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oilfield in the Caspian Sea. During Russian 
President Vladimir Putin's visit to India in December, the two countries also 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for joint exploration and distribution 
of natural gas from the Caspian basin as well as for building underground gas 
storage facilities in India. 
The controversy over the sale of the Yugansk, which produces 60 
percent of Yukos' oil output and pumps 11 percent of Russia's oil, has also 
highlighted India's growing interest in Russian energy assets. While the 
mysterious buyer, Baikal Finance Group, ended up selling its stake in 
Yugansk to Rosneft in December, which has been acquired by Russian state-
owned Gazprom, this does not preclude the possibility of Yukos' assets being 
acquired by India's ONGC. ONGC has been considering a $2 billion 
investment for a 10-15 percent stake in Yugansk. 
Indo-Russian energy cooperation is being further cemented by political 
and military cooperation. Just as India increasingly relies on Russian energy 
resources, so it also constitutes one of the biggest buyers of Russian military 
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hardware. During the then Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar's 
visit to Moscow in October 2004, he voiced similar sentiments stating that "in 
the first half-century of Indian independence, Russia has guaranteed our 
territorial integrity, and in the second half it may be able to guarantee our 
energy security." '^ 
In fact, growing Indo-Russian energy cooperation resurrects former 
Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's idea for a strategic triangle 
among Russia^  India and China. These states are bound together by their shared 
interests in the fight against terrorism, the push for a multipolar world, and 
respect for the principles of state sovereignty and non- intervention with 
regards to their respective separatist movements in Chechnya, Kashmir 
and Taiwan. Now the energy sector can be added to this list of shared 
interests. India and China are Iready collaborating in the development of the 
Yahavaran oil field in Iran and India's leading state-owned gas company. 
Gas Authority of India Limited, has acquired a 10 percent stake in China Gas 
Holdings. With India and China vying for assets in Yukos, Sino-Indian-Russiar 
collaboration in the energy sphere could be further cemented. On December 3 
during Russian President Vladimir Putin's meeting with Indian Prime Ministe;' 
Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, a joint statement was released which included 
a proposal for greater cooperation with China, stating that "the sides express 
their conviction in favor of a progressive increase in trilateral Cooperation, 
which also leads to social and economic development amongst the three 
countries." ^ ^ 
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CHAPTER-3 
Indo-Russian Strategic and Economic Collaboration in the Post Cold 
War Era 
Strategic alliances rarely survive the epoch in which they are born. But, 
the Indo-Russian strategic alliance has done just that. The time-tested relations 
between the two nations, based traditionally on mutual trust and understanding, 
have survived the end of the Cold War and the post-Cold W;ir period, and 
moved into the new, though yet unnamed period of global politics. Since such 
alliances are based on the hard facts of national interests rather than sentimental 
attachments, it alerts us to the simple fact that for both Russia and India, their 
strategic concern in Asia has not radically changed since the 1950s. 
During the State visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin in 
October 2000, a declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of 
India and the Russian Federation was signed. This is a document of cardinal 
significance and marks a new step forward in the elaboration of the principles 
of our bilateral relations. It lays down the broad contours of bilateral relations 
between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation in the twenty-first 
century.' 
After the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of Russia as an 
independent State, Russia declared itself to be 'State-continuator' of the 
erstwhile USSR in the early I 990s. Nonetheless, India recognized Russia as the 
successor-State to the former Soviet Union. India's relations with the Russian 
Federation are muhi-faceted and encompass varied sectors including political 
consultations, economic and commercial relations and cooperation in trade and 
economy, science and technology and military. It is significant that India and 
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Russia are the world's largest democracies, India in terms of the size of the 
population and Russia m terms of its size. 
The importance of the declaration of strategic partnership signed in the 
end of year 2000 between India and Russia is that it promises economic, 
political, scientific and cultural cooperation. Equally significant is that the two 
countries will not only share vital information, old consultations on important 
issues and evolve joint decision to face international terrorism. The 
establishment of an intergovernmental commission on defense matters between 
the two countries is another facet of this partnership. Above all India arid 
Russia has pledged to work for a muhipolar world based on sovereignty 
equality of states."' 
For an understanding of Indo-Russian relations, especially Russia's 
policy towards the issue of Kashmir it is important to understand the subject 
prior to the Soviet disintegration for two reasons: first, the study of the Soviet 
policy piovides the historical background; second, it provides a comparative 
study of the same issue in pre and post-disintegration phases and thus providing 
some useful insights. Important among them is the continuity discerned in 
Russia's perception and policy towards the Kashmir issue since the Soviet 
time. 
The Kashmir issue surfaced in the wake of the independence of the 
Indian subcontinent in 1947 from the British colonialism. After the invasion of 
Kashmir by the mercenaries and the tribal forces, aided and supported by 
Pakistan in 1947, the ruler of the then princely state decided to accede to the 
Indian federation. The Soviet perception towards the Kashmir issue was 
noncommittal at that time. The Soviet Union under the leadership of Joseph 
Stalin was under the impression that the whole Indian subcontinent was an 
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offshoot of capitalism; hence it had no role to play in the region. At that time it 
was the Cold War, moulded with ideological rivalry between the power blocs 
that influenced the Soviet policy towards the Kashmir issue. Stalin was of the 
view that India, like Pakistan, leaned towards Anglo-American bloc. The 
Soviet relations with India and Pakistan were based on Andrei Zhadnov's 
thesis of two camps. Both South Asian countries were considered to be in the 
rival western camp. Hence, Stalin maintained equidistance from both the 
countries. In the pursuit of such a policy the Soviet representative remained 
absent during voting when the Kashmir question came up for discussion in the 
United Nations Security Council in 1948.'' 
Shift in the Soviet Policy and the Cold War Dynamics 
The later years witnessed dramatic changes in the international political 
scenario. The US-Pak axis grew to a new height. In 1948, Pakistan offered a 
base to the US in Gilgit area of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. For the Soviet 
Union the US presence in the South Asian region was a threat to its security. In 
1949, when the Pakistani Prime Minister visited the US, he was offered 
military and economic support. The US policy towards Kashmir at that lime 
was favourable to Pakistan and "unsympathetic and even hostile" towards 
India.^  Pakistan joined the Baghdad pact in 1955 and South East Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), sponsored by the US in 1954. These steps of Pakistan 
created grave concern in the minds of both, the Soviet and Indian leaders. The 
developments led to reorientation in their foreign policies as a result of which 
both moved closer to each other. 
It took four years for the Soviet Union to take any stand on Kashmir since 
the inception of the issue. When the United Nations Security Council met on 17 
January 1952 to discuss the issue in its meeting, the Soviet delegate, Jacob 
Malik, spoke at length on the problem. Referring to various plans put forward 
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by London and Washington, he observed that those plans "instead of speaking 
a real settlement, were aimed at prolonging the dispute and at converting 
Kashmir into a trust territory of the US and the UK under the pretext of giving 
it assistance through the United Nations."^ In support of his argument, he 
quoted from Pakistan and the US newspapers. On 9 August 1952 Pravda 
published a TASS report on the proceedings of Indian Parliament and supported 
the proposal made by CPI members, A.K. Gopalan and H. Mukerjee, in their 
debate on 7 August 1952 to withdraw the Kashmir question from the United 
Nations/ 
The initial response of India to the Soviet offer of closer relationship 
was lukewarm. The Soviet support to India on the Kashmir issue in the UN 
Security Council 1952 was not taken seriously by the Indian leadership. It 
appeared that India did not want Kashmir to be a factor in bloc politics between 
the two super powers. K.S. Shelvanker from The Hindu, attributed somewhat 
similar reasons to the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru's position: ".. .1 
understand that this is precisely the sort of development Indian diplomacy had 
been endeavoring to avoid from the beginning involvement of the Kashmir 
dispute in the Conflict between the rival power blocs and the propaganda and 
Passions of the cold war." New York Times, on 21 January 52, wrote, "Indians 
fear Malik statement on Kashmir may complicate settlement of the dispute", 
that the "general feeling here is that India wants an early settlement of the long-
standing issue before the UN and that the manner in which the Soviet delegate 
delivered his frontal attack against the West has hardly contributed towards that 
end. It is feared in informed circles that Mr. Malik'S speech although it reflects 
Indian sentiment, might pose new problems and further complicate the 
dispute."^ 
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Khrushhev criticized Pakistan's policy as it is not guided by tiie vital 
interests of their people, of their state, but is dictated by monopoly circles of 
other countries. The proximity of Pakistan with the US and its membership of 
the 'notorious' Baghdad Pact, 'the aim of which is anything but peace', and its 
sanctioning of its territory for establishing American military bases, were 
considered detrimental to its security interests. This factor provided impetus for 
growing Indo-Soviet friendship. Bulganin, in a press conference in New Delhi 
on 14 December 1955 said, "As for Kashmir during our visit there we saw how 
greatly the Kashmirians rejoice in their national liberation, regarding their 
territory as an integral part of India."'" 
After completing his visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan, Bulganin in 
his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR argued that, "on the pretext of 
supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir question certain countries are trying to 
entrench themselves in this part of India in order to threaten and exert pressure 
on areas in the vicinity of Kashmir. The attempt was made to severe Kashmir 
from India artificially and converts it into a foreign military base." But, he said, 
the people of Kashmir are emphatically opposed to this imperialist policy. "The 
issue has been settled by the Kashmiris themselves; they regarded themselves 
as an integral part of India. We became profoundly convinced of this during 
our meetings with the people in Srinagar, and in our conversations with the 
Prime Minister of Kashmir, Mr. G. M. Bakshi, and his colleagues". Further he 
said, "The Soviet government supports India's policy in relations to the 
Kashmir issue, because it fully accords with the interests of peace in this part of 
Asia. We declared this when we were in Kashmir, we reaffirmed our 
declaration at a press conference in Delhi on December 14, and we declare it 
today. Khrushchev in his speech expressed similar sentiments, "In Kashmir we 
were convinced that its people regarded its territory as an inalienable part of the 
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Republic of India. This question has been irrevocably decided by the people of 
Kashmir."" 
As a mark of growing friendship, the Soviet Union in the Security 
Council proceedings on Kashmir, in February 1957, applied its first veto on a 
resolution to use UN force to facilitate demilitarization. It was co-sponsored by 
Great Britain, the US, Australia and Cuba. The resolution was unacceptable to 
India. The resolution noted the importance the Security Council "attached to 
the demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to the 
holding of a plebiscite'" and "Pakistan's proposal for the use ol" a temporally 
United Nations force in connection with demilitarization". The Security 
Council held "that the use of such a force deserved consideration." The 
Security Council authorized its president Gunnar Jarring to visit India and 
Pakistan to bring about demilitarization or further the settlement of the dispute. 
Sobolev, the Soviet delegate, on 18 February 1957, proposed 
amendments to the above mentioned resolution. He argued "the situation in 
Kashmir has changed considerably since 1948 when the Security Council had 
first called for a plebiscite. The people of Kashmir had settled the question 
themselves and now considered their territory an integral part of India."'•^ In his 
resolution the Soviet delegate deleted reference to "the use of a temporary UN 
force in connection with demilitarization in Kashmir. After his amendments 
were rejected by the other Security Council members, he vetoed the Western 
sponsored resolution on 20 February 1957. He justified it by arguing that the 
resolution, as it stood, favoured Pakistan.''' In his government's opinion the 
people of Kashmir had in fact already settled the question. 
In March 1959, a Soviet delegation led by A. Andrew visited Kashmir to 
demonstrate that they regarded Kashmir as an Indian state. He described 
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Kashmir as 'the most beautiful place of the world' and reiterated that they 
regarded 'Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Republic' 
Pointing out that Kashmir "is not far from the Southern frontier of the Soviet 
Union" he declared that "in your struggle we are your comrades. '^  The 
following month Karan Singh visited the Soviet Union. At a reception 
Khrushchev welcomed the guest from 'friendly India' and reiterated the Soviet 
support to the Indian Policy in Kashmir. Karan Singh thanked them for their 
unequivocal support to India, especially in the case of Kashmir. 
To discuss the Kashmir issue, when the Security Council met on 27 
April 1962, Platon Morozov (the Soviet delegate) declared that Kashmir is an 
integral part of India and the people of Kashmir have decided this issue. In its 
meeting on 21 June 1962, the representative of Ireland, supported by the British 
representative, introduced a resolution. According to Morozov, the 'principal 
aim' of the draft resolution was the holding of plebiscite and that would be 
nothing but 'flagrant interference' in the domestic affairs of India.'^ ' He. 
therefore, urged the Council to reject the Irish resolution, which according to 
him was basically in line with the dictates of the US. When the Irish resolution 
was put to vote on 23 June 1962, the Soviet representative vetoed it. He 
declared that the question of holding plebiscite in Kashmir was 'dead and 
outdated' and the Kashmir question had been solved 'once for all.' 
The Khrushchev period witnessed a close relationship between India and 
the Soviet Union. It supported the Indian stand on Kashmir at Various fora. It 
also supported Nehru's decision to withdraw the special status of Jammu and 
Kashmir and to integrate the state into the Indian Union fully. The Soviet 
attitude towards Kashmir has not changed since his visits to India in 1955 and 
I960." When the Kashmir question came before the Security Council in 
February 1964, the Soviet representative, Federenko, reiterated his country's 
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view that the question of Kashmir had already been settled 'once for ail'. He 
supported the Indian contention that a Security Council resolution would 
aggravate the situation.'^ 
The Brezhnev Policy 
The Soviet attitude towards the Kashmir issue in the post-Khrushchev 
era underwent change. However, the Soviet envoy to India, Benediktov assured 
New Delhi in October 1964, policy towards Kashmir remain the same. During 
her visit to Moscow, the new Soviet Prime Minister Alcxi Kosygin assured 
Indian Prime Minister, Indra Gandhi, that the Soviet support for India's policy 
on Kashmir remains unchanged and that Moscow regarded 'Kashmir as an 
integral part of India'. 
However, the later years were marked with uncertainty regarding Soviet 
policy towards Kashmir. This shift could be attributed to the Indian defeat in 
the Sino-India war of 1962. There was a general trend in Soviet diplomacy to 
extricate itself from an immoderate involvement in intricate problems that were 
of no direct concern to its vital interests. By adopting such a policy the Soviet 
Union succeeded in disengaging itself from the Indo-Pakistan conflict in which 
it had embroiled itself. It took a neutral stand towards Kashmir issue, as it was 
interested to develop closer relation with both India and Pakistan.'^  
Leonid Brezhnev, unlike his predecessor, decided to adopt a different 
policy towards the Kashmir issue. He envisaged the Kashmir issue as an 
opportunity to bring India and Pakistan closer and to turn the subcontinent into 
a peaceful arena under the aegis of the Soviet Union. In pursuance of this 
policy, the Soviet leaders attempted in the 1960s to develop good relations with 
Pakistan with an aim to counter Chinese influence there.^ ^ However, due to 
certain factors it remained short-lived. During the Soviet attack on Afghanistan 
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Pakistan, along with the US, had played a key role in supporting the fighters' 
struggle against the Soviet army. The Soviet interests, according to Brezhnev, 
would be better served if India and Pakistan could be developed as an 
independent counter-force free of American and Chinese influence. 
Reconciling Pakistan would help in improving Indo-Pak relations and 
consequently fulfilling the Soviet dream of India-Pakistan Soviet alliance. Such 
a triangular alliance, if it could be forged, would be a great bulwark against 
American and Chinese intervention in the subcontinent.'' 
The Soviet leaders in the initial years of the Brezhnev period tried to 
establish closer economic and political relations with Pakistan to eliminate the 
American influence and at the same time prevent Pakistan from moving closer 
to China. It was in this Context that the Soviet leaders inaugurated their new 
policy to use Kashmir as a device for furtherance of Soviet foreign policy 
objectives and invited Pakistan's President Ayub Khan for a visit to Moscow. 
Ayub Khan arrived in Moscow on 3 April 1965 and met Brezhnev, Kosygin 
and other Soviet leaders. Ayub's visit was concluded with a joint communique 
containing a formula on national liberation movements, ambiguous enough to 
be applicable to Kashmir and, indeed, was so interpreted by Pakistan 
government and its controlled press. 
From the position of negative neutrality, that is to say, simply limiting 
the action to the development of relations with the two rivals, the Soviet leaders 
began to display concern over the manner in which the Indo-Soviet relations 
continued to deteriorate. Following the outbreak of war between India and 
Pakistan in August 1965, Kosygin sent several letters to the leaders of both 
countries, appealing for immediate cessation of hostilities. He also offered his 
country's 'good offices' in negotiating for a peaceful settlement. The Soviet 
Union warned all the other countries, especially in an indirect reference to the 
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Western countries that: no government has any right to pour oil in the flames. 
At the UNSC, where this matter was raised several times, the Soviet delegate 
attempted to maintain a nonpartisan view of the issue, though he referred to the 
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. He blamed the current conflict on those 
'forces which are trying to disunite and set against each other the states that 
have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke' and those 'which are 
pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples so as to achieve their 
imperialist and expansionist amis.' 
i'hc friendship with the Soviet Union nevertheless stood in good slcad 
when it came to the support of India on points of objection that India raised. On 
25 October 1965, India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh objected to Pakistan's 
Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto's reference to the internal situation in Kashmir 
and upheld that it was India's internal affair. He held that the opposite view 
was a deviation from the agreed agenda and thus walked out in protest. The 
Soviet Union had shown support to the Indian interpretation that the Council's 
deliberations should be only on "questions directly connected with the 
settlement of the armed conflict, i.e. complete ceasefire and withdrawal of 
armed personnel." It had also abstained from voting on the resolution adopted 
by the Council on 5 November 1965.^ ^ The Security Council resolutions failed 
to resolve the crisis. 
The Soviet Premier Kosygin, on 17 September 1965, in an identical 
message to Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan President 
Ayub Khan reiterated the offer for a meeting in Tashkent to reach an agreement 
on the restoration of peace 'if both parties so desire.'^'' The Soviet Union was 
not interested to mediate in the conflict between the two sides but to facilitate 
to cease hostility and restore peace. The Soviet offer was accepted by both 
India and Pakistan. 
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Lai Bahadur Shastri, in a public meeting on 5 December 1965, reiterated 
his willingness to go to Tashkent and to accept the mediation of the Soviet 
Prime Minister to bring about understanding and good neighbourly relations 
with Pakistan. But he made it clear that the question of Kashmir could not be 
discussed there. The Soviet Union had expressed a similar view earlier and 
advised both India and Pakistan to avoid discussing major issues at Tashkent 
and regard the meeting as the first among a series of bilateral discussions. 
Shastri and Ayub agreed to meet at Tashkant on 4 January 1966. Kosygin 
attended the meeting at the request of both the parties. In his opening speech at 
the Tashkent summit, Kosygin said, in proposing this meeting, the government 
of the Soviet Union was guided by feelings of friendship towards the people of 
Pakistan and India, by a desire to help them to find a way to peace and to 
prevent sacrifices and hardships brought by the disaster of war. After a 
weeklong (4-10 January 1966) hectic parleys between the two sides, in which 
Kosygin took active part to break the deadlock in arriving at a mutually 
suitable agreement, Shastri and Ayub signed the Tashkent Declaration on 10 
January 1966. 
The important points in the Declaration were: withdrawal of force by 
both sides to former positions (held on 5 August 1965) and no later than 25 
February 1966; observance of conditions of ceasefire in Kashmir; stoppage of 
hostile propaganda; resumption of diplomatic relations and renewal of normal 
diplomatic fiinctions, etc. Kosygin hailed the Tashkent Declaration as an 
important political document and a new stage in the development of relations 
between India and Pakistan. Shastri, in a press meeting on 10 January 1966 
praised Kosygin for the 'great and noble role' he played in holding the talks. 
Thus, it was the shift in the Soviet foreign policy approach aimed at 
diminishing the US and the Chinese infiuence in the South Asian region that 
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shaped its policy towards the Kashmir issue. To achieve that objective it was 
necessary, the Soviet leadership might have thought, to give equal weight to 
Pakistan alongside India. Moreover, it rested on the idea that the Kashmir 
problem was created by neither India nor Pakistan, but thrust upon them by the 
colonial powers. That was implied when Kosygin said during the Tashkent 
summit, it should be recalled that the discord between India and Pakistan is the 
heritage of long dominations of colonialists who set enslaved peoples against 
each other. The Soviet leadership maintained a balanced attitude towards the 
Kashmir problem in the period though its strategic policy considerations were 
changing under the new leadership in the region. This was evident from the 
report of the PTI correspondent in Tashkent during summit discussions: 
"Russia considers Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India; it is learnt 
from the highest authority here. The Soviet stand on Kashmir remains as before 
according to the sources. The sources said that Tashkent Declaration would 
improve relations between India and Pakistan on the one hand and further 
strengthen India's relationship with Russia on the other."^" 
Despite the assurances by the Soviet leadership that its policies would not 
negate India's interests, there were overtures from its side that were likely to 
hamper India's interests. A high- level Pakistani military mission went to 
Moscow in June 1966 to explore the possibility of Soviet arms supply to 
Pakistan. New Delhi warned that Soviet arms to Pakistan would weaken Indo -
Soviet relations. To allay India's fear, the Soviet Union assured India that their 
policy with regard to Kashmir has not changed and they regard Kashmir as an 
integral part of the Indian Republic. Further, to demonstrate Moscow's 
sincerity, the Soviet New Times published a map of India showing the entire 
state of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of the Indian Union. Despite all these 
assurances, a group of Soviet senior naval officers led by Vice- Admiral 
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Smimov arrived in Pakistan in March 1968 to explore the possibility of 
cooperation between the two navies. 
Kosygin's visit to Pakistan to strengthen relations with Islamabad 
followed in April 1968. A Pakistani military mission led by General Yahya 
Khan arrived in Moscow on 6 June 1968 to negotiate the first Soviet-Pakistani 
arms agreement. The next day, it was announced that the Soviet Union has 
agreed to supply arms to Pakistan. Immediately Moscow began deliveries of 
tanks, artillery and armed personnel carriers. Protests from India were ignored. 
President of India, Zakir llussain during his visit lo Moscow from 8-10 .luly 
1968, informed the Soviet leaders of India's concern regarding the arms supply 
to Pakistan, but the Soviet Union did not pay attention to the Indian objection. 
Swaran Singh, in a statement to Parliament on 9 April 1969, said, "We have ... 
to admit that we have not been able to convince USSR of the greater danger 
implicit in the supply of arms to Pakistan. The Soviet policy continues to be to 
supply arms to Pakistan."^^ 
Turn in Kashmir Policy 
If the above discussions serve any indication, it was amply clear that 
during the initial years, 1991-92, Russia did not have any clear-cut policy 
towards Kashmir. The pro-Western drive to protect and promote national 
interests was the major thrust of Russia's foreign policy in that period. Hence, 
it was not surprising to see changes in the Kashmir Policy on unexpected lines. 
It was evident during the visit of Russian Vice President, Alexander Rutskoi to 
Pakistan in December 1991. During the visit, he announced a very significant 
change in his country's stand on Kashmir by saying that the right of self-
determination of the people of Kashmir should be decided under UN auspices 
and in accordance with its resolutions. The Russia-Pakistan Joint Communique, 
issued on 22 December 1991, read, along with other things: "The Russian side 
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acknowledged Pakistan's position and expressed the hope that the issue would 
be resolved peacefully through negotiations between Pakistan and India on the 
basis of international agreements."^^ This was in clear negation of the Indian 
stand on the Kashmir issue. 
It was also against the provisions of the Shimla Agreement signed by 
both India and Pakistan, which emphasized on the resolution of the Kashmir 
issue bilaterally without any third party mediation. This approach of Russia 
caused grave concern in the Indian political establishment in particular and 
public in general. Kesava Menon, expressing concern over the Russian stand, 
wrote, "It is now possible that Russia, which takes the Soviet Union's seat on 
the United Nations Security Council, will not exercise veto in favour of 
India."^^ 
Some other instances could be cited here to corroborate the Russian shift 
from its traditional approach towards India and Pakistan The delegates of the 
Islamic conference, held in Moscow in SeptembertO 1992, were received by 
Vice President Rutskoi and Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman, Khasbulatov'. 
Among other things, the conference drew attention to the state of affairs in 
Kashmir, reported ITAR-TASS a news agency. From these events, it seemed 
apparent that Russian leaders were not interested in maintaining 'special 
relationship' of the earlier Soviet period because it had a 'negative impact on 
relations with Islamabad'. The Khrushchevian policy of supporting Indian 
stand on Kashmir unequivocally seemed to be a relic of the past. 
Initially Russia's policy towards India was thus not identical with that of 
the erstwhile Soviet Union. In this period of transition, marked by turbulence in 
every aspect of Russian society, polity, economy and culture, the leadership 
gave up the traditional approach towards its old allies including India. In the 
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post-confrontation, post-communist world, the focus was on democracy, 
market reforms and pluralism for which, the leaders thought, western aid was 
essential. Nevertheless, the sudden shift in the priority areas proved costly for 
the Russian society. Gulf crisis, Yugoslavia-crisis and cryogenic rocket 
controversy, etc. provided ample proofs of Russia's weakness. It was thus on 
expected lines that its relations with India, including stance on the Kashmir 
issue, should get affected in 1991-92. However, to view it as a radical change 
was premature, as later year's unfolded.^ ^ 
The Yeltsin Period 
Russia's policy towards the Kashmir issue favouring India appeared in a 
major way during the Yeltsin visit. The Russian president minced no words in 
expressing Russia's 'unequivocal' support to the Indian stand on the Kashmir 
issue. He cleared the doubt in the Indian mind that the newly emerging Russian 
state, in its drive to shed the old ideology, had made a dramatic turn from the 
old Soviet policy. Yeltsin asserted the Russian stand on Kashniif while 
speaking at a meeting with Indian businessmen on 28 January 1993 in New 
Delhi: we stand for the integrity of India; we support the settlement in Kashmir 
according to the Indian version so as to maintain integrity and unity of India. 
We support it. And in whatever international organizations it may be the 
United Nations Security Council or others we shall stand by this point of view. 
These words were strong enough to clear any doubts in anyone's mind. 
Yeltsin's pronouncement on the Kashmir issue was one of the important 
proofs of the Russian attempt to revive its relationship with India. The 
Hindustan Times editorial on 30 January 1993 titled 'Yeltsin strikes a positive 
note' wrote: supporting India's position that Kashmir is its integral part and 
pledging to stand by it in the United Nations Security Council, the Russian 
President has held out the hope of a Soviet-type counter to Pakistan's renewed 
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efforts to internationalize tlie issue. The Yeltsin visit also removed the Indian 
anxiety about the Russian stand not only on issues like Kashmir but also other 
related issues like Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and Pakistan's move to spread 
religious fundamentalism in the region. He also clarified that "Russia will not 
seek to improve relations with Pakistan at India's cost. In this backdrop of 
Russia's unequivocal support to India on Kashmir, it was in expected lines that 
while the Indian press hailed the Yeltsin visit as 'it heralds new phase of ties', 
the Pakistani press described the Russian stand as 'contradictory' show of 
'poor judgment' 'threat to regional stability 'serious attempt to isolate Pakistan 
at the global level' and the like. 
The Rutskoi visit to Islamabad earlier in December 1991 was 
disappointing for India as he was advocating international arbitration of the 
Kashmir issue. However, by 1993, the Russian leaders realized their mistakes 
and were bold enough to mend them. This was evident during the visit of K. 
Srinivasan, India's foreign Secretary to Moscow in August 1994. His visit was 
important in view of Pakistan's effort to internationalize the Kashmir issue in 
the forthcoming 49th session of the United Nations General Assembly. During 
discussions the Russian leaders expressed support to the Indian version of the 
Kashmir issue, i.e. it is a bilateral issue and should be resolved bilaterally 
according to the provisions of the Shimla agreement. 
Russia's Kashmir policy i.e. support the Indian stand on the issue, was 
reiterated later on many occasions. For instance, in the wake of Hazratbal 
crisis, Russia came forward to support India. In diplomatic changes the Russian 
government assured the Indian government that it sees Jammu and Kashmir as 
an integral part of India and the happenings there as internal affair of the 
country. 29 This was a clear rebuff to the Pakistani attempt to internationalize 
the issue. It supported the Indian action in tackling the crisis in the meetings 
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that took place between Indian and Russian diplomats aftermath of the 
Hazratbal seize. 
Russia came heavily on Pakistan for artificially politicizing the Kashmir 
issue and for using human rights slogans for 'non-human rights end.' Oleg 
Malghinov, First Deputy Russian foreign Ministry's Department on 
International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights during his visit to 
India in the first week of June 1994, voiced his concern artificial politicization 
of the Kashmir issue by Pakistan. Kashmir is not a human rights issue, he said, 
and it should be resolved by means of direct talks by India and Pakistan on the 
basis of Shimla agreement. Malghinov was a member of the Russian 
delegation at the session of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva that year 
where Pakistan had to withdraw its bid to press for a vote on the human rights 
in Kashmir. He emphasized the Russian policy that we are for India's integrity 
and we think that manipulating human rights slogans to give an additional 
argument by those who stand for its disintegration is a bad practice. He 
compared the Indian situation with Russia's problems emerging out of ethnic 
violence and separatism and said, "We have the same problems here in 
Russia." '^' 
In this context, the Russian support to India on the Kashmir issue was 
reassuring: while Russia was confronting the problems of separatism and 
religious fundamentalism in its Chechnya province, India was suffering from 
similar problems in Kashmir. 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Russia's liberal party leader supported the Indian 
stand on Kashmir in his usual radical tone. He minced no words in criticizing 
Pakistan for its help to terrorists in Kashmir during his visit to India on 6 
March 1995. Referring to the fighting in Bosnia and Chechnya he said the same 
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element of religion which played havoc in Kashmir had now been injected in 
Bosnia and Russia. For him the problem in Kashmir was an internal problem, 
hence there was no necessity of any external interference. He stated that there 
would have been no conflict over Nagomo Karabakh if Armenia had been 
handed over that enclave; similarly there would have been no conflict if 
Kashmir had been with India. '^ 
Pakistan's regular forces backed and reinforced an infiltration Kargil 
sector of Kashmir in the spring of 1999. The intrusion plan was in preparation 
while the Indian Prime Minister was on friendship mission to Lahore in 
February 1999. Russia was vocal in its support to India It assured of blocking 
any Pakistan to internationalize the issue at any international forum including 
the United Nations Security Council. A senior official in the Russian foreign 
ministry said: "we will block any attempt by Pakistan to raise the Kashmir 
issue in the United Nations."^^ This stand could be compared to Yeltsin's 
unequivocal support to the Indian stand on the Kashmir issue about six years 
ago in January 1993. 
Hence, the entire Yeltsin period, except the initial two years, was 
marked by consistency regarding its Kashmir policy. While the initial two 
years were marked by uncertainty, the later years witnessed marked 
improvements in bilateral relations. In this emerging scenario Russia's policy 
towards Kashmir was favourable to India. ^ 
Putins Approach Towards India and Kashmir 
India's approach to the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia was 
not much different from that of Russia. The terrorists active In Kashmir had 
(and still have) their bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Abdullah Abdullah, the 
Northern Alliance Foreign Minister, in May 2000, stated that 5000 Pakistanis 
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were training in Taliban run camps for guerilla war and terrorism in Kashmir."''' 
In this context, both India and Russia had common stakes in the turn of events 
in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Alexaer Kadakin, Russian Ambassador to 
India, rightly pointed out in the background of Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit 
to Moscow in November 2003 that "New Delhi's views on the situation in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are consonant with the assessments of our diplomacy."^^ 
The joint declaration issued during the visit stated, "India and the Russian 
Federation strongly believe that Afghanistan should emerge as a peaceful, 
strong, prosperous, united and independent nation that would be free from 
external interference and living in peace and harmony with its neighbours.""" '^ It 
could be mentioned here that the political scenario that emerged after 
September 2001 provided the opportunity for leaders of both India and Russia 
to understand each other's concerns in a better way; and this mutual 
understanding in turn led to the convergence of approaches of both the 
countries in tackling the terrorist menace in Chechnya, Kashmir and elsewhere. 
A new development that took place after Putin came to power was the 
leader's recognition of similarities between the issues of Chechnya and 
Kashmir. Putin utilized many occasions to draw parallels between the two 
issues. Some instances could be cited to corroborate this point of view. During 
his visit to India in October 2000, Putin shared a piece of information with the 
members of Indian parliament, which is 'absolutely true and verified' that, "the 
same individuals, the same terrorist organizations, extremist organizations are 
organizing and, very often, the same individuals participate in organizing, in 
conducting and igniting terrorist acts from Philippines to Kosovo including 
Kashmir, Afghanistan and Russia's northern Caucasus."^^ When there was the 
seize of one Moscow theatre named Nord-Ost on 22 October 2002, Putin 
replied to those who advocated for negotiation with the terrorists, "Osama Bin 
Laden, Taliban supreme Mullah Omar and their like minded are calling shots in 
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Kashmir, West Asia, Chechnya and elsewhere in the world." He rejected any 
possibility of talks with the terrorists. It was reported that in the year 2003 the 
terrorists killed about 300 people in Russia and it is no better in case of India. It 
was the psychological urge, besides the Pragmatic considerations, that brought 
leadership of both the Countries together. In this background, it was no surprise 
to see Russian leadership urge Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism in India. 
After the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry warned Pakistan, in strict terms, to slop cross-border 
terrorism and create a conducive atmosphere for bilateral dialogue and 
consultation.^ ^ To jointly tackle the menace of terrorism, during the visit of 
Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2001, India and Russia 
signed the Moscow Declaration.'* They set up joint working group during the 
visit of President Putin to India in December 2002. Moscow strongly 
condemned the terrorist attack that took place on 26 March 2003 in the 
Nandimarg village of Kashmir, killing more than twenty people. Besides 
condemning the terrorist attack, the Department of Information and Press of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its support to the measures taken by India 
to stop the activity of terrorist forces.'" 
Taking into account all these positive developments, it would be logical 
to emphasize the point that terrorism is one of the important contributory 
factors for perceptional convergence between the two countries. This 
convergence led Russia and India to support each other on their stands on 
Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. The Ministry of External Affairs in India 
praised the referendum of March 2003 in Chechnya, under the guidance of the 
Russian government as important for the restoration, normalization, 
rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Russian Federation's Chechen 
republic within the democratic framework. Similarly, the Russian Foreign 
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Ministry release after the general election in Kashmir in October 2002, said 
that, very fact of holding elections is an evidence of the striving of Delhi and 
the population of Jammu and Kashmir to restore the normal situation in the 
state. Despite the attempts of the extremist elements to frighten the population 
of Kashmir, they could not hinder the voting."'*^ 
It would be too hasty to generalize based on one incident; this attempt at 
mediation may be an exception. The exceptions do not prove the rule, was 
confirmed by his statements made during his visits to India. Putin, speaking 
before the members of the Indian parliament on 4 October 2000, stated: This 
issue (the Kashmir issue) can be resolved on a bilateral basis on the basis of a 
compromise and on an unconditional respect for the line of control. Any 
foreign interference should be stopped. The same position he further reiterated 
during his visit to India in December 2002. During a joint press interaction, 
Putin supported the Indian position that for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, 
India and Pakistan should adhere to the principles of Shimla agreement and 
Lahore declaration. This position of Russia is in consonance with the position 
of India to peacefully resolve the issue bilaterally. 
Besides supporting India's position on Kashmir, Russia has expressed 
concern, from time to time, over the problem of cross-border terrorism from 
which India suffers. Russia agrees with the position of India that for any 
peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue, Pakistan must create conducive 
atmosphere and for this to be possible it must stop promoting and supporting, 
overt or covert, cross-border terrorism. After the terrorist attack on Indian 
Parliament on 13 December 2001, Russia came forthwith in criticizing the 
terrorist attack and warned Pakistan against providing any kind of help to the 
terrorists. Kanwal Sibbal, India's Foreign Secretary told the press in Moscow 
during the Vajpayee visit in November 2003 that Russia had backed the Indian 
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position on Kashmir by reiterating that an end to cross- border terrorism and 
the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure in Paicistan was a prerequisite for 
a purposeful dialogue. During the visit, President Putin welcomed the 
initiatives taken by Prime Minister Vajpayee to improve relations with 
Pakistan. The joint statement issued during the visit expressed hope that 
Pakistan will come out with a positive response to the Indian initiatives for 
peace. 
From the above discussions it is clear that Russia is unlikely to change 
its position on the issue of Kashmir because any contrary position would have 
its obvious bearing on the issue Chechnya. Both Chechnya and Kashmir are 
regions infested with terrorist and separatist elements. Tatiana Shaumian 
rightly pointed out that both the regions are fragile and both the regions have 
implications for territorial integrity of both the countries. It would be difficult 
to sustain any deviation from the stated position on these issues, especially 
when the menaces of terrorism separatism have affected both the countries and 
still continue to affect them. Hence, Putin's approach on Kashmir is likely to 
continue on the same line in his second tenure in office. As the post-Cold War 
realities unfold, it has become almost imperative for both the countries to 
cooperate for mutual benefits. 
Putin, in the context of India, realizes the nature of the rising Asian 
power. Despite the differences between Russia and China, both are searching 
for potential long-term partnerships. Between Russia and India there are 
virtually no differences. At the politico-military level the relations between the 
two countries can be termed as the best in the world, though the economic 
relations are moving at a slow pace. Whether, it is the issue of Kashmir or 
Chechnya, or the role of the UN, or the issue of democracy the Interests of both 
the countries converge. The visit of Manmohan Singh in 2005 was a promising 
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one as it witnessed some important agreements in the economic sphere. In this 
growing stage of relationship, it can be said that Indo-Russian relations under 
the leadership of Putin in Russia would not witness any dramatic changes. 
Putin's approach towards the Kashmir issue is likely to continue, that the issue 
is a bilateral one and it should be resolved bilaterally.''^  
Military and Technical Cooperation 
Indo-Russian Defense Cooperation aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 got a severe jolt, first due to new Russia's pro-Western 
tilt, and second, due to poor relations accumulated by many factors, one is 
certainly the diversion of interests of both the countries. While more than half 
of the Indian defense requirements were met by the Soviet Union, its collapse 
suddenly reduced the percentage of supply. As a result India searched for other 
suppliers. The first half of the nineties were very slow in defense cooperation 
between the two countries, thus to motivate Indian Defense Minister, Sharad 
Pawar to visited other countries including the United States, Britain, Israel and 
Ukraine far defense purposes. The conditions later improved, especially with 
the visit of Yeltsin to India in 1993, and visits to Russia by Indian Prime 
Ministers, Narasimha Rao and Deve Gowda in 1994 and 1997 respectively. In 
the current scenario, it can be said that Indo-Russian defense cooperation is the 
best part of their relations, as Russia has once again become India's largest 
arms supplier. 
India and Russia launched the policies of liberalization and market 
reforms in 1991. Both were facing, as President Yeltsin saw, 'mostly the same 
problems' and for the Solution of these problems the Russian leader suggested, 
"we are to cope with enormous economic and social tasks, and cooperation 
between India and Russia in this area could prove useful and important."'''' 
After the withdrawal of excessive reliance on the Western help, Russia turned 
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towards the old allies, including India. Slowly Russia recovered and the major 
irritants between India and Russia, like rupee-rubble controversy, were 
resolved during the Yeltsin visit in 1993. This paved the way for smooth 
Military Cooperation. 
Also, there have been agreement on cooperation in terms of joint 
research and development ventures, such as the Brahmos missile and the fifth 
generation jet fighter, in the fields of biomedical and other technologies and 
joint space efforts, and Joint collaborations in Central Asian republics.''^ 
Among the ten accords signed during the visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2003, there was an agreement on 
cooperation in space research, which included Russian assistance in an Indian 
lunar mission. India is the only Country with which Russia is engaged in the 
joint development and production of high-tech and complex weapon systems. 
Another hallmark in the relationship is the Indian production of the Su-30 MKI 
jet fighters, under Russian license, for sale to Malaysia. Russia has expressed 
willingness to cooperate with India on co production of weapons systems and 
platforms, like a fifth- generation fighter aircraft, advanced warships and 
submarines.'"' Russia's recent offer includes joint production and investment-
sharing in the development of a fifth-generation fighter aircraft and a medium-
class passenger-cum-cargo aircraft. There are negotiations for opening an 
Amour-class submarine assembly line in India. Russia's sale to India forms 40 
per cent of its total sale of military equipment worldwide. 
One of the long-hassled defense deal finally came to a settlement after 
India signed its biggest ever defense deal ($1.5 billion or over Rs. 7000 Cr) 
With Russia for the purchase of the aircraft carrier. Admiral Oorshkov, in New 
Delhi on 20 January 2004. Defense Ministers of both the countries, George 
Fernandez of India and Sergei Ivanov of Russia, rightly called the deal a 
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'historic landmark''*^ in bilateral ties. The Russian carrier would replace India's 
only aircraft carrier, INS Virat. Its induction in 2008 would ensure that the 
navy does not lose its expertise in handling aircraft carriers. By 2006 New 
Delhi intends to buy at least 30 anti-stealth 2-D 5576-3 radar systems and 
locally produce 50 others. This project is estimated to cost $ 200 million. A 
Russian firm, Beriev, is currently building three A-50 AWACS (Airborne 
Warning and Control Systems) called A-50Ehl. The surveillance aircraft will 
be the first of its kind to be built in Russia, and combines a variety of systems 
fi-om Israel, India and Russia. 
India has become a trustworthy partner of Russia. But both are 
apprehensive about Pakistan's military expansion. Russia 's Ambassador to 
India V. Truvnikov said in Shimla on 2 April 2005 that the US sale of F-16 jets 
to Pakistan could trigger arms race in South Asia. To quote him "At a time 
when relations between India and Pakistan have thawed, it would be a pity that 
the supply of F-16 fighter planes would destroy the fragile environment in 
South Asia and give rise to an arms race in the region.... America should think 
twice before the supply of these fighter planes to Pakistan."'*'^  
The Indian and Russian troops held joint military exercises in October 
2005. Undergoing familiarization at Agra, paratroopers from both countries 
moved to Rajasthan and conducted a mock operation to destroy a terrorist 
camp. At the same time, the navies conducted joint exercises on the eastern 
seaboard. Some key Indian military and naval personnel underwent a two-
month course in Russian to transcend the language barrier. A joint naval 
exercise was held in 2003. This is the first time that both wings of the armed 
forces simultaneously held mock war games. The two Countries hoped to make 
the joint exercises a regular event on the lines of similar exercises with the 
Western Countries Deepak Sinha, heading the 50th Independent Pars Brigade, 
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said the training of airborne forces was being held in two parts. The first was 
carried out in Agra, while the second was carried out in the Mahajan field 
firing range in Rajasthan. Five warships from the Russian Pacific Fleet, 
including a missile cruiser and two amphibious assault ships, took part in the 
'Indra.2005' joint naval exercises which were more of anti-terror in nature and 
have been organized within the framework of Indo-Russian anti-terror 
cooperation. The exercise is supposed to enhance the capacity of both the 
countries to counter maritime threats. It was a two-day exercise that ended on 
19 October 2005. The exercise was large in Scope in comparison to the last one 
held in 2003 as it focused more on tactical part rather than on using more 
weapons. 
Bilateral defence was one of the major components of Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh's visit to Moscow in December 2005. The two sides agreed 
to shift the main emphasis in their military technical cooperation to joint 
development and manufacture of futuristic weapon systems. In his joint press 
conference with President Putin, Singh observed: Our perspective goal is to 
move towards collaborative projects involving design, development and 
Production of the next generation of military products On 6 December 2005, 
both countries signed the much debated Intellectual Property Rights agreement, 
which opens the way for joint high-tech projects on a large scale. As per the 
agreement the accord would apply to new deals only, and not with 
retrospective effect. India agreed to give preference to Russian suppliers, but 
on condition that they make deliveries within reasonable time and price. The 
Multi-role Transport Aircraft and the 5th-generation fighter plane have been 
identified as two such projects. During the visit, both countries also updated 
their 10-year programme on military-technical cooperation up to 2010 to lake 
into account the new thrust towards joint production of new weapons. The two 
sides signed a protocol on procedures for making changes in the programme. 
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According to Russian sources, the lease by India of two nuclear submarines is 
also in the pipeline. Under a $1.8 billion contract for a 10-year lease of two 
nuclear submarines, Project-09710 'Shchuka-B', Russia has resumed the 
construction of the vessels, which were frozen in the 1990s. Both sides also 
discussed the plan to jointly use a military base in Central Asia. 
The Tribune reports that Russia has offered MIG-35s to India. Each of 
the fighter planes that the Indian Air Force would buy could cost anywhere 
between Rs 150 crore to Rs 200 crore, while the total contract would well be 
over Rs 25,000 crore. There are indications that the Indian government could 
be issuing the Request for Proposals, finally putting the process for the 
purchase in motion. The aircrafts are an improved version of the MIG-29s with 
capabilities that MIG Corporation claims no other fighter aircraft in the world 
has. The Russian experts have stated that the aircraft has an all aspect thrust 
vector control; can actually stop mid-way during fiight. This quality would not 
only allow the fighter to get better accuracy in its attack role, but would also 
help to avoid an enemy fighter chase. 
From the above discussions, it becomes clear that the factors of 
terrorism, multipolarism, democracy and economic imperatives have brought 
India and Russia closer. To maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
post-Soviet pluralistic Russia, like India, has been fighting the menace of 
terrorism. It is but natural for Russia to appreciate India's position on the 
Kashmir issue. Besides terrorism, other factors like multipolarism democracy 
and economic imperatives also act as cementing force for peace and friendship. 
Both are interested in the promotion of a multipolar cooperative security world 
order that is aimed not at any particular country but at the tendencies and 
policies, which promote unilateralism thus undermining international 
cooperative framework such as the UN and other multinational fora. 
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India and Russia have expressed similar expressions towards 
establishing democratic order in respective countries and in the world. The 
multi-ethnic and pluralistic culture of both countries has further reinforced their 
democratic sentiments Though Russian experience in democracy is new which 
at times leads to diverse interpretations regarding sustainability of democracy 
in Russia, the discussions above show that the evolution of democracy is slow 
but steady. The lack of experience problems of separatism and terrorism further 
compound Russian dilemma whether to follow a particular course in 
democratic enterprise or to try different experiments. In contrast, India has 
been able to evolve a smooth democratic culture. IJoth countries have posed 
faith in each other to promote the spirit of democracy together. The 
establishment of Inter-Parliamentary committee is a step in that direction. 
Indo-Russian Economic Collaboration 
India and Russia continue to sustain the close and cordial relations in the 
post-soviet era. In recent years both the countries have been pursuing the 
course for establishing a strategic partnership which is regarded as the ultimate 
form of relationship between the two independent states. This goal indeed 
demands that the present relationship be enhanced to a qualitatively new level, 
particularly in the trade and economic spheres. This is reflected in the exchange 
of visits between the two countries at the level of heads of state and prime 
ministers, besides other political levels, exchange of trade delegations etc. 
Several agreements and Memorandum of Understandings have been signed 
these exchanges to further strengthen the economic relations. These agreements 
covering bilateral cooperation have been in the areas of industrial, financial and 
scientific fields.^" 
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The most important characteristic of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation 
is that the credits were not repayable in hard currency but in Indian rupees. 
This amount was utilized for the purchase of Indian goods exported to the 
Soviet Union. This had threefold advantage for our economy. First, the t 
country saved foreign exchange resources including those on some of the 
commodities, which the country otherwise would have to buy in hard currency, 
Such as crude oil and petroleum products. Secondly, it stimulated Indian export 
to the Soviet market-a market, which was assured and stable. Thirdly, it 
enabled India to industrialize itself and build basic industries. 
Another aspect of Indo-Soviet cooperation was that public sector 
projects buih with the Soviet assistance in their production capacities were 
comparable with those of the developed countries and even today constitutes is 
strategic component of the economy. It is relevant for instance to mention here 
that by the beginning of these projects had produced 48 million tonnes of pig 
iron. 38.5 million tonnes of steel and more than 30 million tonnes of rolled 
iron, 70 million tonnes of oil had been drilled, and about 4.30 lakhs of 
metallurgical and other machinery for heavy industries had been produced. 
These projects in the early eighties contributed 40 per cent of steel 
production...60 per cent of oil production and accounted for 15 per cent of 
power generation. This is how Indo-Soviet economic cooperation laid the basis 
for the industrialization of the country and transformed it from a developing 
country to a most developing nation. That more than 90 per cent of the Soviet 
economic assistance went to the share of metallurgy, fuel energies and machine 
building further reinforces this conclusion. If one takes into account Indo-
Soviet cooperation in science and technology, space and nuclear technology in 
particular, Ihc picture graphically illustrates how this friendly cooperation has 
made rich contribution in making India self-reliant. It is relevant to mention 
here that the first Soviet-Indian agreement of February 955. Which gave a 
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credit of Rs. 101.93 crore was directed to build the first phase of the Bhilai 
Steel Plant. The second Soviet credit worth Rs. 93.71 crore on 9 November, 
1957 was to be utilized for the construction of the Ranchi Heavy Machinery 
Plant and the Ophthalmologic Glass Plant in Durgapur, a complex at Korba and 
the first phase of the Neyveli Thermal power station. The third Soviet credit of 
Rs. 14.99 crore was given on May 29.1959 for the construction of the 
pharmaceutical industry-the Antibiotics Plant at Rishikesh, The Synthetic 
Drugs Plant at Hyderabad and the Surgical Plant in Madras. The Fourth Soviet 
credit of September 12,1959 was intended for financing the projects of the third 
five year plan, which included some of the ongoing projects in addition to 
Thermal Power' Stations, construction of the BaraUlil Oil Refinery, heavy 
Electrical equipment plant at Hardwar and prospecting and drilling work for oil 
and gas. This credit was worth Rs. 281.14 crore, to quote some figures. 
On the other hand, India had found a new and stable market in the 
Soviet Union for its traditional export items such as jute, tea, jute articles, and 
coffee Spices, tobacco, skims and leather goods. With industrialization 
manufactured and semi manufactured goods to the Soviet Union, such a pig 
iron, accumulators and power cables. Another new area of India's exports to 
the Soviet Union was consumer goods such as hosiery, cotton and woolen 
fabrics, garments, handcrafts, linen and some of the herbal medicines. And 
with the industrialization of the country, the pattern of the Indo-soviet trade too 
had started changing. 
By early Eighties the trade turn over between the two countries was its. 
2,000 crore and the Soviet Union became one of the biggest trade partners of 
India. It is also relevant to mention that with industrialization of India and 
growing demand of consumer goods in Soviet Union. The trade pattern 
between the two countries also started changing. Till the mid sixties, traditional 
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items of exporl-lea, coffee, raw wool, leather, spices. Jute and jute bags and 
cotton textiles constituted 80 per cent of India's export to the Soviet Union but 
in the early Eighties, their proportion came down to some 50 per cent. This 
shift should be estimated in the context of expanding trade between the two 
countries.^' 
This shows that erstwhile Soviet Union became an important light 
partner of India, primarily because of rupee trade. Trade between the two 
countries increased from Rs. 1.3 crore in 1956 to Rs. 7.800 crorc in 1990-91. 
India's exports increased from Rs. 1.226 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 5.255 crorc in 
1990-91 and her imports increased from Rs. 1,014 crore to Rs. 2,348 crore 
during the same period. The USSR accounted for 17 per cent of India's exports 
in 1990-91 while USSR share in India's imports was 5.9 per cent. It is 
important to mention that the trade denominated in Indian rupees benefited 
both the countries immensely. India like the Soviet Union, derived greater 
advantage as its need to source imports without spending foreign exchange was 
even more than that of the USSR." 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union this unique model of 
economic relationship under-went basic changes. A 5-year trade agreement was 
signed between India and Russia in May 1992 which marked the end of Rupee 
trade from January 1993 and ushered a new-phase of Convertible currency 
trade. India also extended a line of credit of Rs. 250 crore lots the purpose of 
financing India's exports of tea, coffee and tobacco to Russia. Indian debt to 
Russia was to be repaid to the extent of Rs. 3.000 crore annually through 
exports of goods and services. The Indian debt was evaluated at Rs. 31,377 
crore, out of this, Rs. 19,044 crore carrying an average rate of interest 2.4 per 
cent was to be repaid in 12 years. The remaining Rs. 11,733 crore carrying a nil 
rate of interest was to be repaid in 45 years beginning April 1993.2 This and 
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other measures laid the basis for restructuring the economic relations between 
India and Russia in the new conditions. 
In August 1998, Russia faced a crisis due to (i) fiscal mismanagement 
(ii) overdue short-term foreign exchange liabilities. As a result rouble was 
under pressure. The IMF provided financial support of S 22.6 billion to Russian 
bail it out. 
As far as India is concerned rouble devaluation did not have much effect 
because 80 per cent of its exports are rupee denominated and governed by the 
Indian export Rs. 3.000 crore worth of goods are explored to Russia every year 
in discharge of its debt obligation to the former Soviet Union. 
Political stability in Russia combined with economic reforms has begun 
to turn the tide. Russian industries, particularly consumer industries have begun 
to pick up. Real incomes have begun to rise and rouble in now appreciating. 
In 1992-93 India's exports to Russia was 3.3 per cent of its total exports 
and its imports in the same year was 1.2 per cent of the total imports. In 1998-
99 India's exports to Russia was 2.1 per cent of its total exports and its imports 
in the same year was 1.3 per cent of the total imports. 
This shows that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Indo-
Russian trade has registered no marked change and there are various reasons 
for this, including tuff competition from western countries and poor image 
which India has created in the minds of Russian consumers. 
No doubt, Russia provides a large market. The market sized is estimated 
at $ 18 billion. It is growing by 4 to 6 per cent every year especially for 
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foodstuffs, beverages, textiles, leather goods, consumer electronics and 
cosmetics. The emphasis in the Soviet consumer market is on basic needs. 
However, it leans distinctly towards all western consumer goods. Russians 
have learnt to demand the best. Indian exporters can no longer treat the Russian 
market as a place to dump sub-standard goods. In fact, in many important 
commodities India has lost market share substantially. Traditionally, Russia has 
been the largest importer of tea from India together with other products like 
rice, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, textiles and leather garments. But in tea Sri 
Lanka is overtaking India. 
Similar is the situation with Indian companies operating in Russia. Of the 
400 Indian companies that had operations have closed shop andy more are on 
borderline. The enthusiasm of a few years back has eroded by continuing 
problems and the recession. Cadila, Balmer Lawrie, L & T and Bharat lorge are 
reported to have lost faith in operations. 
There arc ample opportunities to collaborate for Indians to have Joint 
ventures in Russia. The areas include petrochemicals telecommunications and 
development of port facilities in the black sea region. Departmental Stores, fast 
food chains and hotel industry also offer investment possibilities in Russia. 
Indian joint ventures in Russia can also help us in penetrating the European 
market. 
There is a good opportunity for a strategic partnership between India and 
Russia in the field of diamond business. Russia's strong production base and 
India's processing capabilities could be pooled to improve value addition to 
each other business-resulting from a stable and viable price for Indian 
processing industry and an assured market for Russia demands. MMT from the 
Indian side and Gokhran from the Russian side are expected to identify 
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different types of rough diamonds which could be supplied by Russian to the 
Indian processing industry at reasonable costs to market ii more competition in 
world markets. Russia would benefit by direct sales which would be more 
remunerative due to elimination of intermediaries. 
Future prospects of Indo-Russian economic cooperation should be 
examined on the basis of experience of India's economic relations with the 
Soviet Union, complementary nature of the economies of the two countries and 
above all the new economic reforms being introduced in the two countries. 
It is relevant to mention here that Russia has made it clear that it will 
discharge its foreign debt regularly. Russian also declared in 2002 that it 
intends to join WTO. Significantly Russia's foreign debt has come down to 51 
percent of the GDP and can fall to 45 per cent by the end of 2002. As much as 
2.6 billion dollars were accumulated in 2001 as a financial reserve. This money 
can fully pass into the year of 2003 (the year of the most sizable foreign debt 
payments Russia must pay about 19 billion dollars). But even in case of a 
pessimistic variant of a fall of oil prices, for instance, if they drop to 14 dollars 
per barrel, Russia will not face serious problems with the financing of a deficit 
free budget, as well as with the fulfillment of the foreign-debts obligations. 
This trend should be seen in the context of on going structural refonns 
which are taking place in Russia at present. Russia has recently enforced laws 
controlling accumulation of wealth by criminals and mafia gangs. Importantly 
flight of Russian capital to other countries has dropped from 24.4 to 17 billion 
dollars. 
This analysis shows how Russia is once again emerging as an economic 
power with its vast natural resources, crud oil, diamonds and its defense 
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manufacturing industries on one hand and expanding internal market on tiie 
other. This open new potentiality for Indo-Russian economic cooperation." 
Putin's Claim of Qualitative Improvement in Russian Economy 
Vladimir Putin's visit to India and in particular to Mumbai, the fmancial 
capital of India and his meeting organized by the CII and FICCI to discuss 
"India Russia Economic Co-operation" in which 350 CEOs of leading 
industrial firms of India interacted with the Russian President, assume great 
significance. As the long awaited visit of the Russian president to India has 
materialized, he has tried to convey to the Indian business circles that there has 
been a qualitative change in politico-economic life in Russia. So far as Russian 
economy is concerned, Putin seems to have turned the comer after the Country 
experienced major economic Crisis resulting from Rouble devaluation in 
August 1998. This is evident from the performance of the economy during the 
year 2000. The GDP growth for the year 2000 as a whole is expected to be 
about 6-7 per cent. Industrial output has registered a record 10 per cent growth 
during the period January-August 2000 against the corresponding period of the 
last year. On the agriculture front, grain collection has exceeded 70 million tons 
which is about 10 million tons more than that in 1999. This will reduce the 
dependence of Russia on the import of food grains. So far as the foreign trade 
sector is concerned, as of 1-8-2000, Russia has achieved a trade surplus of $ 38 
billion as against $20 billion in the previous year by trading mainly with 
countries outside the CIS. What should be equally gratifying to Putin is that 
gold and foreign exchange reserves has exceeds $ 24 billion in August 2000 as 
against $ 13 billion when he formally took office in January 2000. Inflation has 
been brought down to below 40 percent and exchange rate of rouble has been 
stable at around roubles 26-27 to a dollar. 
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Continuing the record of good performance, according to available 
official sources, Russia's tax collection has exceeded by about 75 per cent to 
reach 53 billion roubles ($2 billion by August 2000) and that profits of about 
51,800 large and medium firms have risen by 110 per cent during January-July 
2000 over the level of the corresponding period of last year. Sector-wise, the 
pre-tax profit making units were—communication tourism, food-processing 
and wholesale trade of industrial products. In the opinion of some analysts, 
Russia's improved financial position is partly due to rise in world prices of oil 
and natural gas. It is estimated that at the minimum international price of $ 24 
per barrel, there will be additional revenue to the tune of 54-60 billion roubles 
(about $ 2 billion) to the Federal budget. Hence it is contended that the Russian 
economy may be vulnerable if there is decline in the world energy prices. 
Notwithstanding this, there is overwhelming view in Russia that there is 
definite improvement in Russia's economic Performance during the year 2000. 
Emphasizing Russia's economic performance Putin has called upon Indian 
entrepreneurs to make use of Opportunities now available in Russia. 
With this improvement in Russia's economy there should he favorable 
influence on the general standard of living in the Country Hence there are 
expectations of increase in domestic demand for a wide range of consumer 
goods. In that case import demand for several consumer goods may go up. This 
situation may open up possibilities for India to step up exports of both 
traditional items such as tea, coffee, ready-made garments, medicines and even 
consumer durables. However, in view of the facts that at present most of these 
traditional items are exported against the DRF, the Russian government should 
be persuaded to auction rupee funds with greater regularity and transparency. 
This may create better opportunity and incentive and even provide a good basis 
for reliable and large export houses from India to supply good quality products 
to the Russian market.^ '* 
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Unresolved Economic Issues 
There are several problems and issues which stili confront the Policy 
markers and they should be analyzed and considered objectively. Firstly, ML-
Factor has assumed great importance. (In the fomier Soviet Union M-L meant 
Marxism-Leninism and now in Russia M-L stands for Money - Laundering). 
Money laundering has become a major problem since millions of dollars are 
being continuously siphoned off from the country by semi-legal and illegal 
means According to available reports, over the last one decade, the quantum of 
money being laundered from the country every year has been more than what 
the Country has received from various international financial institutions. But 
the irony of the matter is that on the issue of money laundering the Russian 
policy makers does not appear to have paid much attention and presumably 
therefore have not achieved much success so far. But ML issue has often 
caused much criticism and embarrassment to Russia's policy makers. In an 
effort to tackle the problem of money laundering although Russia has signed 
the convention in May 1999, the same has not been ratified even by September 
2000 presumably due to bureaucratic and technical hurdles. The Russian 
government has, therefore, now urged Putin to submit the same to the Duma 
(the Russian parliament) for ratification. At a time when Russia badly needs 
resources for development, outflow of hard currency from the country on a 
large scale adversely affects the economy and sends unfavorable signals 
abroad. The issue of money laundering is also linked with the pervasive 
problem of mafia and other related economic crimes in Russia which are 
affecting economic development in the country. 
Secondly, Russia has a major problem of repayment of foreign debt 
which is exceeding $150 billion, although part of this debt is being carried 
forward from the Soviet era. While Russia has not defaulted on debt 
repayment, it has managed to reschedule its debt to the London Club. In the 
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year 2000, Russia has to pay foreign debt of USD 14.5 billion, but in the 
budget for the next year provision has been made for only USD 11.3 billion. 
Hence Russia has to mobilize additional resources for repayment of debt which 
will exert pressure of the budget. 
Thirdly, Russia has been facing the problem of wage arrears for the last 
several years affecting even crucial sectors of the economy such as coal 
mining, power generation etc. While the severity of the problem might have 
become less, the current wage arrears exceeds 2 billion roubles ($75-80 
million) causing some burden on the Federal Stale budget. 
Fourthly, the Russian government has not been able put in place 
ownership rights even as the policy of large scale privatization of state property 
has been carried out since the last 8-9 yeas. This is particularly affecting the 
interest of foreign investors. Similarly, the Russian government has been slow 
in carrying out the much needed tax reforms, since the present tax system is 
highly complex and open to misuse by the authorities to harass the genuine 
entrepreneurs. In this context the observation of the foreign minister of Japan 
seems relevant. He has opined that while Japan has given a loan of $6 billion to 
Russia, investing that amount has become impossible because 'Russia's tax 
system lack of transparency in conducing contracts and legal mechanisms do 
not promote formal economic cooperation."^^ 
Lastly, although Putin has been able to get the support of the Duma for 
most of his policies, there are on-going conflicts between some oligarchs 
particularly, Gussinsky and Boris Berezovsky on the one hand and Russian 
government on the other. Similarly, some regional governors are unhappy with 
the consolidation of power back with the centre after Putin has assumed 
Presidentship. While it may be too early to predict as to how these issues are 
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likely to be resolved, they have potentiality to affecting economic development 
in the country. 
Hence if Putin will succeed in solving these issues and is able to push 
through necessary legislation and more importantly implement the policies, 
then Russia may very well succeed in creating proper investment climate to 
attract more investment opportunities from foreign countries. Hence Indian 
policy makers and the business community should also watch closely 
developments in Russia's economic scene to draw necessary conclusions from 
India's own interest and perspective. 
Indo-Russian economic cooperation has not been commensurate with 
their mutual potentials. Felix Yurlov agrees with the opinion of several others 
that the first ten years of economic relations were a 'lost decade', and a 'decade 
of lost opportunities.' He says: Russia, in the mid 1990s, started changing its 
foreign policy and turning its attention towards east, and India in particular. 
Time was lost in spite of all advantages which we had in our relations with 
India, cooperation in different fields like trade and economic field, scientific, 
military, cultural field. So, we have lost quite a lot in those five years. With a 
bad start at present the bilateral trade between the two countries is at a level of 
$1.5 billion. Some of the factors that obstructed the smooth growth of 
economic relations were rupee-rouble trade controversy, diversification of 
economy in both the countries, major focus on military cooperation and 
negligence of other areas such as energy, space, information technology, etc. 
Economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial for both the 
countries. While India can fill the consumer market voids in Russia, Russia can 
meet the Indian requirements in arms, oil, natural gas, mineral resources and 
metallurgy. Under the Integrated Long-Term Programme of Scientific and 
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Technical Cooperation (LLTP) signed during President Putin's visit to India in 
October 2000, botli countries undertook more tiian 150 joint scientific projects, 
which could provide relatively cheap technologies in various fields from 
biomedicine to semiconductors, computer chips, new materials and energy 
sources. During the then visit of Indian Petroleum Minister Ram Naik to 
Moscow in February 2001, the Indian Oil Company, ONGC Videsh Ltd. and 
the Russian Rosneft signed an agreement on the joint exploration of 
hydrocarbon resources in the Russian Far- Eastern island of Sakhalin. During 
the visit of President Putin to India in December 2002, both sides signed the 
Joint Declaration on strengthening and developing economic, scientific and 
technological cooperation. A document on economic cooperation between 
Indian State of Karnataka and Samara region of Russia, and another document 
on telecommunication were signed during the visit.^ ^ 
The last quarter of 2003 witnessed some positive developments in 
economic relations between the two countries. The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) opened its office at the Russian Chambers of Commerce and 
industry in October 2003 to facilitate the process of economic cooperation. 
During the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2003, 85 
Indian businessmen accompanied him to study the prospects of investment and 
joint collaborations with Russian companies.^^ Amit Mitra, Secretary General 
of FICCI (Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), 
accompanying the prime minister during the visit, estimated that the bilateral 
trade might reach $5 billion by 2005. He said such a breakthrough could be 
made through close cooperation in oil and gas industry, telecommunications 
and information technology, metallurgy and energy.^^ 
Mani Shankar Aiyar, India's Petroleum Minister visited Moscow in 
October 2005 to discuss India's energy requirements with Russia. He 
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welcomed Gazprom's (Russian firm) interest in the Iran-Fakistan-India 
pipeline (IPI). A 10-member high-level delegation of Gazprom arrived in 
Islamabad in October 2005 to begin formal discussion on the construction of 
the $ 7 billion Iran- Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, and an ambitious project 
of gas storage in Pakistan. It was the first visit of the Chairman of Gazprom to 
Pakistan, the world's largest gas producing company with over 20 per cent 
share in global gas production.^^ 
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit in May 2003, both 
countries decided to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG) on Lxonomic 
Cooperation to look into the feasibility of the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA). On the Kudankularn issue, the Prime 
Minister sought to allay fears of President Putin on the nuclear fuel falling into 
wrong hands and said a Bill to prevent its misuse would be introduced in the 
Indian Parliament. The Indian Cabinet had already Okayed the Bill. During 
Manmohan Singh's visit to Moscow in December 2005 to attend the sixth 
bilateral summit, President Putin said, "We have been successfully cooperating 
in nuclear energy and Kudankulam nuclear power project is an example. Wc 
see India taking necessary steps to build relations with the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG)."^° Prime Minister Singh observed that there was a vast potential 
for expansion of cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy given India's 
growing energy requirements and the importance of nuclear energy as a clean 
and viable alternative energy source. Some of the most 'significant and 
promising areas' of cooperation identified during the visit were energy, 
telecom and transportation. 
A major hurdle in Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation has been the 
restrictions imposed by Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on both India and 
Russia. Russia, which is also a member of 44- member NSG, has assured India 
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of easing the restrictions. Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Foreign Minister during his 
meeting with External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh in Moscow on 29 
October 2005 indicated that NSG could make an exception regarding India in 
terms of norms observed by the nuclear group so that civilian nuclear energy 
cooperation could be expanded. Natwar Singh was in Moscow to attend the 
meetings of the Indo-Russian Inter- Government Commission (IRIGC) and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
During Prime Minister Singh's visit an agreement was signed on 
technology safeguards while implementing the long-term cooperation in the 
area of joint development, operation and use of the Russian global navigation 
satellite system Glonass. G Madhavan Nair, Secretary, Department of Space 
and A Perminov, Director, Russian Federal Space Agency signed the 
agreement. This agreement envisages launching of Glonass satellite using 
GSLV launch vehicle of India. In turn, Russia will provide access to Glonass 
system signals for Indian use. It also envisages joint development of user 
equipment for exploitation of Glonass signals for commercial purposes. The 
agreement opens the road for the implementation of a 2004 agreement on joint 
design and 'launching of Glonass communication satellites, which will be used 
by both countries for civilian and military purposes. 
Another agreement on cooperation in the field of solar physics and solar 
terrestrial relationships within the framework of CoronasPhOtOfl project was 
signed during the visit. The Coronas-Photon mission aims at research in the 
field of solar physics and solar terrestrial relationships. The agreement enables 
integration of the Indian RT-2 payload with the Coronas-Photon spacecraft and 
the joint space experiment using the RT-2 equipment. The agreement basically 
revives a Soviet-era Coronas-Photon project under which six instruments 
fabricated at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) were to have 
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been installed on a Russian Photon satellite. The project was frozen in the 
1990s for lack of funds on the Russian side. During his visit to the Moscow 
State University, which conferred the title of Professor Honoris Causa, Prime 
Minister Singh urged the young Russians, especially the entrepreneurs, to visit 
and invest in India. Speaking before the academic council of the university he 
called on young Russians to, "Once again look at India and discover the new 
face of India", because "There is a need for a new generation of Indians and 
Russians to discover each other...of late people-to~people, business-to-
business contacts have been far below potential and certainly below what our 
friendship warrants."''' 
Viktor Khristenko, Russia's Energy and Industry Minister invited India 
to invest in Russia's energy sector, and join Russian companies in exploration 
and extraction activities in third countries, particularly in Central Asia. In the 
context of the interest expressed by ONGC and other Indian companies in 
picking up a stake in Russian energy companies like Transneft, Manmohan 
Singh and Khristenko agreed to promote cooperation between their respective 
oil companies through 'joint ventures and equity participation.'''^ The Russian 
minister specifically welcomed India's interest in participating in the Sakhalin-
3 oil project in Siberia. India has already invested $2.7 billion in Sakhalin-1 but 
is expected to have to bargain hard for a share in even more lucrative Sakhalin-
3 venture where Russian and international energy majors such as Lukoil, 
Gazprom, Rosneft and Exxon Mobil are all jockeying for position. Prime 
Minister Singh conveyed India's willingness to consider positively the 
construction of additional reactors in view of its growing energy needs. 
In a meeting Prime Minister Singh and Russian businessmen agreed to 
develop a long-term energy partnership and decided that India and Russia 
would explore oil and gas assets both in production and explorations in third 
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world countries like the Central Asian region. India also responded positively 
to the Russian request to construct additional nuclear reactors in view of India's 
growing energy needs. This was a clear signal that nuclear energy is set to play 
a pivotal role in India-Russia economic relations since international restrictions 
on technology transfer to India are expected to be lifted shortly. Referring to 
India's investment in Sakhalin-1, Manmohan Singh showed interest in 
Sakhalin-Ill. The dialogue between ONGC, GAIL, Rosenefi and Gazprom, he 
said, is gaining momentum. Asking the business communities to seize the 
initiative, the Prime Minister also informed them that India was working on an 
agreement to permit the utilization of the remaining rupee debt for Russian 
investments in India as their bilateral trade was moving from the rupee-rouble 
arrangements to becoming a fully market determined phenomenon. Both 
countries discussed the difficult visa regime, lack of information, weak 
financial base and lack of transport links.^'' 
In the field of Indo-Russian economic cooperation, some new areas can 
be identified. One area is joint cooperation in Central Asia. India could play a 
bigger role in Russia's energy strategy such as joint exploration and 
prospecting for new areas in eastern Siberia and in the Caspian Sea basin. 
Involvement in the construction of the pipeline network, modernizing and up 
gradation of existing port facilities is another such area. India will have to go 
for long-term agreements to buy Russian oil. 
The transport route in the present situation is via the Black Sea. A new 
opportunity that has opened up is to directly deal with the vast regions of 
Russia. For instance, the agreement between Gujarat and Astrakhan, Karnataka 
and Samara, can prove helpful. The potential for cooperation in diamond 
processing, development of inland waterways and road construction needs to 
be explored. 
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Lastly it can be said lluit indo-Russian slratcgic tics coiifronl three 
significant challenges. The first and most important challenge is that both India 
and Russia recognize the importance of the United States in the current 
international order and the importance of maintaining good relations with the 
unipolar power. For both countries, this imperative over-rides most other 
strategic requirements. This affects Indo-Russian relations in a variety of ways, 
from the most obvious such as limitations on the extent of military ties and, 
particularly, research and development collaboration, to less obvious ones, such 
as the fact that both India and Russia have closer economic relations with the 
US than with each other. 
The second challenge that India and Russia face is in understanding and 
dealing with china. There is a general reluctance in the foreign/strategic policy 
establishment of major capitals around the world to talk in any thing more than 
a whisper about how to deal with china. Both India and Russia recognize the 
long term threat that china poses, but are unsure of how exactly to deal with 
this threat. In the Russian case, this problem compounded by Russian arms 
sales to china, which though necessary to maintain a viable Russian defense 
industrial base, something which is in India's interest also, nevertheless 
impacts on the military balance in Asia and on India's security. 
The third challenge that the partnership faces is that both countries are 
relatively weak. Unlike the Soviet-Indian partnership during the Cold War 
period, this was anchored by Soviet superpower capabilities to back the other 
on significant international issues. For example, it is unlikely that Russia is 
today in a position to veto decisions of the UN Security Council unfavorably to 
India, as it did during the 1971 war. 
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Despite these challenges, the strength of the relationship lies in the 
continuing complementarity of interests. Neither India nor Russia can tolerate 
the dominance of any single power in the global community and in the region. 
American power and China's potential power in Asia are realities with which 
both India and Russia have already come to terms. Indeed, both powers may 
have actually learned to use these powers to promote their own interests, as can 
be seen in the war on terrorism and on other issues such as on nuclear weapons 
and ABMs. But these are strategies of weaker powers, and both countries will 
be more comfortable balancing against these powers than bandwagoing with 
them. As both India and Russia grow stronger, their mutual interest in 
countering the dominance of any single power in global and Asian politics will 
only bring them even closer.^ "* 
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CHAPTER-4 
Defence Collaboration between India and Russia in the Context of 
Changing International and Regional Scenario: 
Indo- Russian Co-operation in the field of defense constitutes one of the 
most important features of Indo-Russian bilateral ties. However, the 
relationship is undergoing significant changes in the new context of market 
reforms and globalization, as well diversification of acquisitions by India. 
Owing to the past legacy and ongoing projects, Russia will remain, at least lor 
the foreseeable future, a major defense partner of India. However, in view of 
the increased competition for the Indian defense market and the technological 
demands of India's defense sector, joint development and production of new 
weapons systems could become crucial for sustaining Indo-Russian co-
operation in the coming years. 
Co-operation in the field of defense constitutes the most important 
feature of bilateral ties between the two countries. A majority of the Indian 
military hardware is of Russian origin. Cooperation in tiie sensitive defense 
field presupposes and has engendered a high level of mutual trust and a broad 
compatibility of geopolitical interests. Despite the fact that Indian policy 
makers are engaged in diversifying the sources of military equipment and 
technology acquisitions, because of the long-established ties and ongoing 
projects, Russia is likely to remain for the foreseeable fijture the major defense 
partner of India. On their part, the Russian policy-makers and defense industry 
managers are aware of the need to adapt to the new market dynamism and 
growing competition in the sizeable Indian arms market. Indo-Russian defense 
ties have their share of new opportunities as well as the problems that the two 
sides need to address'. 
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A major development that took place after 1993 was the increasing level 
of defense cooperation between India and Russia. It was no secret that Indian 
military establishment had been dependent on Russia for spares as well as its 
modernization. Though starting with a disappointing note after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian cooperation in the field of 
defense increased gradually. For instance, the two countries signed an 
agreement on military cooperation on 22 October 1996, during the visit of 
Russian Defense Minister, General Igor Rodionov to New Delhi. The accord 
envisaged reciprocal training of the services personnel at each other's training 
institutions, joint military exercises, and deputation of observers to each other's 
military practices. With this new pact, military steering groups were to be 
established by all the three services whose activities would be coordinated by 
Russia's main Directorate of International Military Cooperation and India's 
Defense Planning staff. The two sides were to exchange views and information 
on the operational doctrines of common military hardware. Other components 
of the agreement were related to deputation of military specialists for the 
maintenance of arms and communication, visit by senior officials, participation 
in seminars and symposiums, joint sporting and adventure activities. Indian 
Defense Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, during his visit to Moscow in 
October 1996, signed an agreement to extend military to military cooperation 
that would last till the year 2010. India was the only country with which Russia 
signed this type of bilateral defence cooperation programme. President Yeltsin, 
during his discussions with Yadav, repeatedly referred to his country's 
relations with India 'brotherly.'^ 
The uncertainty regarding the cooperation in the nuclear field was 
overcome gradually in the later phase of the Yeltsin period. The Russian 
leaders, during the visit of Indian External Affairs Minister, I. K. Gujaral to 
Moscow in February 1997, reiterated that Moscow would honour its 
commitment to sell nuclear reactors to India.-^  The Russian Parliament, on 14 
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March 1997, approved with applause the statement that each one of its factions 
supports the policy of cooperation with India. This was an indication of the 
overwhelming public support in Russia for strengthening relations with India. 
This also served as a reliable pointer for the forthcoming visit by the Indian 
Prime Minister, H. D. Deve Gowda to the Russian capital in March 1997, in 
which both the countries discussed the policy of nuclear cooperation. One of 
the major purposes of the Deve Gowda's visit was to finalize the purchase of 
two 1000 MW nuclear power reactors. The negotiation for the sale of reactors 
had started in 1988 but Russia started dilatorily after the 1992 Nuclear 
Suppliers Group Pact; it was bowing to the US pressure. Il became doubtful if 
the reactors would ever be supplied. Since the proposal dated back to 1988, it 
could escape the provisions of the pact. To nullify the American pressure the 
Russian leaders assured Deve Gowda that no third country could have any say 
on their bilateral relations.'' 
Deve Gowda, during his talks with President Yeltsin, recalled the 
Moscow Declaration of 1994 as a Joint declaration against 'aggressive 
nationalism, separatism religious extremism, terrorism and cross movement of 
narcotic drugs and arms.' He emphasized that India and Russia had a shared 
interest in working together in these areas. These challenges posed danger to 
pluralistic societies of both the countries. Hence, to check the menace of these 
ever- increasing threats both needed to develop a common approach on the 
issues of mutual concern. Yeltsin was of the view that India was a major 
stabilizing factor in Asia.^ Hence, for peace and stability in the region, 
maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India was important. 
During Deve Gowda's visit, Russia agreed to help India in developing a 
state of the art integrated air defence system. During the discussions Yeltsin 
criticized the NATO move to expand eastward. He referred to this move as 
'manifestations of expansionism' and said, "Russia believes that dominance of 
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a group of states to the detriment of other members of world community is 
extremely dangerous and inadmissible."^ Also that "the world cannot be 
unipolar and in a muhipolar world India and Russia are two poles 
themselves."^ This common resolve to promote the multipolar world order has 
been reiterated many times in later occasions. 
Indo-Russian defense cooperation in the post- Soviet era has undergone 
a radical change. President Yeltsin's visit to New Delhi in January 1993 saw a 
marked shift in the relationship between the countries. Yeltsin and Prime 
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao signed a 20 years Treaty of i'ricndship and 
Cooperation replacing the similar 1971Indo-Soviet Treaty. This extension by a 
decade has added a new dimension to Indo-Russian relations. During the Prime 
Minister Primakov's visit to New Delhi in December 1998, seven agreements 
signed between India and Russia. The document on long-term military 
technical cooperation till the year 2010 is the key document. On a visit to New 
Delhi in March 1999, Russian defense Minister Igor D. Sergey and his Indian 
counterpart, George Fernandez signed a military cooperation agreement to train 
Indian defense personnel in key Russian military academies.** The long-term 
bilateral defense cooperation programme will cover such new areas as naval 
nuclear technologies and anti-ballistic missile defense systems. This long-
term MTC will enhance the joint R&D capabilities of the two countries in the 
production of new weapon systems. On December 27, 2000, India and Russia 
finally signed the single largest arms deal the Su-30 MKI will be manufactured 
in India with Russian assistance. This means complete transfer of technology to 
India. This Indo-Russian Sukhoi deal is the single largest defense deal ever 
signed by Russia with any foreign country. Under this deal, 150 Su-30 MKls 
will be manufactured in India; including indigenous production of all the 
components over a period of the next two decades. The Su-30 MKI will have 
onboard avionics and other support Systems developing by India and also 
equipment from countries like France, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.^ 
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China also has MTC with Russia. Both China and India account for almost 
three-fourths of Russia's armament exports. 
Russia remains India's biggest supplier of defense products but as prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, stressed during the Putin's visit in December 
2002, the India Russia defense relationship goes beyond merely buyer and 
seller as it now encompasses a wide range of cooperation including research, 
design, development and co-production. 
One of the major irritants about supply of Russian defense equipment is 
regular and timely flow of spare parts. The problem is complex because there is 
no single supply source as a large number of Russian companies are engaged in 
manufacturing of different spare parts. So far spare parts have been supplied to 
India through intermediacy and now Russia is evolving a system under which 
the original manufacturers will supply the spare parts to India. Indian anxiety is 
that the spare part should be supplied well in time. 
Under an agreement reached recently, India's defense acquisitions from 
Russia will now be negotiated on the basis of a model contract which will have 
a sub clause dealing with the life-long supply of spares or setting up facilities 
for their production in India. Russia has also agreed to provide unified price 
lists for spares and components and give Indian specialists access to technical 
documentation of the hardware sold to India."' 
It is pertinent to mention here that Russia sees the proposed privatization 
of the Indian defense industry as a welcome chance for its arms manufacturers 
to consolidate their foothold in the Indian market. 
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"The Russian weapons industry is ready to look into opportunities for 
investment in the Indian defense sector, ' ' said Viktor Komardin, deputy chief 
of the Russian arms exporting monopoly, Rosoboronexport on 17 February 
2002. This shows that integration of the Indian and Russian defense industries 
would be in line with the current shift from the buyer- seller relationship to 
joint development and production of new weapon System. 
Top defense factory managers of Russian have been visiting India, to 
Strategic partnership with India. 
"We take interest in the privatisation of India's defense plants," '^  said 
Mr. Korenkov, General Director of the Bazalt factory, Russia's manufacturers 
of unguided munitions. "If Russia and India are strategic partners, it would be 
logical to integrate out defense industries."'^ 
Bazalt, which has been supplying air bombs and artillery shells to India, 
is now proposing joint developments of new-generations munitions, Such as 
winged air bombs that enable the pilot to hit targets 6 km to 15km away while 
staying out of range of enemy air defence. 
"We are prepared to consider setting up a joint venture with an Indian 
entity and manufacture new munitions for our two countries as well as fan 
export to third countries".''' The Bazalt manager said. 
Participation in India's defense sector disinvestments programme can 
also help Russia to face up to mounting competition from Western arms 
manufacturers. 
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We propose to increase the share of high technologies in our defense 
exports to India, to move from licensed assembly of Russian made weapons to 
joint development and production and to promote factory-to-factory ties, said 
Mr. Komardin. 
Experts said the Russian defense Industry, which is wholly state, owned 
could invest both cash and technologies in the Indian defense sector. "The 
Russian defense industry is capable of investing in India S 600 to $700 million 
over the next three to four years, said Alexand Vaskin of the Indo-Russian 
Security l'"orum. "As for technologies, the Russian contribution could be far 
weightier, if. For example, the two countries go for the joint development of a 
fifth-generation jet fighter or a fourth generation tank on the basis of the 
Russian T-95MBI."'^ 
This shows that Indo-Russian defense cooperation is not only expanding 
but has begun to take a multi-dimensional character. This leads to the 
conclusion that Indo-Russian defense cooperation has already entered a new 
phase. 
India's Nuclear Test and Russian Response 
The rapid pace of relationship seemed to come to a halt after India tested 
nuclear devices in May 1998. That was a true test of friendship on the part of 
Russia. But it was difficult for Russia to reconcile the Indian tests given its 
stated stand on nuclear non-proliferation. It had always been an advocate of 
NPT and CTBT, and wanted India to sign both the treaties. India had rejected 
both the treaties on the ground that they were discriminatory. Russia had 
actually never raised the issue to such a level to jeopardize the emerging 
relations between the two countries. In the wake of the Indian nuclear tests 
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Russian leaders were in a dilemma regarding how to handle the quirky 
situation. 
President Yeltsin, on 12 May 1998, publicly expressed his anguish and 
declared, "India has of course let us down over their nuclear explosions."'^ 
Foreign Minister Primakov in an interview emphatically stated: we do not like 
it. Naturally we are against them because India is upsetting stability that has 
taken shape in the world now in preventing nuclear explosion in general, both 
underground and so on. We would like very much that India, being our friend 
and partner, slop and would not go any further. Crimakov, on 30 May 1998, 
made a three-point proposal for discussion at the foreign ministers' conference 
of the P-5 at Geneva on 4 June. These were: (1) India and Pakistan should be 
subjected to increasingly intense pressure to make them sign the NPT; (2) India 
and Pakistan should be made to join the international test ban; (3) Everything 
should be done to ease tensions in the relations between the two states. The 
proposal envisaged signing of the NPT and CTBT by India and Pakistan, 
bilateral discussion to resolve outstanding problem between the two countries, 
and immediate interaction among permanent members of the LTNSC to work 
out common measures for curbing an arms race in the South Asia. However, 
Primakov opposed any economic sanctions but stressed on the big powers 
stepping up "efforts for resolving the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir and 
sorting out all other outstanding differences between the two Countries." 
Though the initial reaction of Russian leaders to the Indian nuclear test 
was bitter, yet they did not take any concrete step commensurate with their 
reaction. No one, Yeltsin, Primakov or Russian Parliament, stressed on the big 
powers to intervene to resolve the Kashmir issue. The strategy of Moscow 
seemed to resolve the post-Pokharan dilemma by condemning the nuclear tests 
in the subcontinent along with the other members of the P-5 countries but at the 
same time going ahead with business as usual with India. Russia did not 
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impose any sanction on India and did not let the nuclear issue have any bearing 
I ft 
on bilateralrelations. 
Even some of the important agreements and defense deals were finalized 
after the nuclear test. For example, despite the US pressure Yevgeny Adamov, 
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, signed a deal in New Delhi on 21 June 
1998 to build two light water 1000 megawatt nuclear reactors at Kundankulam 
in Tamil Nadu. In fact, more than Indian tests, Moscow's main wony was the 
threat of other threshold countries and above all Pakistan turning overtly 
nuclear. The Pakistan Ambassador in Moscow was called lo the Russian 
Foreign office urging them to show maximum restraint in connection with the 
Indian tests, and to adhere to the non-proliferation norms. The Russian 
embassy in Islamabad also got in touch with the Pakistani authorities on the 
same issue.'^ 
Not all Russian leaders were critical of the Indian nuclear tests even at 
the initial phase of reactions. The Russian Duma in fact came out in praise of 
the Indian tests. Gennady Seleznev, Chairman of the Duma supported the 
Indian tests: "I believe that India acted correctly. In this respect it acted very 
consistently and it was a correct decision not to curtail its research programme 
halfway in spite of US pressure. I can only admire their national pride." 
Izvestia in its headline, 'Moscow will not quarrel with its ally Indian nuclear 
tests do not threaten Russia' on 14 May 1998 emphasized, India is not Iraq, 
Iran, Libya or North Krorea. To befriend her is not shameful. The reference 
obviously was to India's long record as a practicing democracy and the 
international prestige that it enjoyed from its very inception. Vladimir 
Kuchenenko in Rossiyakaya Gazeta highlighted the double standards of the 
West and its attempt to preach 'victorious morals' to India. He asked why India 
can't, for instance, ensure its own security through nuclear weapons at a time 
when other countries have this right.^' Hence looking at all these developments 
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one could well understand the Russian policy of not decrying India's nuclear 
tests out rightly, but to show understanding at India's security imperatives. 
It would be appropriate to dwell, at some length, on the shift in Russia's 
policy towards India, particularly towards the Kashmir issue after the last 
quarter of 1992. It is true that for over a year after the break down of the Soviet 
Union, the entire system of trade and economy, military and technical and 
cultural ties between India and Russia were thoroughly undermined. " The 
situation was so hopeless that Russian analysts were said to fall into two 
categories: pessimists and skeptics. President Yeltsin saw himself as being 
involved in a war against economic collapse, panic, famine, decline and death. 
He admitted, "The coming months would be toughest in my life." In such a 
desperate situation, the Russian leaders sought the help of the Western powers 
to revive the sagging economy. The transition from state socialism to 
capitalism required enormous financial resources. The Kozyrev-Gaider team 
hoped that the West, which so enthusiastically hailed the end of communism in 
Russia, would provide massive financial assistance for reforms. However, this 
did not happen on the scale expected by the reformist government.^'' The 
consequent disappointment led to self-introspection among the Russian leaders. 
Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Duma International Committee even talked in 
the Duma of reframing Russian foreign policy as "all of Russia's partners 
without exception the Americans, West Europeans and to my great regret, all 
East Europeans have used us as a doormat."^^ The US policy during the Gulf 
war in 1991, its vigorous pursuit of eastward expansion of NATO, its attitude 
to ethnic problems in Russia, led to the disenchantment among the Russian 
leaders; thus ending the romanticism between Russia and the West. 
The factors that influenced the Russian leaders to adopt a Pragmatic 
policy were: Russia's exclusion from deliberations related to the future of the 
Korean peninsula; the US efforts to deny Russian entry into the military 
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markets of US regional allies, Such as South Korea; US encouragement of 
Central Asian energy development while playing down Russian role in this; 
and the US efforts to retain strategic importance in the Western Pacific 
highlighted the diminished position of Russia in US regional security 
calculations. The changes influenced the Russia foreign policy. 
However, the requirements of Moscow and New Delhi in the defense 
field happened to be mutually complementary, and strong relationship was 
buih over four decades. As Victor Komardin, the Deputy Director of 
Rosoboroncxporl remarked in a seminar in New Delhi in 2002, "The history of 
Russia forced the country to develop its military industry and science. . .The 
Russian defense sector provided armament and war equipment not only for the 
Russian Armed Forces but also for the armed forces of friendly states."^^ 
Russia as the main successor state of the Soviet Union inherited the 
lion's share of the Soviet Military Industrial Complex (MIC). It comprised of 
around 2000 enterprises, more than 900 research organizations and design 
centers and a work force of roughly 5 million. It was mainly the MIC along 
with the large energy sector that could compete in the world market. Arms 
exports were considered crucial for the very survival of the cash-starved 
defense industries owing to the paucity of domestic defense orders' India and 
China emerged as the two major buyers of Russian military equipment.^^ 
Following the demise of the Soviet Union, many defense plants closed 
down and thousands of highly qualified scientists and technicians emigrated 
abroad. The pressing requirement of India at the time was to ensure the supply 
of spare parts. Various Indian 'logistic delegations' were deputed to scour 
about the defense factories or original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
scattered all over the former Soviet space literally with suitcases full of dollars 
in search of spare parts that were hard to come by in the confusion following 
the Soviet collapse. India, understandably, did not buy new weapon .systems 
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from Russia during this period. Up to 1996-97, the major part of arms transfers 
from Russia or their production under license in India consisted of the order 
given to the former Soviet Union. The fact that Russia had buckled under US 
pressure in 1993 on the Cryogenic deal also created doubts about the reliability 
of Russia as a defense supplier, although both India and Russia did see to it that 
the incident did not mar their friendly ties. 
The Cryogenic Deal 
The agreement on Joint development of cryogenic booster unit was 
signed by the Soviet Space Agency Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO) in 1991. The contract valued at 2.35 billion rupees 
provided for the transfer of Soviet cryogenic space technology to India and for 
training of Indian specialists.'^ ^ 
Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union had declared that it would 
abide by all the treaties and agreements signed by the latter. During his India's 
visit President Yeltsin had openly committed himself to stick to the deal despite 
the U.S. pressure. At stake was Russia's credibility as a reliable business 
partner as well as its substantial commercial interests. The Indian contract was 
a major order with Glavkosmos the canceling of which would have placed the 
Russian space agency in dire financial straits. The USA objected to the 
agreement on the ground that it was in violation of Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR). According to the USA the technology involved in cryogenic 
engines was of dual use. It could also be used for developing ballistic missiles. 
However, it was stressed that in entering into the agreement both India and 
Russia were fully committed to this technology not being used for the 
development of ballistic missiles. 
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It was widely felt that the U.S. pressure on Russia to shelve the deal was 
also partly dictated by the U.S. commercial interests. The Russians felt that the 
USA did not want Russia to become a competitor in the world market of 
advanced technologies. It was also apparent that the USA did not want India — 
a prominent Third World country, to join the club of "space faring powers."^° 
Indian media commented widely that the USA did not want India to emerge as 
a possible competitor in future in the lucrative and upcoming satellite launch 
market by acquiring the capability of providing cheaper launch facilities.'' It 
seemed a part of the broader Western design to keep the Third World countries 
permanently shackled in an unequal and unfair system. 
Despite his brave words in New Delhi in January 1993 that Russia 
would go ahead with the cryogenic deal, President Boris Yeltsin succumbed to 
the U.S. pressure when he met the U.S. President Clinton in Tokyo in June on 
the occasion of G-7 summit. A spokesman of the U.S. State Department 
thereafter curtly declared that Russia would sell a few rocket engines to India 
but halt the transfer of technology. Because of grave economic situation and 
political uncertainties at home. President Yeltsin's need for Western economic 
and political aid was particularly great. He had reasons to be satisfied with the 
hefty aid packet offered. 
The manner in which Indo-Russian cryogenic deal was scuttled made it 
glaringly apparent to the whole world that the USA was calling the shots and 
Russia, the successor state of the once mighty super power was meekly 
obeying. It was quite shocking and not easily palatable to a sizeable section of 
vocal opinion in Russia. Nezavisimaya Gazett, an independent centrist 
newspaper ruefully remarked that during the past two years relations between 
Moscow and New Delhi were governed not by Russia's own interests but in 
accordance with U.S. policy objectives."^^ 
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What followed made the divisions and cleavages within the Russian 
establishment open and apparent for everyone to see. Thus, the Russian 
Foreign Ministry and the President's staff on the one hand and the Russian 
Parliament and the space agency, Glavkosmos, on the other hand seemed to be 
speaking in different voices. The Russian Foreign Ministry hastened to send a 
note to the then Indian Ambassador in Moscow, Ronen Sen, conveying 
Glavkosmos's inability to fulfill the contract. But it was not corroborated by a 
government order which is usually the case. In fact, Alexander Dunayev, the 
Head of Glavkosmos, was not acquainted with the government's decision of 
freezing or annulling the Indo-Russian contract. Dunayev told the 
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Foreign Ministry had no 
right to declare a change in the Indian deal without a formal permission from 
the government. He further added that Glavkosmos intended to continue full 
scale deliveries to India, including technology, until the government makes a 
decision.'''* The Speaker of the Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov remarked that if 
the Russian-Indian contract was cancelled, it would be Russia's national 
disgrace. Many in Russia tended to agree with him. 
The Indian contract worth 350 million dollars was a major order for 
Glavkosmos at a time when sources of government funding of the space agency 
were shrinking. Apprehensions were felt that backtracking from Indo-Russian 
space deal might adversely affect Indo-Russian cooperation in economic and 
military fields. It was felt that it could have a negative impact on Russia's 
general image as a business partner and a source of defence purchases among 
the Third World countries. It could have a negative impact on the recently-
concluded Russia-Malaysia agreement for the sale of Russian MIG-29 military 
aircraft, which were to be serviced in India. India was also to train Malaysian 
Air Force pilots. 
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In the absence of clear government order to this effect hopes were 
entertained for some time that the contract might not be cancelled after all. On 
22 July Russian Parliament voted for a resolution that required Parliamentary 
ratification of any agreements reached by the government relating to MTCR. 
The Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and International & 
Economic Relations was to conduct hearing on the Indian contract. 
In the meanwhile amidst reports of persistent, on U.S. Pressure Russia 
agreed to join the MTCR in early September 1993 at the time of Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin's U.S. visit. All Russian contracts with the third 
countries were to be revised. And the USA was to get full information on such 
contracts signed since 1990. 
India drew her own conclusions. It was clear that on NPT and MTCR 
Russia had chosen to stand solidly with the West. It was also noted that the new 
Russian nuclear doctrine adopted by the Russian Security Council in November 
1993 was almost identical with the nuclear doctrines of U.S., U.K. and France. 
Since 1982 the former Soviet Union had struck to the principle of 'no first use' 
of nuclear weapons. However, the new Russian security policy authorized 
Russian forces to strike first with nuclear weapons in case of aggression against 
the Russian Federation and 'its allies', which meant, as the Defence Minister 
Pavel Grachev made it clear, the other CIS countries. Russia was, thus, taking 
upon itself the defence of the former Soviet space. Moreover, as Russia was 
reducing its defence expenditure and making its armed forces leaner and 
meaner, it moved closer to the NATO doctrine on nuclear deterrence. In India 
it was seen as Russia backing away from the Delhi Declaration signed by Rajiv 
Gandhi and Gorbachev banning the use of and threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. Ironically, this change in Russian nuclear doctrine took place at a 
time when it openly aligned itself with the West in putting pressure on India for 
signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which India regarded as grossly 
170 
discriminatory."*"^  Indians realized that there were clear limits to Indo-Kussian 
cooperation involving sensitive areas of technology and defence. Unlike the 
former Soviet Union, Russia was not an independent power centre and did not 
wish to antagonize the West for the sake of a Third World ally. Protecting 
Russia's vital interests, particularly in the former Soviet space, would perhaps 
induce Moscow to resist the Western pressure. Relations with India obviously 
did not fall within the parameters of core Russian interests. 
Russians were keen to ensure that while they complied with the U.S. 
desire to modify the cryogenic deal with India llicy should he ;idcc|iialcly 
compensated for the financial losses they were likely to incur. Thus, it was 
reported that the USA offered Russia by way of compensation for the loss of 
Indian deal bidding rights for launching nearly a dozen commercial satellites in 
the coming six years at 40-70 million dollars a piece. Russia was also promised 
help in the construction of the international space station ' Freedom.'^ ^ 
As regarded India and Russia, the two sides subsequently displayed 
maturity and realism and reached a compromise solution, Russia was to 
withhold from passing on to India those elements of technology that could be 
used for dual purposes —civil as well as military. But the technology not 
considered dual purpose was to be transferred. For the balance of money 
Glavkosmos was to provide India two additional rocket engines. The first 
Russian cryogenic booster units were to be handed over to Indian Space 
Research Organization in 1966.^ ^ 
The government of India put up a brave face on the entire episode and 
declared that it would push ahead with the indigenous development of the 
requisite technology. It was declared that as a consequence of watering down 
of Indo-Russian deal and withholding of the crucial technology by the latter, 
Indian programme would at the most be put back. 
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Moscow Regains Position as a Reliable Partner 
During Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's New Delhi visit in 
December 1998, the two countries extended the long-term agreement on 
military technical co-operation up to the year 2010. The agreement envisaged 
shifting the emphasis from buyer-seller relationship to the joint development of 
new technologies.^ * The two countries are at present co-operating under this 
programme. Following his return from Moscow in November 2005, Defense 
Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicated that after 2010 the progress of Indo-
Russian defense co-operation will be reviewed and the two may go in for 
another 10-year programmer.^ ^ 
As the country's Prime Minister in 1999, Vladimir Putin observed that 
only 20 per cent of Russian defense industry plants were ftinctioning and that 
many were about to be closed. After taking over the presidency in 2000, Putin 
critically noted that Russia's MIC was archaic and that it did not correspond to 
the contemporary military-political tasks of the country.''^  He took measures to 
revive and restructure the MIC through consolidation and amalgamation into 
viable and profit-making conglomerates. The objective was to create about 50 
vertically integrated defense holdings and concerns with different forms of 
ownership. As a result, it appears that a substantial part of Russia's MIC has 
been salvaged and the country has emerged as the second biggest arms exporter 
after the US. In fact, during 2000-2004, Russia was the largest exporter of 
conventional weapons, while during 1999-2003, the US was the largest 
exporter ahead of Russia.'" 
Major Weapon Systems Purchased from Russia 
The major weapon systems acquired or contracted from Russia in the 
last five years include Su-30MKI multi-role fighter aircraft, 11-78 tanker 
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aircraft to be used as platform for Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS), Mi-I 7-IV military transport helicopters, R-77 air-to-air missiles, 
Kilo class/type 877E submarines, frigates, Ka-31 Helix airborne early warning 
helicopters, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, MiG-29K, including MiG-
29KUB version for use on aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, Ka-27PL (Ka-28 
version) and Ka-31 helicopters; T-90 tanks, fire control radar, air and sea 
surveillance radar, combat radar, aircraft radar, anti-tank and anti- ship 
missiles, etc.''^  
The heavy weaponry listed above is basically meant to deter adventurism 
on the part of India's potential adversaries as well as to project power. In fact, 
there is a general consensus in the country's strategic community that a country 
of India's size and vulnerabilities must project power, especially so in the 
Indian Ocean region. The value of projects under the current long-term defense 
co-operation programme up to 2010 is generally agreed to be around $9-10 
billion.^ ^ 
Signing of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Agreement 
The bane of the Indian defence establishment is the failure to develop 
indigenous weapon systems of the requisite quality within the planned time. 
Russian equipment was purchased in bulk as a stopgap arrangement in the hope 
that it will be replaced by indigenous MBTs and LCAs. This did not materialise 
and a dependency has been created on imported hardware. 
For the past couple of years, Russia had been insisting that India sign the 
IPR agreement regarding defence co-operation. The agreement was finally 
signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Moscow in December 
2005. Apprehensive of India diversifying defence equipment sources, Russia 
was keen to safeguard its financial and intellectual property rights. The IPR 
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issue became a sore point. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov warned, 
"We will find it difficult to move forward in high-end defence technologies 
without an agreement on the protection of intellectual property. We will not 
hand over technologies for nothing. Russia is not Soviet Union."'*'' Russia also 
put pressure on New Delhi. India was warned that the doors of Russian defence 
factories would be shut to Indian military and technicians in the absence of an 
IPR agreement. In November 2005, Russia refused to transfer technology as 
part of its planned sale of Igla surface-to-air missile systems. IZarlier. in late 
September 2005, Russia said it would not give the technology along with the 
Smerch Multibarrel Rocket Launcher system and reduced the order from 69 
pieces to 46. 
Russia has conceded the Indian demand that the IPR provisions apply to 
future transactions only. The accord is intended to ensure that no technology is 
transferred to third countries and royalty is paid to Russia for work performed 
on Russian-built weapons by other countries. Reports suggest that the terms of 
IPR agreement also mention Russia as India's preferred supplier. Some Indian 
defence experts have cautioned against such a provision. However, India 
reportedly agreed to the clause as it is still "loo dependent on Russian arms 
supplies."''^ 
New Areas of Cooperation 
The two countries have signed several new agreements that will sustain 
cooperation through the coming years. 
Admiral Gorshkov (INS Vikramaditya) Deal 
India and Russia have come to an agreement on the much-publicised 
40,000-tonne aircraft carrier, under the Admiral Gorshkov agreement the 
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carrier will be refitted and modernised in Russia. It will be equipped with MiG-
29K fighters, Sea Harriers and Sea King, Ka-31 and Ka-28 helicopters. The 
price negotiations are continuing. Investment decisions would be made after a 
detailed project report is submitted by Russia While the carrier is a free gift 
from Russia, the refit package will cost about Rs 1.800 crore. This does not 
include the price of 46 naval MiG-29s that are also being bought with the 
aircraft carrier, which is expected to arrive in India by the end of 2008. The 
total cost is likely to be Rs 5,000 crore."^ 
Nuclear Submarine Issue 
The Gorshkov deal was reportedly a part of the package that included 
the lease of two 971 Shchuka-B or Akula class nuclear submarines and several 
strategic Tu-22 (NATO designation 'Backfire') bombers'* .^ Subsequently, 
Russia was reported to have backed out of the nuclear submarine deal so as not 
to displease the Americans.' The issue is in the news again. Citing Russian 
sources, Vladimir Radyuhin wrote in The Hindu (December 7, 2005) that the 
lease of nuclear-propelled submarines to India is in the pipeline. Under a $1.8-
billion contract for a ten-year lease, the Russian side has resumed the 
construction of the subs, which was frozen in the 1990s. In October 2005, 200 
Indian naval officers have started training at a submarine training centre at 
Sosnovij Bor near St. Petersburg. ^"^ Earlier, the Soviet Union had leased a 
nuclear-propelled submarine nicknamed Chakra to India from 1988 to 1991. 
The Navy is hopeful that the nuclear submarine will finally arrive. 
India has issued a global tender for the purchase of 126 multi-role 
fighter aircraft. The deal is worth $5-6 billion. Contenders are American F-16 
Falcon and F/A-18 Super Hornet, the Swedish .IAS-39 Gripen, the French 
Mirage-2000-5 and the Russian MiG-29M2.42 Russia will have to contend 
with other competitors. Rosoboron Service India Chairman Anatoly Negreev 
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candidly remarked, "Russia is worried about losing out to US, France and 
Israel. We need to be more competitive....India is our destiny." 
Joint Development of Weapons 
Not being in a position to finance the production of weapons on a large 
scale, Russia has offered to conduct "joint development and production" of 
weapon systems. From the mid-1990s onwards, it has become the lit motif in 
Indo-Russian dialogue. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov recently said, 
"We are prepared to transfer high technology to India in strategic tie-up based 
on a new pattern of defence cooperation."''^ From the Indian perspective, joint 
development and production of major weapon systems offers a significant 
advantages vis-a-vis earlier licensed production which only "taught us to 
assemble kits and subassemblies but not design and manufacture of 
components."^" 
Major Joint Development and Production Projects 
1. BrahMos 
The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile with the range of 280 km is 
based on 3M-55 Onyx missile designed by Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia. It 
is repeatedly cited as the shining example of joint research, development and 
production by India and Russia. The Indian Navy has already inducted the sea 
version of the missile. The land and air versions of the missile are in the 
process of development and likely induction. The Russian military so far has 
not inducted it. Russia needs to change its laws before its induction, which it 
has promised to do. The two countries have also decided to jointly market 
BrahMos to third countries by 2007, by which time India and Russia arc 
expected to finalise sale procedures and put into space at least 18 satellites 
under GLONASS to track the missile's movements.^' BrahMos is just one 
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example of joint collaboration. The IPR agreement has cleared the deck for 
more such projects. In view of difficulties and snags in the development of 
indigenous technologies, such collaboration might be the best way for India to 
acquire and develop new technologies. 
2. 5th Generation Fighter Aircraft 
For several years, the two sides have been considering joint 
development of the generation multi-role fighter aircraft and transport aircraft. 
The intention was reiterated during the December 2005 visit oJ' the Indian 
Prime Minister. The Russian government has already selected the Sukhoi 
aviation firm for the purpose and likewise allocated funds. However, the size of 
the Sukhoi aircraft does not find favour with Indians. RIA Novosti (January 18, 
2006) in one of its news report has argued that Moscow should develop both a 
light-engine plane and a heavy fighter. Russia needs a heavy-duty fighter as its 
weaponry and electronics have always been bulky. The Sukhoi-developed 5th 
generation fighter would be a heavy aircraft. Further, India and France might 
help Russia to develop a light-engine warplane, which could become popular in 
the international market. A competition is going on between the Sukhoi and 
MiG aviation firms in Russia. MiG proposes to build a lighter aircraft.^^ 
3. Medium Transport Aircraft Development Programme (MTA) 
The development of MTA has been assigned greater urgency in India. 
MTA negotiations began in the late 1990s and in 2000 the $700-million project 
became part of the 10-year Indian-Russian military-technical cooperation 
programme. The investment was shared between Russian aircraft maker Irkut 
and India's HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd). Subsequently, differences 
between the two came to light as the Russians wanted 19.5 tonnes of carrying 
capacity while the Indians are satisfied with 14-16 tonnes. Russia wants to 
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develop PS-12 engine to power the aircraft at the cost of $3-4 bilJion. The 
Indians are inclined to use French or US engines. Recent reports suggest the 
sides are close to agreement to resolve the issue. The cargo carrying capacity of 
the MTA will be 20 tonnes, but the Indian MTAs will be powered by Snecma 
Moteurs' CFM 56-7 Turbofans. Solutions for the glass cockpits will be 
considered from the French firm Thales. lAF will acquire 45 and the Russian 
side 60 units.^ ^ 
4. Co-operation in Space - the GLONASS 
During President Putin's visit to India in December 2004, an agreement 
was signed between Roskosmos and ISRO on the joint use of the Soviet- era 
Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) by making it fully 
functional by joint efforts, including the launching of new Russian satellites 
from Indian launch pads with the help of Indian vehicles. The deal will reduce 
India's dependence on the US GPS (Global Positioning System), which may be 
denied in times of conflict. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 
December 2005 Moscow visit, an agreement was signed on measures to protect 
technology during long-term co-operation in joint development, operation and 
use of the GLONASS for peaceful purposes. Vladimir Radyuhin, however, 
opines that GLONASS shall be used by both the countries for civil as well as 
military purposes.^ '* 
Joint Military Exercises 
During past couple of years, Indo-US military-to-military co-operation 
has greatly expanded. In contrast, Indo-Russian defence co-operation has 
largely been in the military-technical field. Recently, Russia also has shown 
greater interest in boosting military-to-military ties. In October 2005, the two 
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armies and navies held joint exercises in the desert of Rajasthan and off the 
coast of Vishakhapatnam, respectively.^^ 
Defence Deals 
T-90 Tanks 
India will also purchase 310 front-line T-90 main battle tanks. The 
Rs. 3,000 crore ($705 mn) T-90 deals include the outright purchase of 124 
tanks while the remaining 186 will be partly assembled and partly produced in 
India. This contract also includes transfer of technology, overhauling, and 
probable joint manufacturing and marketing of the tank to other countries. 
India would also acquire complete technology transfer of the state-of-the 
art tank with missile-firing capability for indigenous manufacture. There had 
been extended price negotiations on the equipment, necessitating the defence 
minister's visit to Russia as well. 
The 310 T-90 tanks - which add up to five armoured regiments - have 
been necessitated due to delays in the indigenously developed Arjun main 
battle tank and will seek to offset the acquisition of a like number of 1-80 UD 
tanks by Pakistan two years ago. 
Tu-22 Bombers 
In addition, the two sides have reached an agreement on the lease of four 
Tu-22 'Backfire' bombers, a maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft fitted 
with 300km range air- to-ground missiles and capable of flying at three times 
the speed of sound. 
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The agreement on leasing the Tu-22s is a major breakthrough as the 
Russians had earlier been raising objections to its use in case of war owing to 
impediments posed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Su-30 Fighters 
A special feature of the Su-30 agreement is the joint production, joint 
marketing and buy-back of equipment manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics 
Ltd (HAL) by Russian production agencies. The Su-30 agreement further 
provides for licensed production of additional engines, airborne cquipniciU, 
setting up of repair and overhauling facilities and setting up of production 
facilities. It is planned to produce at least 150 Su-30s at HAL. 
Russia is ready to cooperate with India In building a super-fighter jet of 
the 21 century. The Sukhoi Corporation has already made some headway in 
developing the fifth- generation fighter jet. It has built an experimental Su-37, 
which serves as flying laboratory for testing new technologies. 
Other Purchases 
Military cooperation between the two countries started more than three 
decades ago. It is estimated that more than half of the armaments the Indian 
Army are of either Soviet or Russian make. Out of the Army's 3,400 tanks, 
2,200 are of Russian origin: these include 700 T-55s and 1,500 T-72s. Eighty 
per cent of the Indian Air Force's (lAF) equipment and 85 per cent of the 
Navy's equipment are of Russian origin. According to estimates quoted in the 
Russian media, Russia annually sells military equipment worth more than $1 
billion to India, The defence agreements signed with India since 1998 - which 
Includes the deal to supply 40 state-of-the-art Su-30 fighters - are expected to 
fetch for Russia $4 billion annually. 
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Land Systems 
India has signed a contract to buy 1,000 Russian laser-guided 155mm 
Krasnopol-M rounds and 10 laser rangefmders for Rs 1.49 billion ($345.5 
million) to give its artillery a precision-targeting capability. 
The agreement with KBP Instrument Making Design Bureau, signed in 
Aug 2000, Is subject to the successful high- altitude test firing of the projectiles 
by the Bofors FH77B 155mm towed howitzer. They were successfully test 
fired in the western Rajasthan desert earlier in 1999. However, they reportedly 
failed to perfomi adequately during trials in northern Kashmir's mountainous 
region. 
Naval Systems 
During Russian defence minister Igor Sergeyev's visit to India in March 
2000, the two sides had detailed discussions about the prospects of equipping 
the Indian Navy with Kilo and Amur Class submarines. 
The Navy has taken delivery of the second Kilo class submarine built by 
Russia, INS Sindhushastra, worth $200 million. Russian shipyards are also 
arming the old Kilo submarines of the Navy with long-range missiles. Three 
new Krivak class frigates are being buih for the Indian Navy in Russia and the 
price of each is estimated to be around $800 million. 
Two of the Indian Navy's Russian-buih Sindhughosh-class (Kilo Type 
877EKM/636) patrol submarines will be armed with the latest Russian 3M-
54E1 anti-ship missiles (ASMs). 
Two submarines are now at the Admiral Teyskiye Verfi Shipyard in St 
Petersburg for modernisation. The upgrade includes arming the submarines 
with the 3M-54E1 missiles, developed by the Novator Design Bureau. 
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A lO"' submarine of this class that is under construction at the yard is 
also expected to have a missile-firing capability fitted. Vertically-launched 
versions of the 3M-54EI will arm three improved Krivak Ill-class (Project 
1135.6) frigates that are under construction for the Indian Navy at the Baltiisky 
Shipyard in St Petersburg. Each frigate will boast eight 3M-54E anti-ship 
missiles. The hull of the first ship is already built; the keel of the second has 
been laid. 
India's decision to place orders with Russia for three battleships, the 
first of which would soon be joining the Indian Navy and christened lulwar, 
makes it very clear that the crumbling of the Soviet Union during the Eighties 
has made no difference to the continuance of Indo-Russian cooperation in all 
areas including the crucial defence sector. The present agreement is for the sale 
of frigates by Russia being built under a $1 billion contract to be completed by 
2003. It imparts continuity to Indo-Russian naval cooperation, which began in 
the Sixties. An earlier proposal for the purchase of two 877 EKM submarines 
from Russia was based on a modality of payments in stages. They were 
intended to replace the Foxtrot submarines, which became due for 
decommissioning, and maintain the levels of submarine presence in the Indian 
Navy. 
Air Force Requirements 
India has already signed a contract worth $170 million for 40 Mi-17-IB 
helicopters. Femandes, during his visit to Moscow in June 2000 said that the 
contract for the helicopters was the second most important one signed by the 
government after the Sukhoi deal of 1996. 
The Indian government was interested in buying the A-50/ A-50U 
airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft built by Russia. India is 
trying to get the AEW&C capability because of the crash of its Airborne 
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Surveillance Warning and Control (ASWAC) prototype aircraft in January 
1999. Russia has offered to deliver one A-50 version of the plane immediately 
and two upgraded versions within two years. There has been a test flight of the 
plane in Chandigarh. The A-50-U can take up to 100 targets simultaneously 
and it is said to have a detection range of around 230km against the MiG-2 1 
type aircraft and a range of around 800km against missiles. India also plans to 
buy the S-300 air defence missile system from Russia.^^ 
Moscow Adjusting to Change 
The competition for a share of the Indian arms market is growing among 
major suppliers. The post-Pokhran sanctions on India by the US were removed 
in November 2001. Israel has emerged as the second biggest arms exporter to 
India after Russia. Diversification ensures that a country can not be held to 
ransom by a sole supplier. It can also lead to lower prices as well as access to 
various technologies. However, diverse suppliers cause the problem of 
interoperability of different types of equipment, while a single source of supply 
leads to standardisation of equipment. On their part, the Indian armed forces 
have the experience of using and integrating different types of equipment. 
Moscow had previously balked at India's attempts to diversify arms 
supply, especially when India opted for the British Hawk AJT (Advanced Jet 
Trainer) instead of MiG-AT. But, Russia appears to have finally reconciled to 
the inevitable change. A PTI dispatch from Moscow on January 18, 2004, 
quoted the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying: "We had never 
planned to monopolise the Indian (arms) market. Depending only on one 
source is bad for any armed forces, it leads to their degradation."^^ Ivanov said 
that Russia understands India's desire to get the best available technology and 
welcomes it, and has to compete by offering the best technology. Referring to 
the Israeli Phalcon radar deal that would be fitted into 11-78 tanker aircraft, he 
added that Moscow was not averse to ties with third parties while working on 
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Indian defence orders. He also referred to the French and IsraeH systems 
having been incorporated in Su30 MKI multi-role fighter aircraft designed and 
developed for India. The Russian defence industry itself is changing, for 
instance, Russian NPO Saturn and French Snecma have set up a joint venture 
called Power Jet that produces SaM 146 aircraft engines. The engine is 
believed to "represent all the latest know-how."^^ The European Aerospace and 
Defence System (EADS) has purchased a 10 per cent stake in Russia's Irkut 
aviation company. 
Owing to past legacy and long-term dependence, Russia is likely to 
remain a major defence partner. In a keynote address to the General Staff 
Academy of the Russian Armed Forces, the Indian Defence Minister said that 
Russia "has been, and remains the largest source of our arms, weapon systems 
and technology imports." He emphasised that the recent strengthening of 
defence ties with many countries "is not at the expense of our traditional 
friendly relations with Russia which remain unique, time- tested and 
steadfast."^^ Even if no new weapons are purchased, India will continue to need 
spare parts for the weaponry of Soviet/Russian origin and also depend on 
Russia for their upgrades and modernisation. The license production of 140 Su-
30 MKI under a $3.5 billion deal, itself will go on till 2017-2018. 
While diversifying arms acquisitions, India would not like to risk the 
derailment of the current system that may pose potential security hazards in the 
near term. India would like to maintain its strategic autonomy and decide each 
issue on the basis of merit and from the standpoint of India's national interests. 
Steps have been taken of late to streamline defence acquisition procedure and 
make it more transparent, speedy and accountable.^ " 
Co-operation with Russia has made a vitally important contribution to 
the development of Indian defence potential, ft has given India access to 
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sophisticated weapons and advanced technologies at a time when others were 
not willing. The defence cooperation reflected the convergence of their larger 
geopolitical interests. In the post-Soviet difficult transition period, arms 
purchases by India and China have helped the Russian MIC to tide over the 
crisis and survive. As a major arms supplier to both India and China, Russia 
has been persistently pressing for 'triangular' cooperation among Russia, China 
and India. However, despite the recent improvement in India's relations with 
China, in view of the disputed status of the Sino-lndian border and other 
security concerns, India cannot afford to lower its guard. Russian arms supply 
to China and the possibility of further transfer of Russian arms and technology 
to Pakistan through China, do add to New Delhi's worries. At the same time, if 
India distances itself, it may make Russia even more dependent on China. '^' 
No country can be fully self-reliant in all areas of defence-related 
technology. Moreover, the today trend is towards joint development and 
production of defence equipment. According to the emerging opinion in the 
Indian strategic community the country must be self-reliant in areas where 
technology denial regimes are imposed, like nuclear and missile technologies. 
India may concentrate on developing and further expanding the areas of her 
core competence. In other areas, the country may opt for overseas partners, 
including Russia. Joint development and production of new weapon systems 
may emerge as a very promising area of continued Indo-Russian cooperation. It 
may provide continuity and stability to existing ties. Advanced avionics and 
electronic systems developed by Western countries and Israel may also be 
incorporated as is already being done. Competition among the suppliers may 
indeed be good and has already produced beneficial results. There is a need to 
handle the emerging situation with dexterity and savoir by giving attention to 
details and nuances. In the pursuit of its enlightened national interests, it is to 
be expected that India would seek to leverage its position as a major defence 
buyer, and so would Russia as a supplier. 
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In the 21st century geopolitical scenario, all the major actors are 
engaging each other. Nonetheless, India's ties with Russia will continue to be 
driven by not only common strategic and geopolitical interests but also shared 
interest in the defence sector. They would, however, need to adjust policies 
wherever necessary for enhancing mutual gains in this vital sector if they want 
to sustain a robust relationship in the new global environment. 
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and cooperation was made. In spite of the earlier Soviet indifference and basic 
differences in Socio-political systems of the two countries, mutual relations 
improved markedly from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which 
demanded India to move closer to the USSR. India's attitude towards the 
USSR has been derived from its overall foreign policy objectives. In 
understanding and evaluating this attitude, it is therefore, indispensable to keep 
in view two important considerations: first, the assumptions, motivations, style, 
basic goals and the principles of India's foreign policy which governed her 
relations with other States in general; second, the specific goals which India 
sought to achieve in her relations with the USSR. It is the inter-relationship 
between the general and the particular objectives and the degree of their 
combination as well as contradiction that give us an idea of the various phases 
of India's relations with the USSR. Such an analysis, however, should not be 
restricted merely to the conceptual level. The interaction of such other factors 
as intimate geographical, historical and economic ties between the two Slates, 
the influence of external factors and the failure or success of Indian diplomacy 
at the international level should also constitute a part of the analysis. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, popularly known as the architect of India's foreign 
policy, had a clear idea of what a country's foreign policy shall be. It must sub 
serve its interests, both economic and political. India under Nehru's leadership 
decided to expedite an historical process which by the very fact of India's 
independence was known to be well under way. India rcaMscd the difficulties, 
the non-self-governing people were facing in overthrowing the colonial rule. 
The achievement of freedom by India made it necessary for her to follow a 
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policy of resisting colonialism throughout the world. The opposition to 
colonialism in turn is directed to lend help and support to the dependent 
peoples in the achievement of their freedom. This policy was manifested in the 
Asian Relations Conference, the Asian Conference on Indonesia, and in the 
meetings of the Colombo Powers which initiated the Bangdung Conference. 
Nevertheless, a closer examination of India's foreign policy in this regard 
reveals that in everyone of these cases whether in her support to independence 
movements as in Indonesia or her hesitation to support them fully, as in the 
initial stages of the Suez Crisis, India's policy has been first of all a policy of 
protecting her security and other vital interests. India demonstrated selectivity 
in championing the causes of dependent peoples. She refused to condemn 
Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe. India's attitude towards the Soviet 
colonialism was the product of the lack of experience with the Soviet Union as 
against the experience with Western colonialism. In fact, India's championship 
of subjected people was not based on moral grounds alone. It was part of 
India's strategy to safeguard India's independence and security. 
In September 1954, the Soviet Union made an unexpected and dramatic 
offer to build a giant slccl plant in India to help India and to develop its iron 
and steel industry. Nehru welcomed the Soviet offer and indicated India's 
readiness to accept the Soviet aid because Soviet help would "go a long 
way in the rapid industrialization of our country". He also regarded the Soviet 
offer as a welcome alternative source for the supply of capital and machinery 
and also a bargaining counter to the West. On 2nd February 1955 the USSR 
and India signed an economic agreement providing the Soviet assistance for the 
construction of a giant steel mill at Bhilai. The agreement came at a time when 
a negotiation with Britain for another steel plant was bogged down on technical 
grounds. 
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The Soviet support to India's claims on Goa had been made public from 
the very outset. During their 1955 visit, the Soviet leaders had expressed the 
hope that Goa would soon become a part of India. The Soviet President 
Brezhnev, who was on a state visit to India at the time of Goa operation 
declared in Bombay that the Soviet Union had complete sympathy for the 
Indian people's desire to liberate Goa, Daman and Diu from Portuguese 
colonialism. On 8 December 1961the day the world learnt of the liberation 
Brezhnev assured a civic reception of firm Soviet support for the action. The 
Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev sent a telegram to Nehru saying that the 
resolute action of the Government of India to do away with the outposts of 
colonialism in its territory was absolutely lawful and justified." He declared 
that the Soviet people unanimously approve of these actions. When the 
Westerners brought forward a resolution in the Security Council to censure 
India, the USSR blocked it with a prompt Veto. The Soviet delegate contended 
that his vote 'represented a victory for the true principles of UN Charter: 
Today saw the expression of the will to defend colonial 
countries and peoples and their right to life, freedom 
and independence. 
The Indian Government and public were greatly appreciative of the 
profound sympathy and understanding of its aspirations by the USSR. The 
Soviet stand on Goa certainly helped in drawing India closer to the USSR and 
helped in consolidating the friendly ties. 
It may be said that a community of interests between India and the 
USSR resulted in the steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic 
support. India-USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests 
and similarity of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. 
Though, for different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence 
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in Asia, checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and 
NATO, and at a later stage, containing China. Almost through out this decade 
i.e. from 1953-1964, India had a sense of common purpose with the USSR. 
During this decade, the USSR remained India's principal source of strength in 
international affairs, as well as in her material needs. It goes to the credit of 
shrewd diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru that without entering into any formal 
treaty or alliance or giving the impression of being subservient to the USSR, he 
secured all from the USSR to suit the national interest of India. India under 
Nehru's stewardship always retained the freedom of action in her foreign 
policy. 
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dealt a blow 
to India's foreign policy framework. Events happened with such rapidity for 
which India had not prepared itself The shock was the more devastating as it 
was so unexpected and the collapse was so dramatic. India could not remain 
untouched of the consequences of the events taking place in international 
scenario. For India, the events in Soviet Union had been a major blow because 
changes in Soviet Union occurred at a time when India herself was going 
through a severe economic crisis and an internal turmoil of such a magnitude 
which changed the nature of the political complexion of India. 
Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the relations between the 
Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and there is a great scope 
for deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. The Indo-Russian relations are 
based on the strong foundations of good neighbourly ties, liberal political 
ideology, and convergence of national interests, geopolitical settings, economic 
opportunities and international interdependence. 
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Thus the 'collapse of the Soviet Union' leaves a vacuum in the 
international political system. The Soviet Union played an important role 
against imperialism and western expansionism. It supported national liberation 
movements and assisted in the development of several third world countries, 
which found themselves against the Western bloc of countries. 
Some important steps were taken to sort out these problems as early as 
January 1993 by the then President Boris Yeltsin when he visited India. He 
tried to recreate the spirit of the Indo-Soviet friendship. During the visit he 
conveyed the impression that Russia put a high value on Indo-Russian 
relations. He described India and Russia as natural partners and that the Indian 
and Russian interests were identical. Significantly, he reiterated Russian 
support for India's position in Kashmir. At the same time India was turning 
again to Moscow with a long and expensive list for modern weaponry and 
hence emerged as the largest arm purchaser from Russia. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has affected India adversely in many 
sectors. Indeed, strategically speaking, the most important implications are in 
defense and military areas. India, as we know, was buying a very large number 
of military weapons, equipment and hardware from the Soviet Union. These 
included Mig fighter aircrafts, battle tanks, submarines etc. During 1986-90, 
according to one estimate, about 73 percent of the total value of arms imported 
by the Indian defense forces originated in the Soviet Union. Practical 
difficulties which confront Indian armed forces since 1991 include, 
replacement of the spare parts as well as replenishment of the existing stock. 
The matter assumed such a seriousness that the Defense Minister of India, 
Sharad Pawar, had to rush to Russia in September 1992 to bail out the armed 
forces of its immediate difficulties. At the end of the visit while there was some 
hope in the improvement of the situation, it was evident that ultimately India 
195 
will have to explore alternate sources. Moscow, it is argued, may not be in a 
position to meet the Indian demands as paucity of funds may force Russians to 
close down their units. Besides, many of the Russian scientists and technocrats 
are reported to have left the country and got jobs in the Western countries 
where they are promised better salaries and employment opportunities. 
Whatever, existing military weapons and hardware are in stock in the member 
states of CIS. They would like to sell them in the Western markets In order to 
earn foreign exchange. Above all, one significant advantage which accrued to 
India in procuring armaments and equipment from the Soviet Union i.e., on 
credit, is most unlikely to be revived. 
Although Russia has put forward a proposal of military collaboration 
with India, but the harsh reality was that Moscow did not feel the strategic need 
of India in the post Cold War era. As a matter of fact decline in the strategic 
significance of India to Moscow began with the improvement of relations 
between the Soviet Union and China. Moreover, when Gorbachev started 
giving priority to good relations with the West which was to provide loans and 
technologies, there was a sea change in the geo-strategic perceptions of the 
Soviet Union. When Russia was strategically integrated with Europe and China 
has ceased to be a socialist rival, need for a strategic consensus with India did 
not have the same relevance as in the previous two decades. In brief, 
diplomatically India cannot hope to depend on Russia to the same extent as she 
did on the Soviet Union. 
Gradually the obstacles were overcome to an extent, and from 1997 
onwards Russia was again on the way towards establishing a special position 
for the supply of defense-related equipment. 
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India and Russia decided in March 1997 to continue defense tics into tlie 
21st century and Russia offered a new air defense system and a $10 billion 
military deal. Significant agreements were reached during Yevgeny Primakov's 
visit in December (1999) when cross-century defense relationship was 
formalized. Described as "cooperation 2010 Document" it envisaged 
partnership in research, development and joint production of sophisticated 
equipment besides incorporating other defense areas. 
The Soviet Union was succeeded by the Russian federation and the 
people in Russia went through traumatic experience which has yet to end. 
Slowly and gradually the pieces are being picked and a surer policy is being 
established. It has certainly been a painful experience, the almost precipitous 
lowering of living standards, the fall in production, the amazing rise in 
unemployment and the equally amazing levels of corruption, the decline in 
central authority, the specter of the ugly face of the mafia, the increasing 
disparities and so on. 
The worst is perhaps not yet over, but at least now there is a semblance 
of order and some re-establishment of central authority. The wheels of 
production have started moving although even the previous levels have not 
been achieved. At least foreign policy assumed some recognizable shape and 
Russia has begun to assert itself in a somewhat more determined manner with 
better coherence and purposefulness. Both Moscow and New Delhi are 
discovering that geopolitical realties do not vanish even in the winds of change. 
The point does not need to be laboured that India had multifaceted and 
deep-going relationship with the Soviet Union which ranged from the political 
to economic and technological, and to strategic and security ties. It was a 
special and unique relationship. It was valuable to both countries for meeting 
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hostile external challenges; certainly for India the Soviet Union constituted 
irreplaceable counter-balancing force in facing up to its regional and 
international concerns and an added source of strength in pushing economic 
and scientific development. India had received valuable assistance in 
establishing a basic industrial infrastructure. 
The most concrete expression of the new thinking was provided during 
the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 
1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia China and 
India were able to form a regional bloc. A lot depends in the region on the 
policies of China, Russia and India, he said that India is a great power and our 
relationship is based on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two 
countries for stability in the world. Primakov also reiterated the Russian stand 
that Russia supports India's claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council. 
Many developments had and were taking place to reveal the identity of 
viewpoints as well as long term convergence of interests between New Delhi 
and Moscow. The events involving Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the bypassing of 
the United Nations, the devastation of Iraq, the spread of religious fanaticism, 
the Kargil war all these happenings continued to bring them together. 
A major change took place after the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament 
on 13 December 2001, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned Pakistan, in strict 
terms, to stop cross-border terrorism and create conducive atmosphere for 
bilateral dialogue and consultation. To jointly tackle the menace of terrorism, 
during the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Moscow in November 2001, 
India and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration. They set up joint working 
group during the visit of President Putin to India in December 2002. Moscow 
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strongly condemned the terrorist attack that took place on 26 March 2003 in the 
Nandimarg village of Kashmir, killing more than twenty people. Besides 
condemning the terrorist attack, the Department of Information and Press of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry expressed its support to the measures taken by India 
to stop the activity of terrorist forces. 
Taking into account all these positive developments, it would be logical 
to emphasize the point that terrorism is one of the important contributory 
factors for perceptional convergence between the two countries. This 
convergence led Russia and India to support each other on their stands on 
Kashmir and Chechnya respectively. The Ministry of External Affairs in India 
praised the referendum of March 2003 in Chechnya, under the guidance of the 
Russian government as important for the restoration, normalization, 
rehabilitation and economic reconstruction of Russian Federation's Chechen 
republic within the democratic framework. Similarly, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry release after the general election in Kashmir in October 2002, said 
that, very fact of holding elections is an evidence of the striving of Delhi and 
the population of .lamniu and Kashmir to restore the normal situation in the 
state. Despite the attempts of the extremist elements to frighten the population 
of Kashmir, they could not hinder the voting. 
Putin's visit in December 2002 sealed a new special relationship 
between India and Russia. President Putin described that he was "the best 
friend of India". A statement endorsed by Prime Minister Vajpayee, describing 
the Russian leader as "a trusted friend of India". The Putin-Vajpayee summit 
produced a strong statement called upon Pakistan to fulfill its obligations by 
preventing infiltration of terrorists across the line of control and eliminating the 
infrastructure of terrorism as a pre-requisite for the renewal of peaceful 
dialogue. Russia unambiguously endorsed India's stand that the Shimla 
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Agreement and the Lahore declaration provide the sole framework within 
which any India-Pakistan dialogue should eventually take place. 
Significantly, on Iraq issue the two sides expressed complete unanimity 
of views, opposing unilateral use of force and supporting a comprehensive 
settlement of the issues only through political and diplomatic efforts under the 
UN aegis. 
To sum up it can be concluded that there is a great scope for deepening 
the Indo-Russian relations not only to create conditions for improving the 
socio-economic conditions of their people but also to play an important role in 
shaping the future world order. The unipolar world order which came into 
existence after the break-up of the Soviet Union can be replaced by the 
multipolar world order if India, Russia and China came closer to each other to 
counter the Anglo-American hegemony. This relationship is equally marked by 
the absence of any national irritants, no border disputes, and no negative legacy 
of history. The identity of their views on the political and economic order and 
on major international issues ensures that their 'strategic partnership' would 
contribute to play the role in shaping the 2V^ century world order. 
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